Almost a year ago, I was approached by an award-winning documentary director and lauded journalist, Richard Kerbaj. He was seeking insight and background on Al Qaida in Iraq and ISIS for a documentary film he was going to make for British Channel Four. The film was about the hunt for Mohammed Emwazi (known in the media as Jihadi John). What I expected to be an hour or so interview with Richard turned into an intense, but satisfying, all-day affair. I was pleased to support Richard’s effort to tell the tale of Emwazi’s brutality, the tragedy of those whom he murdered, and to give some voice to the voiceless officers who had done the hard, tough work to find, fix and finish this murderous terrorist. I have not seen the film but reviews from London indicate that Richard and his filmmakers have done an outstanding job capturing this needed-to-be-told story.
Emwazi was a Kuwaiti national who moved with his family to the United Kingdom in 1994 and grew up in west London, became radicalized and joined ISIS in Syria. He was part of an ISIS cell, dubbed by his hostages as “the Beatles,” and was in the forefront of ISIS’ propaganda campaign throughout the dissemination of his horrific beheading videos. Emwazi murdered more than seven hostages from the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan.
As the film was being released, the British media was producing a blizzard of articles and reporting on the Emwazi story; some somber and factual, others in the tradition of tabloid journalism. This is a very emotional story for the British people, less so for Americans, and I took note of the articles being published, even scanned one, and noticed a string of breathless headlines accompanying almost all of them.
When I retired from CIA, almost three years ago, I would have never expected to have had the media engagement I have had. Part of that is because of my time and service working with Mike Flynn as his Deputy at DIA, part of it is my writing as an expert for The Cipher Brief, some from speaking at Chatham House, and now from my limited participation in the Emwazi documentary. I think I’ve had more than my allotted “15 minutes of Warholian fame.”
Even though I spent most of my career staying out of the media glare, I firmly believe that having an open press is part of our country’s checks and balances and I abjure the Administration’s constantly-pushed notion that the media is the “enemy of the American people” and part of the “Deep State.” I also acknowledge though, that interaction with the media comes with some risk.
I learned a great lesson from my colleague and fellow Cipher Brief expert network member John Sipher. John told me his cardinal rule was to never talk on background and always speak on the record. His philosophy was that operating by these rules made you think more deeply about what you say and colleagues would always know you are not an “anonymous source.” I took John’s rule to heart and it has served me well over the past several years. I have also found journalists to be uniformly professional and very respectful of my personal equities. They have always been clear with their intent and have always shared with me the quotes they intend to use so I would have a heads up on context and how my input was being incorporated into their piece. I’ve had a very positive and constructive engagement with the U.S press.
Perhaps that’s why it came as some surprise when the British press published this flurry of articles (mostly derived from the film and interviews with participants on the British side).
Some of the media outlets used provocative headlines which would make the reader believe that for the Emwazi operation, I played the same role that Bill McRaven played in the Bin Laden operation. Further reading of the article and I presume, watching the documentary, will prove otherwise.
While I believe I was able to help Richard better understand the nature of the hunt and the hunters, I was very assiduous in avoiding any inference or implication that I had a deeper role than an observer of the overall U.S. counterterrorism effort. In fact, I was serving in the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time of the Emwazi operation and while frequently updated on the general efforts against senior ISIS operatives and leaders, I did not have access to the operational details, nor did I have any oversight or supervisory role. The fact of the matter is that having Emwazi share the space-time coordinates with a Hellfire missile was the end result of years of tedious and painstaking efforts by a talented, committed and dedicated team of professionals across the U.S. and UK intelligence communities. My concern was the British media headlines would appear to my colleagues across the U.S. Intelligence Community who were involved in the operation as appropriation of their hard work at the least, and outright exploitation of their dedication at the worst.
I learned several lessons out of this experience:
- One, there is a risk from engaging the media as they have a job to do and will do it the best way the can; to inform and to generate revenue for their publisher. I acknowledge there exists an argument on both sides regarding the probity of former officers interacting with the media and that this issue was a consequence of my decision to engage.
- Second, is that the media on our side of the Atlantic operates slightly differently than it does across the pond. I will remember that going forward.
- Third, even though I can control to a great degree how my quotes are used in a given article, what I cannot control is the headlines the editors will choose to use to showcase the article.
I am hoping my busy colleagues will not judge a story by its headline, but take the time to read the article. The operation to remove Emwazi from the battlefield was, at the time, a significant blow to ISIS and deserves appropriate exposure along with the professionalism which made it possible.
Read more from Doug Wise in The Cipher Brief
