The recent North Korean nuclear test and the subsequent disguised long-range missile test have seriously cornered China. The world community, especially the United States and South Korea, have urged China to take decisive actions to “punish” Pyongyang’s flagrant challenges to international norms and rules. Beijing, however, is reluctant to impose unilateral sanctions against Kim Jong-un’s regime. China says that it only supports multilateral measures initiated by the UN Security Council.
Beijing’s reluctance has not only triggered debates on its claim as a “responsible rising power” but also soured relations with Seoul and Washington, which argue that only China can effectively stop Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition. Indeed, China provides economic aids, in the form of fuel and food, to North Korea, and they are vital for sustaining its economy and society.
China has been countering international pressure by pushing the ball to the United States. According to the Chinese government, the world cannot expect China to unilaterally resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. Other stakeholders have responsibilities, too. Most importantly, as Beijing contends, the United States holds the key to the resolution of the issue.
According to Chinese diplomats and security experts, North Korea’s nuclear program is fundamentally driven by its fear of the United States. Thus, a resolution of the issue lies in their bilateral negotiations and improvement of mutual trust.
So is China behaving like a “responsible great power?” Does its claim that other stakeholders also have responsibilities hold any truth? Most important, does China have legitimate reasons not to impose harsh unilateral sanctions on Pyongyang?
To answer these questions, we need to understand China’s geostrategic motives in Northeast Asia. China’s current Korean Peninsula strategy reflects its concerns, in a realist world, of great power rivalries. Chinese strategic thinkers tend to believe that China’s rise has triggered increasing motives on the part of Washington to contain it from rising further. The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s encouragement of greater security roles for Tokyo are cited as evidence of malign U.S. intentions toward a rising China.
In this context of geostrategic conflicts, China, like any other great power in a similar situation, prefers to have a security buffer in the Korean Peninsula to insulate itself from direct military security challenges from the United States. This geostrategic logic of China’s Korean Peninsula strategy inevitably motivates Beijing to try to maintain the status quo in the Peninsula, which implies continuous economic aid to the Pyongyang regime to sustain its survival.
Indeed, one nightmarish scenario for Beijing’s strategic thinkers concerns the prospect of Korean Peninsula unification by Seoul, as its alliance with the United States could mean American military deployed across the Yalu River. Indeed, South Korean security experts and former diplomats all unequivocally maintain that a unified Korea must keep its military alliance with the United States.
In the eyes of Chinese strategic thinkers, China’s reluctance to impose harsh economic sanctions, which could indeed cripple the Pyongyang regime, does have a sound geostrategic rational that is consistent with its own national interests. But in the context of rising Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry, the last thing that Beijing wants to see is the deployment of American military at its doorstep.
Others need to see and recognize China’s legitimate geostrategic concerns. “Great power relations” between the United States and China are defined by mutual fear and mutual mistrust. The rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have indeed ushered in heightened strategic mistrust between them and intensifying conflicts in many places, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It is thus unreasonable to expect China to take actions that will ensure the weakening of its security buffer in the Korean Peninsula. Both Washington and Seoul need to be aware of Beijing’s legitimate strategic concerns that are dictated by an anarchic world order.
There is also certain truth in Beijing’s claim that Washington should share the responsibility of resolving the North Korean nuclear quagmire. After all, states pursue the nuclear option due to their insecurity. All existing nuclear states, including the U.S. and China, are driven by the same insecurity. North Korea is no exception. Its massive conventional military disadvantage versus the United States is the fundamental driver of its insecurity and its nuclear quest. In fact, every country in a similar situation would have done the same.
The Korean Peninsula is the last place where the Cold War has not ended. As a result, there exists profound mutual mistrust between North Korea on the one hand and the ROK-U.S. alliance on the other. Reducing mutual mistrust could be the first step necessary to motivate Pyongyang to at least agree to limit its nuclear program. It is therefor a reasonable claim on the part of Beijing that the United States needs to engage the Kim regime to improve their bilateral relations.
However, the Obama Administration has not done much in this regard. After the most recent nuclear test, Pyongyang said that it would consider de-nuclearization if Washington is willing to sign a peace treaty and establish normal diplomatic ties between the two countries. However, this call has been rejected by the Obama Administration.
The current Korean Peninsula quagmire represents a huge challenge to the international community. While it is reasonable for the world to expect Beijing to do more, other countries need to be aware of China’s legitimate geostrategic interests that are profoundly defined by great power rivalry, especially Sino-U.S. strategic conflicts. Moreover, the United States is a stakeholder in the issue, and its long-standing relationship of enmity with North Korea has partially contributed to the latter’s nuclear quest. So while China should do more, Washington also has responsibility.
