OPINION — There has been an argument suggesting that the international community—particularly the United States—should engage with the Taliban to hold them accountable and ensure they do not return to the same path they followed before 9/11: providing safe sanctuaries to Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups. Advocates of such a policy often assume that the United States had no engagement with the Taliban prior to 9/11. This assumption is misleading. In reality, the U.S. had established both direct and indirect communication channels with the Taliban years before the attacks.
A declassified U.S. State Department document detailing these interactions shows that the Department alone conducted more than 30 in-person meetings with the Taliban in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Germany, and the United States. Notably, just two days after the U.S. missile strikes on Khost Province in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, a phone call was arranged between the Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs and Mullah Omar. During that conversation, Mullah Omar insisted that negotiations should continue through U.S. and Afghan embassies in Pakistan, underscoring his preference for sustained diplomatic engagement despite tensions.
The declassified document highlights a meeting on September 18, 1996, when the Political Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan met with Mullah Jalil, then the Taliban’s liaison with the ISI and later appointed as the group’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meeting took place just days before the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. In it, Mullah Jalil explicitly stated that “the Taliban do not support terrorism and would not provide refuge to bin Laden.” What unfolded after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, however, directly contradicted that assurance. Moreover, another record in the same document notes a meeting on January 16, 1997, during which, in response to a U.S. request to inspect two terrorist training camps in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, Mullah Jalil agreed and emphasized that “the Taliban supported the U.S. on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues.” Yet, despite this commitment, the Taliban never granted permission for the U.S. to visit those camps.
A review of this and other declassified documents concerning U.S. “diplomatic” engagement with the Taliban reveals a consistent pattern: the Taliban never adopted a definitive stance on surrendering Osama bin Laden or formally renouncing terrorism. Instead, they prolonged negotiations, repeatedly offering new “opportunities” to maintain U.S. engagement without making substantive concessions. At the same time, the United States missed several opportunities between 1996 and 2001 to act on intelligence that could have curtailed bin Laden’s operations.
One recurring theme in those talks was the Taliban’s insistence that restrictions had been placed on bin Laden, supposedly preventing him from threatening U.S. national security. Recent reports suggest the Taliban are employing a similar tactic today—though with updated language and rationale. In meetings with U.S. officials between 2021 and 2022, Taliban representatives portrayed themselves as taking “efforts against terrorism.” This narrative was so misleading that one member of the international community described Afghanistan as “a retirement home for terrorists”—implying that the Taliban’s strategy was not to oppose Al Qaeda, but rather to shield its members by providing them with safe haven, financial support, and a quiet life away from the frontlines of global terrorism.
In reality, the situation in Afghanistan is deeply distressing for anyone who, in any capacity, was involved in the two decades of the Global War on Terror or in broader efforts to advance peace and security worldwide. What makes it even more troubling is the familiar pattern: just as in the pre-9/11 years, the Taliban continue to present themselves as partners in managing terrorism while in reality offering sanctuary and space for terrorist groups —including Al Qaeda—to endure and pursue their efforts for global terrorism.
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Al Qaeda’s Operational Command
Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan today is multilayered and extensive. They can no longer be regarded as merely a non-Afghan jihadist group that chose to remain in the country after the Mujahideen began losing territory to the Taliban in the 1990s. Instead, they are now considered an in-group rather than outsiders, largely because Al Qaeda fought alongside the Taliban against the ANDSF and NATO forces for nearly two decades. The Taliban’s return to power is viewed by Al Qaeda as a joint victory, further solidifying their bond.
As a result, Al Qaeda no longer maintains the degree of operational distance from the Taliban that it did prior to 9/11. A telling example came in July 2022, when Ayman al-Zawahiri was located in a guesthouse just a few miles from Afghanistan’s Presidential Palace in Kabul, where he was killed in a U.S. counterterrorism operation. His presence in a major city, without significant security precautions, was unprecedented and demonstrates the depth of Al Qaeda’s trust and confidence in the Taliban.
Developments since al-Zawahiri’s death indicate that, contrary to some predictions, his killing did not create a rift between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Instead, it underscored the resilience of their partnership. The Taliban adjusted certain aspects of their security architecture—such as tightening safehouse protocols and limiting the movement of senior figures—but these measures were largely shaped by Al Qaeda’s own advice and operational expertise. For its part, Al Qaeda internalized the lesson that even within an environment of unprecedented sanctuary, complacency could prove fatal. Rather than distancing itself from the Taliban, the group recalibrated its security posture, adopting more disciplined precautions for its senior leadership while maintaining its close integration with Taliban structures.
Far from weakening the relationship, the incident created a new opening for Al Qaeda to increase its leverage within the Taliban. By portraying itself as the more experienced actor in counter-surveillance and operational security, Al Qaeda positioned itself to interfere more directly in Taliban decision-making processes, particularly those related to security reforms and intelligence practices. In this way, al-Zawahiri’s death became not a point of rupture, but an opportunity for Al Qaeda to deepen its influence over the Taliban’s internal structures. This development allowed Al Qaeda to operate with even greater freedom.
To effectively facilitate its operations in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda restructured its organizational framework in late 2022, drawing on both its historical practices and the lessons learned from two decades of conflict. The reports suggested that at the center of this effort was the appointment of a new Emir (leader) for Afghanistan, currently based in Kandahar, who frequently travels to key provinces such as Kabul, Khost, Nangarhar, and Balkh. The Emir acts as the vital conduit between Al Qaeda’s senior leadership and its provincial operatives, ensuring cohesion across dispersed units and maintaining alignment with the group’s broader strategic objectives.
Under his supervision, Al Qaeda has organized relatively small operational cells of 15–25 individuals in each province. These cells are deliberately kept small to reduce exposure while maintaining flexibility and resilience. Despite their size, they serve highly specialized functions—ranging from managing logistics for training camps and operating safehouses and guesthouses to facilitating covert communications and conducting counterintelligence operations. The UN Security Council Monitoring Team’s 35th report corroborates the existence of Al Qaeda training camps, safehouses, and guesthouses inside Afghanistan as well. Counterintelligence activities of Al Qaeda are particularly crucial, enabling the group to monitor potential infiltrators, detect hostile intelligence efforts, and safeguard its networks from compromise. This decentralized yet disciplined structure not only provides Al Qaeda with a durable operational footprint but also creates a scalable framework for future expansion, allowing the organization to draw on local recruits and foreign fighters whenever conditions permit.
The Emir’s role extends beyond coordinating provincial operations to managing the clandestine movement and integration of operatives. Through a network of facilitators and couriers, he oversees the discreet transfer of personnel across Afghanistan’s borders—primarily from Pakistan and Iran, and occasionally via Central Asia. Recruits are often moved in small groups to avoid detection, temporarily sheltered in safehouses, and then integrated into Al Qaeda’s Afghan structure through vetting, indoctrination, and training. This careful orchestration ensures that even if individual cells are compromised, the broader network remains intact and adaptable. By guaranteeing secure transit routes and embedding fighters into operational units, the Emir plays a pivotal role in Al Qaeda’s survival, regeneration, and deepening partnership with the Taliban, whose security structures provide essential cover.
In mid-2024, Mohammed Salahuddin Zeidan—better known as Saif al-Adl and serving as Al Qaeda’s operational leader—characterized Afghanistan as Dar al-Hijra, the “Land of Emigration,” in an essay intended to rally support for the cause of Gaza. He described Afghanistan as a refuge where Muslims from around the world could migrate to safeguard their faith and consolidate strength in preparation for striking their enemies. In the essay, Saif al-Adl urged Muslims globally to come to Afghanistan “to gain training, experience, and knowledge before undertaking attacks against” Israel and the Western world. This statement was not only a call to arms but also a public signal of what Al Qaeda expects from the Taliban and the territory under their control. The Taliban, for their part, did nothing to refute the call; instead, they launched a campaign to attract more “tourists” from around the world to Afghanistan, thereby reinforcing Al Qaeda’s narrative rather than undermining it. Undoubtedly, the absence of strategic counterterrorism capabilities on the ground, the Taliban’s complicity with Al Qaeda, and the country’s difficult terrain together make Afghanistan the safest place on the planet for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to consolidate, regroup, and expand.
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Al Qaeda’s Revenue Hub
Al Qaeda is also seeking to generate revenue for its activities in Afghanistan. To this end, the group established a second command-and-control hub in Panjshir Province, distinct from its primary base in Kandahar. Unlike the Kandahar structure, which focuses on operational coordination, the Panjshir hub is tasked with attracting investment in mining projects across Panjshir, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, Badakhshan, and other northern provinces with the goal of boosting Al Qaeda’s financial resources. Recently, the Press Office of the Taliban’s governor in Panjshir, Mawlawi Mohammad Agha Hakim—himself known to hold allegiance to Al Qaeda—reported that he had received a delegation of Ulema and investors from the Middle East, including representatives from Yemen, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar. According to the governor’s office, the delegation expressed interest in investing in Panjshir. Particularly notable was the presence of Abdullah al-Zindani, head of the Yemeni Ulema Shura and son of Abdul Majid al-Zindani. The elder al-Zindani, now deceased, was widely recognized as the spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden and a key figure in running Al Qaeda’s recruitment and training camps. The participation of his son in such a delegation underscores the enduring transnational networks that continue to sustain Al Qaeda’s presence and ambitions in Afghanistan.
Interestingly, photos of Abdullah al-Zindani and other members of the delegation visiting Panjshir were widely published in the media. The very next day, however, the spokesperson for Governor Mohammad Agha Hakim released a statement declaring that the Taliban governor had banned the media from publishing photos or videos of his meetings. This sequence of events suggests that the initial coverage of the delegation’s visit was the result of an internal lapse. Once the images were already in circulation, the subsequent ban appeared less like a preventive measure and more like a belated attempt at damage control—an effort that was ultimately futile, as the photos had already reached a wide audience.
Most senior appointments in Panjshir Province have reportedly been made at the recommendation of Al Qaeda, reflecting the group’s influence within the Taliban’s administrative structure. Mawlawi Hakim Agha, the current Taliban governor of Panjshir, previously held a prominent position within Al Qaeda’s command structure in Afghanistan—his placement as governor underscoring the Valley’s strategic importance to the network. Similarly, Mullah Musafer, commander of the Taliban’s Panjshir Bridage, stands out as another critical figure who has formally pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. Long regarded as one of the group’s most elusive and influential operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Musafer was implicated by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in several high-profile attacks, including the January 2017 terrorist assault in Kandahar that killed five UAE diplomats, the provincial deputy governor, and an Afghan diplomat. He is not the only Al Qaeda operative embedded within the Taliban administration, but Musafer remains one of the most significant given his dual role in directing military operations and facilitating illicit mining activities that generate substantial revenue for Al Qaeda. An unpublished report by a risk assessment firm, shared among Western diplomats, indicates that Al Qaeda profits tens of millions of dollars from mines in Badakhshan and Takhar.
Al Qaeda has enormously capitalized on the Taliban in Afghanistan to strengthen its networks of recruitment, operations, and financing. Since December 2021, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 jihadi madrasas have been established across the country, operating outside the supervision of the Taliban’s Ministry of Education. Oversight instead falls under a newly created body—the General Directorate of Jihadi Madrasas and Orphanages in Kandahar—which centralizes control of these institutions. Reports indicate that the curriculum was designed by an Al Qaeda team, embedding the group’s ideological agenda into the educational system. Furthermore, applicants to these madrasas are subjected to special security clearance procedures, ensuring ideological conformity and minimizing infiltration, thus tightening Al Qaeda’s hold over the next generation of militants. As a result, Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan continues to pose a serious and enduring threat—not just to Afghanistan and its neighbors, but to global security at large.
Conclusion
The Taliban’s return to power has not altered the fundamental dynamics between them and Al Qaeda; rather, it has deepened them. The history of U.S.–Taliban negotiations before 9/11 reveals a clear pattern of deception, one that persists in today’s engagements. Al Qaeda is no longer an external guest in Afghanistan—it is an entrenched partner, strategically embedded within Taliban structures and empowered by a permissive environment that enables training, recruitment, and financing. From exploiting illicit mining and cultivating transnational investor networks to indoctrinating a new generation through tens of thousands of jihadi madrasas, Al Qaeda is rebuilding its infrastructure with the Taliban’s active complicity. Far from being a “retirement home for terrorists,” Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the safest and most sustainable base for Al Qaeda’s global ambitions since the pre-9/11 era. Unless this trajectory is confronted with clarity and resolve, the international community risks witnessing the regeneration of a threat with consequences that extend well beyond Afghanistan’s borders.
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