Weeks after withdrawing from the Iran nuclear accord, the Trump Administration ratcheted up pressure on Iran by imposing harsh sanctions on key Iranian figures who have helped facilitate the Islamic Republic’s continuous array of malign activity in the Middle East. But questions linger around whether this financial-based approach will actually deter Iran’s subversive regional tactics or inhibit its longer-term path toward possessing a nuclear weapon.
The Background
On May 8, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the United States’ secession from the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), asserting that the agreement “is defective at its core” and that his decision will “make America much safer.” The move precipitated the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions on several Iranian individuals and entities that had been rescinded when the JCPOA was implemented in January 2016. In fact, Trump proclaimed that the U.S. will now “be instituting the highest level of economic sanction” on Iran.
U.S. government departments and agencies have already initiated 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods for activities involving Iran that had been permitted pursuant to the JCPOA.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reinforced Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, stating that the deal “failed to guarantee the safety of the American people from the risk created by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Pompeo also highlighted what the administration views as the JCPOA’s shortcomings, including its “sunset provisions,” which lift restrictions on critical Iranian nuclear activities in 10-15 years, its verification measures, and its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile development or destabilizing actions.
Pompeo also outlined twelve demands that the Islamic Republic must meet for relations between Washington and Tehran to be normalized. The list requires Iran to provide complete transparency and comprehensive verification of its past and current nuclear activities, release detained U.S. citizens, halt the launching and development of nuclear-capable missile systems, terminate its support for terrorist organizations and proxy groups across the Middle East and South Asia, and end its interference in the sovereign affairs of neighboring countries.
Since assuming office in January 2017, the Trump Administration has taken a tough stance toward Iran. Following Iranian ballistic missile tests conducted in January 2017, the Trump administration put Iran “on notice” saying it will “no longer tolerate Iran’s provocations that threaten our interests.” During a speech delivered last October, President Trump emphasized that his administration is focused on working with allies to counter Iranian aggression in the Middle East, increase sanctions on Iranian entities, address Tehran’s proliferation of missiles and weapons, and deny the regime all paths to a nuclear weapon.
Over the last few months, the Trump administration has also sanctioned major Iranian individuals and entities. In October 2017, the Treasury Department prominently sanctioned Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an elite paramilitary force unit as the “guardians” of the 1979 Islamic Revolution,” citing the IRGC's support for terrorist groups Hezbollah and Hamas as well as for the Taliban. “The IRGC has played a central role to Iran becoming the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror… and Treasury will continue using its authorities to disrupt the IRGC’s destructive activities,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin at the time of the designation.
Last Tuesday, the Treasury Department sanctioned five Iranian individuals they believe provided ballistic missile-related technical expertise to Yemen’s Houthis rebel group, including Mahmud Bagheri Kazemabad and Mohammad Agha Ja’fari, two IRGC leaders who “oversee the transfer of missile components and the deployment of ballistic missile specialists across the region in support of the IRGC’s activate.”
The Issue
Sanctions have been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to push back against Iran and compel Tehran to alter its behavior for years. The U.S. government has imposed numerous sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals involved in malign nuclear activities, ballistic missile development, human rights abuses, and support for terrorist organizations. Iranian leaders who have been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department include Qasem Soulemani the head of the notorious Quds Force branch within the IRGC responsible for executing Iran’s foreign policy doctrine. The U.S. also led a vigorous international sanctions regime that crippled Iran’s economy and drove Tehran to negotiate the JCPOA.
Nonetheless, the Iranian leadership continues to initiate chants of “Death to America” and remains committed to supporting terrorist and proxy groups that have sown chaos throughout the Middle East.
“The timing of what [these recent sanctions] mean for Iran is going to depend on many variables ranging from the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement to regional developments to Iran’s perceptions of what domestic requirements must be satisfied to maintain stability,” says Cipher Brief Expert Norm Roule, former National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.”
As part of its effort to limit the impact of the sanctions, Roule expects that Iran will look to “sell as much oil as possible in the next few months,” and is also likely to attempt to “lock in contracts with China and Russia as a means of demonstrating weaknesses in the sanctions regime.”
One potential setback that could impede the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions is the divide between Europe and the U.S. over the Iran nuclear deal. Last Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei spelled out a number of conditions that the European parties to the deal must meet for Iran to remain a party to the JCPOA. Khamenei insisted that European powers should continue to buy Iranian oil, that European banks should continue to protect trade with Iran, and that the European countries pledge to not negotiate on Iran's ballistic missile program or regional activities. If these demands were not met, Khamenei threatened to resume enriching uranium.
Despite Khamenei’s charged rhetoric, Roule does not believe that companies in Europe will risk their access to the U.S. financial system to maintain ties to Iran.
“If you are the head of an international company or bank, you have to be out of your mind to risk the U.S. market and litigation and exposure to your firm’s assets in order to work with a country that brings such little profit and is so susceptible to sanctions because of its malign regional behavior, missile, issues, terrorism, let alone the nuclear issue,” he explains.
There is also a possibility that the Trump Administration is formulating contingency plans aimed at spurring regime change in Iran through military force, especially if Iran elects to restart its nuclear weapons program. However, in a recent interview with Voice of America's Persian Service, Secretary Pompeo dispelled the notion that the Trump Administration aims to facilitate regime change in Iran. “It’s not about changing the regime,” Pompeo explained. “It’s about changing the behavior of the leadership in Iran to comport with what the Iranian people really want them to do.”
Ultimately, while imposing additional sanctions on Iran signals that the Trump Administration is increasing financial pressure, it may require a momentous event for Tehran to shift its strategy or way of thinking.
“It’s going to be some time before such pain is felt in Iran that it will feel compelled to change its behavior,” says Roule.
“The nuclear, regional, and missile issues are just too important to Iran’s hardliners view of the purpose of the revolution.”
