The uncertainty surrounding President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy platform caused a sense of unease in Japan over the future of cooperation with the U.S. on economic and security issues, though a subsequent meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe established a personal rapport that bodes well. The Cipher Brief spoke with Nicholas Szechenyi, Deputy Director of the Japan Chair at CSIS, to understand what uncertainties still remain.
TCB: President-elect Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently met in New York. How has this meeting been received in Japan, and how far did it go to assuaging some of Japan’s feelings about a Trump presidency?
Nicholas Szechenyi: Trump’s provocative statements on economic and security policy over the course of the campaign—such as his opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations and his suggestion that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons—startled the Japanese public and prompted concerns about the potential for drift in U.S.-Japan relations during his presidency. Trump brings an aura of unpredictability to foreign policy that is understandably unnerving for Japan, which has long declared the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of its foreign policy strategy. The Abe-Trump meeting in New York proved significant in placing a premium on close personal ties between leaders as segue to substantive dialogue on next steps for the bilateral relationship. Abe was the first foreign leader to meet with Trump after the election, a strategic move amid uncertainty about what a Trump presidency might mean for U.S. policy in Asia.
TCB: Donald Trump recently doubled down on his pledge to withdraw the U.S. from TPP. How would a withdrawal from the TPP agreement by a Trump administration affect Japan?
NS: Prime Minister Abe expended a great deal of political capital to advocate for Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, and the Japanese Diet (parliament) will likely ratify TPP in the coming days. This is rather ironic given that the United States had long pressured Japan to join TPP but could now be on the outside looking in. U.S.-Japan joint leadership on TPP was indispensable to promoting high standards for trade liberalization and setting the rules and norms that would govern economic activity in the Asia-Pacific region. The withdrawal of the United States, the world’s largest economy, would weaken the economic and normative weight of TPP, as well as the economic pillar of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The failure to bring TPP into force would also leave Japan without a central tool for economic reform that could enhance the long-term competitiveness of the Japanese economy.
TCB: What is the likelihood that Japan would try and push forward with the remaining 11 nations in the agreement?
NS: Japan and the other parties to TPP could decide to move forward without the United States but would have to amend a provision stipulating that the agreement can only come into force after 85 percent of TPP members have ratified it in terms of economic weight. It would also take time to undo all of the U.S. commitments that were locked into the agreement. Trump advisers have expressed a preference for bilateral free trade agreements, but Japan will likely reject any request to reopen negotiations with the United States. Japan and the other parties to TPP will have to decide whether to see the TPP project through or shelve it and hope Trump can eventually be convinced of the economic and strategic rationale for membership.
TCB: What would the United States stand to lose if it withdrew or decreased its forces in Japan?
NS: The U.S.-Japan security treaty of 1960 commits the United States to defend Japan and grants permission for the United States to use bases for regional security. The treaty remains the centerpiece of U.S. and Japanese strategy in Asia, and both countries share an interest in maintaining regional stability as a foundation for economic prosperity. The two governments agreed on a plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan to reduce the impact of the U.S. presence on the local population, especially on the island of Okinawa where most of that presence is concentrated. But realignment should not be confused with withdrawal. U.S forward presence in Japan and the Asia-Pacific is critical to deterrence. Withdrawing U.S. forces from Japan could precipitate a crisis in the U.S.-Japan alliance and signal a retreat from Asia, which would destabilize the region and erode U.S. credibility and influence.
TCB: Are there any other factors we should be aware of for the sake of the alliance’s future?
NS: Trump’s “America first” rhetoric arguably generated anxiety in Japan about the strategic trajectory for U.S.-Japan relations, but Japan should remain confident about its contributions to U.S. interests. As noted above, Japanese foreign policy is centered on close ties with the United States and there is plenty of evidence demonstrating that commitment. Recent defense policy reforms, for example, would allow Japan’s military to come to the defense of the United States if it comes under attack, a remarkable development that supports the U.S. desire for allies to do more in the realm of security. If you assume that North Korea will seek to provoke the Trump administration early on by showcasing its nuclear weapon and missile programs, the importance of U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense will immediately become clear. And Japan’s long history of direct investment in the United States as a source of economic growth should generate positive momentum for bilateral economic ties even absent TPP as an organizing principle. The current political transition in the United States has produced an exceptional degree of uncertainty about what change will mean under Trump, but the shared interests that have underpinned the U.S.-Japan alliance for decades will remain the same and should serve as the foundation for robust bilateral ties well into the future.
