There are multiple international dynamics at play in Venezuela this week, particularly between the U.S., which is supporting the uprising of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido, and Russia, a supporter of the government of Nicolas Maduro.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a strong and unusually public allegation this week that President Maduro was ready to leave the country and that Russia had convinced him to stay. Russian officials denied it and called Washington’s ‘interference’ in the country a “most grave violation of international law.”
The Cipher Brief is fascinated by the dynamics at play and we tapped Cipher Brief expert and former member of CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service, Steven Hall, to talk about what’s going on behind the scenes in Venezuela.
The Cipher Brief: What are the Russians doing in Venezuela?
Hall: I think what we're seeing in Venezuela is an extension of a broader policy that Russia, that Putin, has been working on for at least the past five years. The first step in that policy is to divide and weaken internally the United States and the West. He's had some success with that. Certainly, in the United States, we find ourselves in one of the most polarizing political positions that we've been in in years which, of course, started with the Russians attacking our democracy and meddling in our election process and, of course, the inevitable ripple effect that we've seen over the past couple years in the Trump administration.
Russia has been very successful at confusing and causing a lack of focus, causing a lot of internal concerns, whether it's over the Mueller report or Barr's response, Russia has the United States very much wrapped around the axle and unfocused on world affairs. That then allows Putin a great deal of latitude to start a lot of trouble elsewhere. I think a good example of that, certainly not the only example, but a good example of that is in Venezuela. Of course, you've also got to look at Syria and eastern Ukraine, as well.
I think Venezuela is basically an example of Putin taking advantage of the chaos that he's created in the American political system to try to advance his own goals in the Western Hemisphere.
The Cipher Brief: How far is he willing to go in Venezuela? Do you believe he has specific goals that he's driving toward or is the Russian presence there just intended to sow discord in the U.S.’ backyard?
Hall: I think Putin has two goals in Venezuela. The first, is what you were just alluding to, which is showing the United States, the rest of the world, and the Russian population that Russia - and of course that means Putin - can extend and can project Russian geopolitical power throughout the world. That's a key goal for Putin. I think it matters a little bit less to him as to what the real effect is - just having the ability to project that power is a big win for Putin.
Whether you're talking about Venezuela or Syria, Putin can try to lay claim to that great power status, which is so important to not only Putin's psyche, personally, but also to the national Russian psychology of being a great power. That's one key thing, the projection of power. I think the second key thing that Putin is really interested in doing... And by the way, this part holds true for China as well, which is, of course, also deeply involved in Cuba, which is involved in Venezuela. Really, this holds true for any authoritarian regime, but Putin specifically remains convinced that it is the policy of the United States to try to undertake regime change in areas where the United States doesn't like the current government. Putin, of course, feels this personally, because he still believes that the Arab Spring and the subsequent revolutions, were all U.S. government plans to remove regimes, which could eventually happen in Moscow, too.
To the extent that Putin sees a situation where the U.S. is interested in regime change, when you've got President Trump and others in U.S. government saying, "Maduro needs to go, indeed, we recognize Guaidó as the President," that's a direct threat to authoritarians everywhere, but specifically to Putin who is convinced that, in the long run, the U.S. government wants to do the same thing in Moscow.
The Cipher Brief: What you're describing is a deeply insecure motivation that's driving him. Is that really what it comes down to? It seems today unlikely that the U.S. would ever be able to mount a successful regime change effort against a country like Russia; nor would the U.S. perhaps, want to. And your answer kind of characterizes Putin as deeply insecure about what he sees going on around him. Is it really just that simple?
Hall: It's funny that you ask that question, because I was a CIA guy, and an intelligence guy, for 30 years and I was not any great analyst on Russia, though I certainly benefited and understood those parts of the world that I served in and where I saw the intelligence coming from and I do remember posing almost the exact same question that you just asked me to a senior U.S. government official who spent his entire life working on Russia.
I remember asking, "How much of Russian foreign policy can we really ascribe to this, what seems to me, deep-seated national insecurity? Not only on Putin's level, but the Russian people at large? Is it really possible that Russian foreign policy is based on insecurity, as opposed to broader, deeper, more substantive geopolitical goals?" This senior official told me, "Yes, it’s actually insecurity." I was surprised and sort of taken aback by that.
I think there is a great deal of insecurity and, really, if you look at it objectively, it makes sense. There are now, I believe, five states in the U.S. that have larger economies than Russia; you've got significant economic challenges, not to mention demographic Asian issues in Russia; you've got whatever percentage, I think I read the other day it's over 25%, of Russians, it's probably more than that, who fall below the poverty line and don't even have indoor plumbing.
You do get a sense that not only Putin, but the Russian people, want to be taken more seriously and the way they do that is perhaps engaging in some place like Venezuela, as opposed to working on the Russian economy or something along those lines.
By the way, just compare it to the China situation, because China is a rising economy, it's a rising world power. Some of this I think is cultural, but they take a very, very long-term approach and, I'm not a China expert, but I sense a lot less insecurity on the part of Chinese leadership than I do the scratching and clawing that I see coming from the Russian leadership. It's one country sort of on the rise and another country slipping down the slope. Russia's just trying to scratch and claw any way it can to get back to, what it considers, to be its former greatness.
The Cipher Brief: With all the talk about China, when you consider the increased aggressiveness of their intelligence operations against the U.S., both traditional spying as well as the continued theft of intellectual property, there is an overwhelming message coming from this administration about the threat that China poses, but what you just said about Russia, to me, at least makes me ask the question, have we perhaps tipped the scales a little bit out of balance as it relates to these two threats?
Are we thinking about these threats the correct way or have we put too much stock in the threat that China faces and not enough in the threat that Russia faces, because of what's driving both of them?
Hall: I do think you can compare the two. One of the things for me that stands out is that China and the U.S. have a very strong mutual interest in making sure that the trade and economics between our two huge economies are not fundamentally disturbed and that we somehow get it right, because both countries have so much to lose.
I think China, probably more than the United States, has a lot to lose if we don't get the economics right between the two countries. That is a leverage that Russia simply does not have with the U.S. You can make an argument that Europe needs to pay a lot of attention to Russia, because of petroleum politics, making sure you get the Nord Stream North and the Nord Stream South, all the different pipeline distributions, and the geopolitical implications of that right. That simply doesn't hold true for the U.S. though. Our trade with Russia is so much smaller than it is with China. That means that while Russia can play a zero-sum game with the United States, they can try to make the United States lose and that is therefore a win for Russia, China kind of has not as much wiggle room. It doesn't have the luxury of playing that zero-sum game, at least not across the board. It's got to take into consideration what you just stated, which is a weak U.S. is really, over the long run, not good for China.
That said, China is at least as much of a threat to U.S. national security as Russia is; in a different way and in a different context. Again, economics are involved in that, but there's no doubt in terms of espionage, in terms of counter intelligence and just in terms of intellectual property theft. Not to mention the military efforts in the South China Sea and our regional partners there. China's a significant threat to the U.S.
The Cipher Brief: Back to Venezuela, we recently saw Secretary of State Mike Pompe pull the curtain back a little bit to say that the U.S. knew that Maduro's plane was on the runway esrlier this week, it knew he was planning to leave the country and that Russia interfered and caused him to stay. Then we saw National Security Advisor John Bolton come out on the front steps of the White House naming and shaming Maduro's inner circle.
What impact do you think that may have had in terms of the overall situation and how it plays out?
Hall: I thought it was fascinating that the claim was made that Maduro was ready to take off in his plane and head to Cuba. That certainly have been a good thing, not just for the Venezuelan people, but for the Western Hemisphere at large. The naming and shaming, to me, falls into a somewhat larger question as to, okay, so now what? You've got significant pushback, it would appear, to the Maduro regime, you've got at least the beginnings of some sort of coalescing behind Guaidó. You might make a distinction between how much internal support does he have, but he's also got significant external support in Latin America in addition to the U.S.. Whenever you've got the U.S. in agreement with a number of larger and more influential Latin American countries, Brazil being the best example of that, then you've got something that really any Latin American dictator needs to be worried about.
The standard fact, of course, in Latin America is well, ‘The American Yankee imperialists can't dictate how things are going to go, we're not their backyard.’ When you've got so many Latin American countries agreeing with the U.S. in this case, saying that Maduro is driving this, that’s significant. The question now is, how does the U.S. leverage that? If you're not careful, things can change very quickly. I think if you put American boots on the ground somehow in Venezuela, you're risking a lot of alienation. We really have to figure out a subtle way forward with Venezuela and subtlety is not something I would quickly ascribe to this administration.
Read more from Steven L. Hall in The Cipher Brief
