In advance of today’s inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s first female president, The Cipher Brief interviewed Randy Schriver, founding partner at Armitage International LLC and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, to ask about the cross-strait implications of this change in leadership. As someone who has interacted with Tsai Ing-wen regularly over the past 15 years, Schriver shared his opinion of Tsai as a pragmatic leader as well as his hopes that the U.S. will demonstrate appropriate support for this island nation under pressure from China.
The Cipher Brief: How have you seen cross-strait relations evolving in recent years?
Randy Schriver: When President Ma came into power, the two sides found a way to talk directly with one another. They came to the so-called 1992 consensus, and there was a lot of progress between the two sides in terms of reaching agreements. I think that period really allowed the two sides to work on things that had been stuck for quite some time. The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) government before President Ma had made some progress but it was really, I think, the KMT (Kuomintang Nationalist Party) government’s ability to come in and carry forward on many of those initiatives that led to a lot of momentum and success for the two sides over the last eight years.
TCB: How do you think that progress is going to be affected by Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration?
RS: It remains to be seen, but I think the Chinese are likely to increase pressure and take a harder line. I think part of that relates to their discomfort with the DPP, but part of it had nothing to do with Dr. Tsai and the DPP. I think they want to try to isolate Taiwan. They want to try to create anxiety in the region as well as anxiety in Washington about the direction of cross-strait relations in hopes that Washington and others might assist in pressuring Dr. Tsai. I think they have a playbook of sorts. We saw that during the previous DPP government, when the Chinese were trying to create what they call ‘co-management’ of Taiwan with the U.S. And I think they’ll try to pursue that again. Part of that entails just putting pressure on Taiwan.
TCB: In what ways is China able to put pressure on Taiwan?
I think you’ll see movement in the diplomatic area to try to take away some of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. We’ve seen some of that develop already. They may try economic levers, like cutting back tourism to Taiwan or affecting the implementation of the cross-strait trade agreement, ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement), in a way that could hurt Taiwan’s economic interests. There’s Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and then of course there’s the potential for military pressure – more provocative exercises, more incursions across the centerline of the strait, aircraft ships, etc. There are a variety of things they can do.
TCB: In a recent article for the Diplomat, you said, “U.S. ship visits to Taiwan would help support the goals of the Taiwan Relations Act and would send reassurance to the people of Taiwan at a time when Beijing is increasing pressure on our democratic friend.” Considering the TRA was recently reaffirmed, is there a real need for Taiwan to be reassured by the United States? Is there any doubt in that relationship?
RS: I think the doubt would creep in from memories of the previous DPP administration when, although the Bush administration started out very strongly supporting Taiwan, over time, the relationship got a little more distant. I think many in the U.S. placed blame on Taipei for those problems. So, I think it would help if Taiwan got some reassurance that the U.S. will stand beside them when Dr. Tsai comes into office, particularly in light of increasing Chinese pressure.
TCB: Do you think that Tsai Ing-wen needs to make a clear statement about how she interprets Taiwan’s constitution in terms of acknowledging the one China principle?
RS: First of all, she is capable of navigating these issues without a lot of direction from Washington or anywhere else, so I think we ought to be a little careful. Sometimes there is value in ambiguity. When you consider the different things she is trying to balance – in particular her supporters in Taiwan who want to take things even further in the direction of independence, or push Taiwanese identity even further—she’s got to balance all that. So in this case, ambiguity might be helpful. If it’s not thoughtful, clarity could actually be problematic. I think she’s trying to find the right balance between what her supporters can tolerate in Taiwan and perhaps what China and others will see as a reasonable stance. When she talks about constitutional order though, that’s an implied endorsement of sorts, because the constitution is a one China constitution.
TCB: What is unique about Tsai Ing-wen?
RS: She’s not a traditional politician. In fact, in many ways she’s a very reserved, quiet person. She’s really had to work at the public aspects of campaigning and building a political constituency. I think she’s someone who is very pragmatic and thoughtful. She was trained as an attorney and has a lot of experience in negotiation, so she is much more the technocrat than the ideological figure.
Certainly as the first woman president elected in Taiwan, there is a historic aspect to her presidency and I think she is thinking about ways that can be leveraged in Taiwan, but also internationally. I know she thinks about how she can work with other elected women leaders around the world. I think she represents an interesting change in Taiwan.
TCB: What should people should look for in the next few months after she takes office?
RS: We need to keep the onus on Beijing as well. It’s very tempting for people to say “Tsai Ing-wen should do this or that,” or “will she say this or that on the ‘92 consensus?” But there’s only one party here that has missiles pointed at someone else. There’s only one party here that has an intransigent position on legacy issues. I think we need to give Tsai Ing-wen space, give her the opportunity to respond to people who have elected her and avoid validating China’s overreaction or pressure tactics. I think it’s really important that people in Washington understand that she is navigating something very delicate in Taiwan. Providing her reassurance, and allowing her time and space to do things that she needs to do will be really important.
