When Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he set out to tackle rampant corruption and reinvigorate a slowing economy, but he also set the stage for the modernization and expansion of the country’s military. In recent years, Xi has consolidated his control over the armed services as the military has projected power in the region and beyond. The Cipher Brief’s Will Edwards turned to China expert Dennis Wilder, who focused on East Asia issues at the CIA and at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, to discuss the changing face of China’s military and the country’s force projection.
The Cipher Brief: What capabilities is China trying to improve or acquire with its military modernization programs?
Dennis Wilder: Force projection options, both regionally in East Asia and far distant from China’s coast, are the most important capabilities that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is trying to develop as Beijing emerges as a major power with global security and economic interests. An editorial in the authoritative PLA Daily nine years ago on Army Day signaled this shift in military priorities from the historic mission of continental defense of Chinese territory and safeguarding Communist Party authority to adding what was termed the new historic mission of, “safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.”
A centerpiece of this emphasis on force projection is the commissioning in 2012 of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and the apparent decision to build at least two more. Other dimensions are the establishment this year of China’s first overseas military facility in Djibouti, a marked departure from China’s oft-stated opposition to the imperialist concept of military bases on foreign soil and China’s first-ever joint naval exercise in the Baltic Sea with the Russian Navy.
TCB: What are some of the organizational reforms, and what is their purpose?
Wilder: The Chinese military, under the orders of President Xi Jinping, is undergoing its most profound and widespread organization reforms since the founding of modern China in 1949. Traditionally, the PLA has been dominated by the ground forces and organized with large infantry armies to defend against invasion along its long land borders, as well as serve as the ultimate guarantor of internal stability. China’s military regions were structured to maximize the power and authority of regional commanders, who were always ground force generals.
In early 2016, President Xi presided over the creation of new theater commands that are more focused on force projection and joint operations that cross the service arms. Although this process will take many years, in January, Beijing announced the precedent-breaking appointment of a career Navy admiral to head one of the commands, the one responsible for the contentious South China Sea. In keeping with the shift to an emphasis on joint operations and high-tech forces, Beijing is reducing the size of the land forces while increasing the size and budgets of the navy, air, missile, and cyber and space forces.
TCB: How do these capabilities and reforms fit into China’s national strategy?
Wilder: President Xi describes China’s national strategy as the modernization of China into a “fully developed nation” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist victory, in which one billion prosperous Chinese live in urban centers. Part of that strategy is to have a “strong” military with power projection capabilities to defend China’s interests regionally and globally, including the protection of vital commercial sea lanes.
Thus, China aspires to become over the next two decades the world’s second most-capable maritime power with the capacity to defend its sovereignty claims, economic interests, and to deter the United States from interfering in what it deems are its internal affairs and in maritime disputes with neighboring countries. China’s Coast Guard already has the world’s largest maritime law enforcement fleet, and according to the Washington think tank CNA, is well on its way to having more principal combatants and submarines than the U.S. Navy within the next five years. By reducing the authority of the land force commanders and attacking corruption in the military, President Xi is also increasing his and the Party’s control of the armed forces.
TCB: What do these reforms and advanced capabilities mean for U.S. policy?
Wilder: China emergence as a maritime power offers the potential for it to be a stronger partner in humanitarian and disaster relief as well as in peacekeeping and counterterrorism initiatives, and the Pacific Command is already engaging China heavily in these areas. However, China’s rapidly modernizing military challenges U.S. security dominance in many aspects of military power.
In the East and South China Seas, China is attempting to enforce its interpretation of its sovereign and maritime rights in ways that are incompatible with U.S. commitments to regional allies and to the U.S. understanding of international rules and norms. Recent reports of unsafe air operations by the PLA Air Force near U.S. surveillance aircraft operating over international waters, highlights the need to reach some mutually-accepted understandings or risk miscalculations and unintended clashes.
As China’s military power grows, concerns will grow over its intentions toward its neighbors and its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. If the United States wishes to retain its dominance in the Pacific, it will have to dedicate greater portions of its maritime power to the Pacific Command or convince its allies to greatly expand their capabilities.
The PLA is also aggressively pursuing the new military domains of space and cyberspace to narrow the gap in the military balance with the United States. Again in these areas, China is pressing the boundaries of the existing international norms, and there is an urgent need to engage at senior levels in the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue and other military-to-military venues to avoid an East Asian arms race.
