On September 28, protesters marked the anniversary of the start of last year’s Umbrella Revolution, in which 200,000 Hong Kongers took to the streets to demand genuine democracy for their city. The demonstrations ended after over two months of occupation, with the protesters failing to achieve their ends.
Although the democratic bloc in the Hong Kong legislature blocked implementation of Beijing’s preferred plan—the Chief Executive would be directly elected, but with candidates approved by a pro-Beijing nominating committee—it marked a pyrrhic victory. In rejecting what surely amounted to sham democracy, the city was left with its extant political system intact, leaving Hong Kongers no direct say in the appointment of the city’s leader.
The heady exuberance that was plain to see in last year’s demonstrations has waned. The relatively low turnout at this week’s protest suggests depleted energy among Hong Kong’s democracy activists—no doubt tied to the fact that there is no obvious means for them to pursue their reform agenda.
Even so, the once-again tranquil city-state may be in for a bumpy ride. The development of a Hong Konger identity distinct from a Chinese one, and the rise of a politically active younger cohort on the one hand, and Beijing’s efforts to bring the island city under its thumb on the other, suggest trouble ahead.
Two recent comments foreshadow the struggle to come. In a speech last month, Beijing’s primary representative in Hong Kong, Zhang Xiaoming, asserted, “The Chief Executive’s dual responsibility [to both Hong Kong and Beijing] means he has a special legal position which is above the executive, legislative and judicial institutions.” The suggestion that Hong Kong’s leader is not only responsible to Beijing, but also above Hong Kong law, sent shivers down the spines of legislators and judges alike, not to mention private citizens. The Basic Law, which Beijing claims to uphold, promised the establishment of democracy, but the central government has made clear it prefers to move in the opposite direction.
On the other end of the spectrum, Joshua Wong, a student leader of last year’s Umbrella Revolution, recently told the Washington Post that the democracy movement has “clear goals: to fight for democracy and achieve autonomy.” This is not a radical position to hold—Hong Kong has been autonomous in important ways since 1997—but it is incompatible with Beijing’s apparent desire to curtail, and eventually eliminate, that autonomy.
Beijing under Xi Jinping is, without doubt, an immovable object. Do Hong Kongers’ democratic aspirations amount to an unstoppable force? As the Chinese Communist Party continues to curtail Hong Kong freedoms and turn the Chief Executive into a tool to be wielded in the pursuit of Beijing’s ends, two paths will present themselves to Hong Kong’s activists. On the one hand, they might simply conclude that Hong Kong will slowly but inevitably become just another Chinese city and do what countless others around the world have done in decades past when faced with living a life under one-party rule: vote with their feet and emigrate abroad.
On the other hand, Hong Kongers may recognize that there is little space to achieve their goals within the “one country, two systems” paradigm. The independence movement in Hong Kong has always been a fringe movement, but it may not remain so if Beijing refuses to constructively engage with the city’s democrats. Unfortunately, absent revolutionary change in Beijing or, perhaps, fiercely determined international support, a drive for Hong Kong independence seems bound to end tragically.
Whatever the future holds, the high-water mark for freedom in Hong Kong may already be in the rear-view mirror.
