Potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula was averted this week when the North Korea media announced that Kim Jung un delayed a decision on firing missiles toward Guam, while he watched U.S. action a little longer. Prior to this welcomed announcement, President Donald Trump made it clear that the U.S. would respond to the North Korea threat with “fire and fury likely the world has never seen.” Kim Jung-un responded by threatening to land four missiles near the territory of Guam., inciting President Trump to say that the U.S. was “locked and loaded if North Korea acted unwisely.” Well, North Korea acted wisely. It doesn’t mean, however, that North Korea will continue to act wisely.
North Korea is on the cusp of proving to the world that they have a viable nuclear deterrent – an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach the continental U.S. with a nuclear warhead. Our challenge is to convince North Korea that they don’t want to go there. North Korea displaying this capability and threatening the U.S. will require a response from the U.S., which is what they recently got verbally from President Trump. Acting on this threat with the launch of a missile with a possible nuclear warhead will require a U.S. response. And the most conservative response will be taking preemptive action to intercept and destroy a missile launched from North Korea that could be a nuclear threat to the U.S. or its allies in South Korea and Japan.
A more aggressive response to this threat from North Korea would be a “preventive” strike against missile or nuclear sites, to ensure that the North does not have the capability of launching a missile that could threaten the U.S. or its allies. North Korea must understand and expect that there will be a “preemptive” strike against any missile launched that’s viewed as an imminent threat. All leaders have this responsibility to protect its citizens and allies. A “preventive” strike is more contentious, given the absence of an imminent threat. However, that doesn’t mean such an approach would not be pursued, given threatening developments from North Korea. This North Korea must understand.
It should now be clear that we are headed down an unpredictable path. All indications are that Kim Jung-un will continue to launch missiles and have nuclear tests until he’s convinced North Korea has a viable, deployable nuclear deterrent. They’re not there yet. Having miniaturized nuclear warheads that can be mated to missile delivery systems isn’t enough. Tests to ensure that these nuclear warheads don’t burn-up when re-entering the atmosphere are necessary, assuming a rational actor. Of course, there’s nothing to prevent Kim Jung-un from gambling and launching a nuclear tipped missile, prior to undergoing requisite flight tests.
What’s needed now is a strategy that attempts to prevent Kim Jung-un from further missile launches and nuclear tests. Most would argue that this is unrealistic; that Kim Jung-un will more aggressively pursue his goal of having nuclear ICBMs that can strike the U.S. To Kim Jung-un, this is the ultimate nuclear deterrent, ensuring his survival.
Our task now is exponentially more difficult than one to twenty years ago. We’re dealing with a nuclear North Korea that reportedly is capable of miniaturizing its nuclear warheads. Indeed, why would Kim Jung-un abandon his nuclear program when he’s on the cusp of having a nuclear capability that would threaten the U.S.? North Korea is the ninth nuclear weapons state (although the U.S. does not officially recognize them as a nuclear weapons state), something they have been pursuing since the early 1990s. Their goal now appears to be achieving this capability soonest, locking it in and then negotiating with the U.S. from strength, insisting that they be recognized as a nuclear weapons state and treated accordingly. As I’ve mentioned in previous commentaries, and directly to North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister at the October Track 1.5 Talks in Kuala Lumpur, recognizing and accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state would be a mistake. It would incite a nuclear arms race in the region, with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and others also seeking their own nuclear weapons, regardless of extended nuclear deterrence commitments from the U.S. It could also result in rogue states and terrorists getting access to nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials
We’re dealing with a North Korea that thinks our policy is regime change. This is a constant refrain from those senior North Korean officials I’ve been meeting for the past decade. They cite the fate of Omar Gaddafi of Libya as proof that abandoning nuclear weapons is a path to self destruction. Our task is to convince them that it’s a path to survival; becoming a legitimate sovereign state interacting with the international community and international financial institutions and eventually having normal diplomatic relations with the United States.
Getting North Korea to halt missile launches and nuclear tests should be our immediate objective. Indeed, getting them to stop now before they become an existential nuclear threat to the U.S. should be our goal. That goal possibly can be accomplished if China convinces North Korea to immediately enter into unconditional discussions with the United States. These discussions will permit the U.S. to table its demand that North Korea initially stop and eventually commence with the dismantlement of its nuclear programs, in return for responding to North Korea’s demand for security assurances, a peace treaty, scaling back joint military exercises with South Korea, and lifting economic sanctions.
Returning to unconditional talks now with North Korea, with assurances that they will not conduct missile launches or nuclear tests during these exploratory talks, could be the first of many steps, on a path to more formal negotiations that will include South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Ideally, these talks could produce an agreement similar to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement that committed North Korea to complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs, in return for the security assurances, economic development assistance, and normal diplomatic relations.
