As President Barack Obama was meeting with leaders from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) this week, U.S. satellite imagery confirmed China has deployed surface-to-air missiles on an island in the Paracel chain in the South China Sea. The Paracel island chain is claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Vietnam. Though Beijing’s “island building” in the South China Sea have remained in the spotlight for months, few have acknowledged the military forces carrying out these actions, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the fundamental and structural changes occurring within them.
On paper, the PLA stacks up pretty well when compared to the U.S. military, with about a million more active military members and similar scaled land forces. Beijing has also been recently investing heavily in its naval fleet and now has an estimated 200 more vessels than the United States and a new submarine program. Beijing attempted to show the world just how strong the PLA is during last September’s Military Parade, which marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and involved more than 12,000 troops, 500 pieces of military hardware, and 200 various aircraft types. But in a competition that historically favors quality over quantity, size doesn’t always matter—particularly in today’s technology driven warfare.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has apparently come to understand this as well. Following the parade, President Xi announced the reduction of PLA troops by 300,000, and in December, he announced the total restructuring of the military towards a more Western-style, joint command.
“While the new organization is closer to a U.S.-style command structure, many significant differences remain,” former U.S. Army attaché to China, Dennis Blasko, told The Cipher Brief. Many of these differences stems from the “Party-State” nature of the PRC. The PLA is under the command of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. The Ministry of Defense, on the other hand, operates under the State Council, holds no authority over the PLA, and is limited to external coordination with foreign militaries. This system of political officers embedded within the military forces allows the Communist Party to control and dictate military ideology.
With the U.S. government constantly expressing alarm over Chinese military actions, it is easy to assume that the PLA is a highly professionalized military, and a force to be reckoned with. Still, the corruption and structural inadequacies remain limiting on PLA capabilities, which is why President Xi has made his military overhaul a top priority in achieving his “strong military dream” for China. Should the recent military reforms be successful in modernizing China’s military, the PLA may develop into a modern military, more capable of fighting, and winning, wars.
Just as the PLA’s military power is often exaggerated, so are China’s intelligence capabilities. The PLA set up an intelligence unit to commit cyber espionage, but five Chinese military officers from that unit were indicted in 2014 by the U.S. Justice Department for stealing technology from a number of American companies. As it is, many of the Chinese hackers are individuals who know Beijing won’t prosecute them for their actions, and may even encourage them to do so.
The PLA possesses the broadest set of collection capabilities of the various intelligence agencies in China, and controls most of China’s technical collection capabilities. Peter Mattis of the Jamestown Foundation told The Cipher Brief, “the PLA posts defense attachés to more than 100 countries and runs a clandestine human intelligence program that was responsible for all but one or two of the Chinese spies arrested in the United States since 2005.” And just as the organization of the PLA strategic and tactical components are undergoing reform, China’s military intelligence is being restructured to allow for better coordination abroad.
So far the most tangible reform in the military intelligence realm is the newly created Strategic Support Force (SSF), which is a clear acknowledgment from Beijing of the importance of non-traditional military tactics. The SSF’s responsibilities will include a variety of information-focused capabilities, such as intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber offense and defense, and psychological warfare.
Achieving President Xi’s dream of a strong Chinese military will not be easy, as high ranking officers, comfortable with the benefits that come from holding longstanding positions are shifted into new roles. “This phase of the PLA’s modernization process is bound to cause anxiety, disruption, and even resistance among the ranks. Until everyone is comfortable with their new roles, operational readiness in some units could decline temporarily,” said Blasko.
The PLA’s internal problems of corruption and disorganization stand in the way of the successful modernization of China’s military. President Xi has accepted that it may not be until 2050 that China reaps the benefits of such extensive military reforms. Experts agree that the PLA that emerges in 2050 has the potential to be one that is stronger and smarter, and more of a direct threat to the United States.
Alexandra Viers is an International Producer for The Cipher Brief.
