Amidst the fanfare of North Korea’s 7th Workers’ Party Congress, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’ promotion to Party Chairman was one of the few substantive announcements to emerge. The Cipher Brief spoke to former CIA linguist and leadership analyst Soo Kim to learn more about the significance of his new appointment.
The Cipher Brief: So far, reports of the congress are light on policy details. What can we glean about future policy from the information we have?
Soo Kim: The few who waited with bated breath for North Korea’s major policy announcements at the Party Congress had their hopes dashed. Kim Jong-un unveiled the country’s five-year economic plan, which, as monumental and overarching as it sounds, was short on specifics. He emphasized increasing coal output and electricity generation, domestic energy sources, factory automation, and agricultural mechanization. He exhorted his people to become a scientifically and technologically powerful state in areas such as space and nuclear technology. But how these grand reforms will be pursued remains unclear. Kim also suggested the North’s willingness to hold talks with South Korea to ease peninsular tensions, an offer that was subsequently rebuffed by the South’s Unification Ministry as mere propaganda lacking in sincerity.
Following Kim’s Party Congress address, North Korean media published a report on Kim’s first public appearance at an exhibition of North Korean-made tractors and trucks, where he stressed the importance of Pyongyang’s self-reliance policy and also called for a 60- to 70-percent increase in farm machinery production. Kim wants to guide North Korea’s development into an economically powerful country, but this goal will remain largely unattainable so long as Pyongyang stands committed to its nuclear weapons program. The international community has repeatedly expressed vehement disapproval of the DPRK’s nuclear development, most recently using sanctions to place economic pressures on the regime and cut it off from the external world.
TCB: With the congress completed, will we see a decrease in the provocative behavior exhibited by North Korea in the first part of the year?
SK: Kim’s Party Congress address gave no indication of Pyongyang backing down on its nuclear weapons program or provocative behavior. Instead, his speech touted North Korea’s January hydrogen bomb test and February satellite launch, and justified the country’s commitment to its nuclear program as a defensive measure against encroachment upon its sovereignty. We now also know his intent to continue pursuing Byongjin, the contradictory, double-emphasis policy of nuclear and economic development. Kim most likely is cognizant of this discrepancy but continues to insist upon this policy. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program gives a boost of self-confidence and pride to the North Korean people (so Kim thinks) – the regime hails a nuclear or missile test as a moment of victory for the country. But a weapons test to display force to the external world is a costly one for the regime and its people. If anything, nuclear deterrent capabilities are for Kim’s survival. It’s possible that the North’s display of nuclear prowess is more an insurance policy for Kim to fend off competition and challenges to his absolute rule. North Korea won’t be giving up its nuclear deterrent capabilities as long as Kim maintains his iron grip on power.
TCB: What is the significance of Kim Jong-un’s new title as Party Chairman?
SK: Consolidation of Kim’s power. The Workers’ Party is North Korea’s most powerful institution, and the Party Congress is where – theoretically – the country’s weightiest decisions are made, including the election of the Central Committee, review of past policies, and the unveiling of new party lines. Realistically, however, all power and decision-making authority are held in reserve for Kim Jong-un. His promotion from WPK secretary to its Chairman bestows upon him the highest authority of Pyongyang’s most powerful organization, affirming his supreme rule. It also shows that the young Kim is no longer behind the shadows of his grandfather’s and father’s legacies.
TCB: The congress involved many new cabinet appointments. What does this mean for Kim’s power base?
SK: Since taking over the reins of North Korea’s supreme leadership in late 2011, Kim has been going through a lengthy and thorough “house-cleaning,” purging some 70 officials through executions, demotions, and mysterious accidents. The brutal execution of his uncle Jang Song Taek in 2013 for purportedly building a rival power base was demonstrative of Kim’s resolve to remove any challenges – even family – to his absolute control of the regime. The recent cabinet appointment elevates those loyal to Kim and surrounds him with his supporters, bolstering his status as the DPRK’s chief dictator. Notably, Kim appointed his younger sister Kim Yo-jong to the Party’s Central Committee. Yo-jong already holds positions of influence in the DPRK government, is reportedly a deputy director in the Party, and involved in the country’s propaganda department. Her promotion within the North’s leadership system could signal her increasing involvement in the country’s decision-making, perhaps similar to the role her aunt, Kim Kyong-hui, played during Kim Jong Il’s rule. We will continue to see Kim solidifying his rule through subsequent reshuffles in the North’s leadership roster in the coming years.
