But experts say that the complexities of successfully negotiating a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia are very real and could prove too much. Saudi Arabia’s requirements of significant Israeli concessions on Palestine, along with the insistence on a permanent security framework with the US, will require significant expenditure of political capital from leaders in all three countries. And despite the surprising diplomatic move by Beijing to broker the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, announced in March of this year, Iran’s foreign ministry says normalizing of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would “harm regional peace and stability”.
So, what does all this mean? The Cipher Brief turned to Norm Roule, former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who is now a regional and energy security expert, to help think it through.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Norm Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the ODNI from 2008 until 2017. As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policymakers in the National Security Council and the Department of State. Mr. Roule is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an advisor to the Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, a 2023 Visiting Fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, and a non-resident senior adviser with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an advisor to United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and the Counter Extremism Project (CEP).
The Cipher Brief: Establishing Saudi Israeli diplomatic relations is the most complicated and perhaps consequential Middle East initiative since the Abraham Accords negotiations. Those talks took place at a different time and with an administration that had taken on more robust engagement with the Middle East. Do you believe this initiative is genuine and likely to succeed?
Roule: The U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Israel are indeed working to see if an arrangement can be developed to establish Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations. The players appear optimistic and eager to gain the strategic and political benefits that would follow success. Media attention hasn’t focused on specific challenges, especially the thorny question of whether the deal can survive without deliverables on Palestine and the exact form of a U.S.-Saudi security agreement.
With this said, I am optimistic about this deal, in part because I think it is the right thing to do and also because one can’t work on Middle East issues for forty years without optimism.
Administration and regional officials are also optimistic, but we have yet to come to the point where anyone needs to grasp the nettle of hard decisions.
Every diplomatic initiative that tackles long-standing problem begins with a policymaker’s decision to go “Big for Big” or “Less for Less.” The former aims for a broad solution addressing many problems. The latter focuses on small steps and confidence-building measures. The administration has reportedly chosen the former. Critics of this approach worry it will collapse under the weight and complexity of outstanding issues; advocates argue that smaller solutions lead nowhere.
Success of this effort will likely hinge on the intensity, personalities, and discipline involved with the process of the talks. Several senior administration officials have engaged the region in surprisingly publicized meetings. I say “surprisingly” because the media attention implies the administration has some confidence they won’t fail. These meetings are probably focused on ensuring relevant decision makers understand the challenges and equities of the various players and developing the framework for the process required to move forward.
The scale and complexity of the challenges that must be overcome, make it likely that the Biden team will downplay prospects of success, at least in the near term.
Moving forward, U.S. policy makers will need to ensure the effort receives routine high-level support. This may be difficult in a world occupied by Russia’s war against Ukraine, let alone U.S. and Israeli domestic politics.
The Cipher Brief: Before we get into the specifics of the talks, tell us how U.S. policymakers see U.S. strategic interests in the region and how this deal would support these interests.
Roule: The U.S. has a series of constant and profound strategic interests in this region, although recent years have yet to see a policy approach that respects their importance. Let me name the handful that matter most.
First, America has correctly claimed that its greatest strength rests in the power of its alliances and partnerships. But it is no secret that traditional regional partners have become confused about U.S. reliability and credibility in the last decade. The U.S. currently maintains around 35,000 military personnel in the region. Increased regional integration will help with the burden sharing, enabling us to refocus or draw down this costly presence.
Next, consider the map. The Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea-Persian Gulf geography holds three of the world’s most important trade chokepoints: the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab, and the Strait of Hormuz. Our core economic and security interests – and those of our partners – requires that these chokepoints are secure for international trade. The greatest threat to these chokepoints comes from Iran and its proxies. Diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv would help CENTCOM manage the security of the region. Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel won’t produce a security alliance immediately, but it will improve our operational efficiency and agility, and ease planners' headaches.
Third, there is energy. Our domestic oil and gas production and green energy ambitions make us less dependent on foreign suppliers. But the interruption of oil supplies from the Gulf would play havoc with global energy prices and seriously damage our economy. This deal would help integrate the oil and gas network of the Gulf states with the East Mediterranean players and lay the groundwork to move energy from Gulf solar and hydrogen producers to Europe.
Next, events of recent years have underscored the importance of supply chain security. An integrated trade system connecting Asia to Europe via the land and waters of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries creates a reliable supply network that also offsets any future threat posed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In this same vein, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates should increasingly be seen as nodes of non-oil transportation, industry, and even alternative sources of raw materials that will reduce our reliance on China and Russia. For example, the Saudi mining program aims to produce copper, iron, nickel, and lithium. These metals are critical to the success of a green economy.
Fifth, policymakers routinely assert that we are a nation of values, and that this principle forms the foundation of our foreign policy. We are committed to the security of Israel and this effort, if successful, will help achieve that goal. A broader U.S. strategic partnership with Riyadh will facilitate the coalitions to tackle the grinding poverty of Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Africa, and Palestine. The Saudi demand that Israel make long-term concessions on Palestine in exchange for diplomatic relations is consistent with this approach.
U.S. foreign policy requires that we shape our policies to respond to the realities of a multipolar world.
Gulf countries increasingly play a global role far beyond energy. Climate change is a good example. Governments worldwide have uniformly praised Abu Dhabi’s leadership of COP 28. Managing the views of the global South is another example. It wasn’t an accident that Saudi Arabia hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at last May’s Arab League meeting. Riyadh has become the routine host for meetings of world leaders with Arab countries. Riyadh will reportedly host a meeting that includes the U.S., European countries, Brazil, China, and India to discuss Russia’s war on Ukraine. Notably, Moscow has apparently not been invited. The foundation of the Saudi and UAE approach is their ability to engage the Great Powers and North/South global voices. Israel should be part of each of these efforts.
The Cipher Brief: What makes the idea of Saudi diplomatic relations with Israel more likely today than in the past?
Roule: First and foremost, we need to look to the rise of a new generation of political, economic, and social leaders in the region and the bold programs they have created. The Arab Spring shattered the ideologies that had dominated the region for decades, constraining its potential. Abu Dhabi and Manama were early models for this success. Riyadh’s decision to throw off the shackles of the religious police and empower women to take a broader role in society proved pivotal in its ambition for global influence. Iran’s revolutionary slogans are now glaringly archaic and tattered. The Islamic Republic’s hold on power looks brittle and is sustained only through oppression, akin to communism in Russia in the 1980s. At the same time, this new generation has the confidence to engage different Great Powers if their interests require. These rising leaders also have no problem publicly rejecting what they perceive as one-sided Western proposals.
This new posture has already changed how the Gulf Cooperation Council countries deal with the Palestinian Authority. Gulf leaders who now tax their people and seek funds for massive transformational projects reject aid requests from regional governments they deem corrupt or ineffective. Riyadh funds Palestinian humanitarian programs, but has also pressed the Palestinian Authority to undertake political reform and end the diversion of funds to terrorism. At the same time, the Kingdom has made it clear that it continues to endorse a two-state solution and condemns Israel’s settlement expansion that threatens that goal.
The Saudis have also shown they can reconcile with adversaries. If Saudi Arabia can welcome a war criminal like Bashar al-Asad into the Arab League to address the suffering of the Syrian people or meet with the same murderous Iranian leadership that authorized and publicly praised missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, it isn’t hard to believe they can directly engage Israeli leaders.
We should also look at the elements that drive U.S. policy on this issue. President Biden has made no secret of his strong support for Israel’s security. His ability to bring about diplomatic relations between the Saudis and Israelis would be a powerful legacy. Many will also think that a successful deal would be a powerful talking point in an election year. Satisfying Saudi demands for a security agreement, faster provision of defensive weapons, and support for a civilian nuclear program would do much to dispel regional concerns over America’s credibility as a security partner.
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The Cipher Brief: Before we look at the possible elements of a deal, talk to us about what Saudi relations with Israel would bring to Israel.
Roule: Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel would dramatically transform Israel’s political and economic ties with the Islamic world and Arab League. Israel would become an important element in Saudi Arabia’s integration with Europe. Relations would also offer a boost to ending interfaith distrust and violence. Riyadh’s example would also encourage other countries, for example, Malaysia and Indonesia, to recognize Israel.
Saudi recognition of Israel would be a powerful political achievement for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who sees himself as a man of History, and his ability to achieve diplomatic relations would transform his place in Israel’s history books. At the same time, it isn’t clear he is willing or able to offer meaningful concessions to Palestinians without risking the collapse of his hardline coalition and political oblivion. We shouldn’t underestimate this challenge.
The Cipher Brief: What are the most challenging issues confronting each player in this initiative?
Roule: The Biden administration came to office with harsh criticism of the Kingdom and injudicious promises to isolate Riyadh. It would need to explain why it has decided to offer Saudi Arabia an unprecedented security agreement within a short two years. The administration likely won’t be able satisfactorily respond to the Kingdom’s harshest critics on the Left and Right. But there are enough Senators in the center of the two parties to make a deal possible. The Biden administration will remain concerned that it won’t be tarred with claims that it gave Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a political victory at a time when many argue the latter is dismantling Israel’s democracy.
The Cipher Brief: What do the Saudis seek in exchange for diplomatic relations with Israel and do you think those demands are realistic?
Roule: The Saudis appear to have four basic requests: a NATO-like security agreement that assures them of U.S. support against an attack by Iran, faster provision of sophisticated defensive weaponry against missile attacks, U.S. support for a civilian nuclear program, and Israeli concessions to Palestine. An agreement on these issues (along with economic and human rights commitments) could be bound within a single treaty of friendship. With the election calendar in mind, the most propitious time to conclude an agreement by early 2024.
I will speak briefly on most of the Saudi requests and address the issue of a security agreement last.
Nuclear talks with the Saudis have been underway since the second Obama administration with considerable progress made in the Trump years. The Saudis have sought to address our concerns over the purpose of the program by requesting that an American firm partner with the Kingdom. The development of a U.S.-Saudi nuclear combine, based on the ARAMCO model, would provide the insights Washington requires to determine that the Saudi program remains peaceful. The challenge has always been the question of domestic enrichment. The Saudis see enrichment as a way to exploit their domestic uranium ore, an employment opportunity for Saudis, and a resource it could export much as it now exports hydrocarbon energy. Many in the U.S. oppose such a move but even the Israelis now say they no longer oppose domestic enrichment. In any case, it is a tough argument to say that we allowed Iran to develop industrial enrichment that includes mines, reprocessing centers, and now production of uranium enriched to 60%, but believe it reasonable to deny the Saudis a similar program.
Next, we have defensive weapons sales. Denying the Kingdom defensive weapons because of our opposition to the Yemen War never seemed wise. We should never inhibit a partner’s ability to protect their (and our) people against an aggressor. In any case, the intensity of the Yemen conflict has faded, and the administration routinely praises Riyadh for its steps in Yemen. Some Congressional opponents will never support weapons sales to the Kingdom, but faster provision of defensive weapons, especially anti-missile systems to defend against Iran, should be workable.
On Palestine, the administration is likely to support the concessions Riyadh seeks from Israel. Congress is likely to support these moves as well. The challenge – perhaps the greatest challenge to this entire initiative – is whether Prime Minister Netanyahu can convince his hard-line supporters that Saudi diplomatic recognition is worth compromise. Many will argue that this is impossible. We should be alert to visits by senior officials from both sides and what role this will play in a visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington.
Last, we come to the issue of the NATO-like security agreement. Opponents will argue that after decades of costly involvement in the region, such an agreement ensures we will find ourselves embroiled in a future conflict, Nonetheless, I believe such an agreement is both wise and doable, particularly if nested within a broader document that includes human rights requirements and commitments of economic engagement.
We shouldn’t be surprised if Riyadh demands tangible evidence of U.S. and Israeli commitments. Many in the region note that the promised F-35s have yet to reach the Emirates despite its leadership on the Abraham Accords. The inexplicable failure of the Biden administration to stand with the Emirates on the day of the 2022 Iranian and Yemeni missile and drone attacks will likely strengthen Saudi determination to demand proof of U.S. and Israeli commitment. This makes me think a deal announced as a package may be executed in phases.
The Cipher Brief: A U.S.-Saudi security alliance would be the first such security agreement the U.S. has concluded with a non-democracy since South Korea in 1953. What would such a security agreement look like, and why would Congress approve it?
Roule: We should ask first what Riyadh seeks in a security agreement. The short answer is the confidence that the U.S. will be there in a future security crisis with Iran. The agreement must be worded so as to provide this assurance.
As to the possible elements of an agreement, that answer requires a quick review of the language of our NATO commitment. We should also consider our agreements with Japan and the Organization of American States as alternative models. A common point that might surprise readers is that these agreements do not require that we automatically declare war against aggressors. Declarations of war by the U.S. remains the decision of Congress.
Article 5 of the NATO treaty stipulates that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members who must assist the victim. Article 6 defines “attack” as including hostile action against “forces, vessels, or aircraft.” But the treaty doesn’t say that our response must be a declaration of war against the aggressor or even that our response be military in nature.
Article 5 of the U.S. security treaty with Japan also states that an armed attack against either party will be treated as a common threat. Each signatory will respond according to their respective “constitutional provisions and processes” and report the aggression to the UN Security Council. The language is softer than NATO’s Article 5 but also doesn’t require that either side automatically declare war on the aggressor.
Last, Article 3 of the Organization of American States security treaty declares that an armed attack against a treaty member is considered an attack against all signatories, and each would assist the victim in accordance with the UN charter. Members determine what form their response would take. The OAS would also convene a consultative group to determine collective measures necessary to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere.
Of course, the political gravity of a crisis would pull policymakers in the direction of a military response. But it isn’t difficult to predict that the specifics of the aggression, military wisdom, public opinion, and Congressional decisions will shape the U.S. response.
Many respected voices will argue that a security agreement with the Kingdom would never survive Senate review. Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but I think an agreement based on these broad themes and incorporated into a more comprehensive agreement will succeed if the White House is willing to expend the required political capital. I am not sure the White House is yet prepared to do so. I understand that last week an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to designate Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally was defeated in the Senate.
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The Cipher Brief: Saudi Arabia has been a prominent support of Palestinian issues for decades and a frequent critic of Israeli treatment of Palestinians. How will the Saudi government explain this initiative to its people?
Roule: I expect your readers may be surprised as to the extent this issue is already under public discussion. Only a few days ago, the widely respected Arab News published an editorial on this very issue. I encourage your readers to read it closely.
My sense is that the Saudi leadership will argue that diplomatic relations with Israel benefit the Kingdom’s long-term social and economic ambitions but have not been undertaken by compromising its historic support for Palestinian rights or risking the Kingdom’s stature as a regional leader. On the last point, Riyadh would need to execute a crisp diplomatic strategy to preserve its dominant role in Arab and Islamic institutions that have historically opposed Israel.
The Cipher Brief: What about Israel and the Palestinians?
Roule: Although I think the Saudis are serious about a requirement for significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinian Authority, it is hard to see how this will happen given the political DNA of each side seems to make them incapable of compromise. One wise and long-time observer of the region suggested to me that any victories to the Palestinians may be more rhetorical than practical given these challenges.
As we all know, Israel is in the midst of its greatest political crisis since its establishment. No one seems to know how this will end. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces serious legal charges, and his political survival – and perhaps personal freedom - relies on the support of the most right-wing coalition in Israel’s history. His partners will likely loudly any concessions on settlements. Israel may also ask Washington for additional military and economic support before it drops opposition to the Saudi nuclear program and the provision of sophisticated weapons to the Kingdom.
Whatever sympathy one may have for Palestinians, two realities remain. Gaza is led by a terrorist organization loyal to Iran, and the Palestinian Authority seems incapable of reform under its current leadership. Many observers of the region privately agree that fundamental reform of the Palestinian Authority is likely impossible until President Abbas passes from the scene. But some degree of reform will be required. At the very least, U.S. and Israeli critics will demand assurances that any economic relief will not be funneled into what is commonly called the Palestinian “Pay for Slay” program. We should not underestimate the importance of this issue. A bill is currently moving through the Knesset to enable victims and their families to file claims against terrorist organizations and individuals who incentivize attacks by offering salaries to terrorists.
The Cipher Brief: What would be potential elements of the package to address Palestinian equities?
Roule: The Saudis believe their recognition of Israel requires far more concessions than the temporary restrictions on settlements achieved by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
Press reports state that Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel requires three Israeli concessions: an Israeli promise never to annex the West Bank, an end to settlement expansion and legalization of unauthorized settlements, and the transfer to Palestinian control of land in the West Bank currently under complete Israeli control. The White apparently supports all of these demands. The final agreement may include a substantial aid package to fund Palestinian infrastructure. The deal must restore the Palestinian belief in their future and energize their moribund economy.
An outcome that removes barriers between Palestinian towns reduces travel time for Palestinians within the West Bank and improves transportation links and water supply would transform the lives of Palestinians. Hamas will be a different challenge. Israel recently approved the development of the Gaza Marine Gas Field, which offers the prospect of solving Gaza’s electricity shortage with gas left to export. Accelerating that project will be a valuable incentive to undercut Hamas’ opposition.
Diplomacy is a team sport, and this effort will be no different. Europe, Jordan, and Egypt will need to be engaged early to gain their support if only to undercut President Abbas's and Hamas's inevitable opposition and to endorse the Saudi narrative of the benefits of improved regional integration. Iran will do its best to pressure Hamas to upset a deal, perhaps by instigating a new cycle of violence. Support of these countries will be critical to minimize violence. The administration would be wise to consult with Abu Dhabi to seek its counsel and support.
The Cipher Brief: Let’s consider what establish of Saudi-Israeli relations would mean for China, Russia, and Iran. What issues come to your mind should everything fall into place?
Roule: I don’t think this will change Riyadh’s economic relationship with China and I have always felt that Beijing’s political dominance of the region was unlikely at best. A security alliance between the U.S and Saudi Arabia will confirm the strategic relationship that has existed for 80 years. It will dampen rumors regarding the Kingdom’s use of the yuan in oil sales and likely accelerate the development of a regional relationship with India to compete with Chinese regional commercial ambitions. Fundamental differences will remain between Washington and Riyadh on energy issues, but a strategic partnership will make communication.
Riyadh will likely downplay the idea of a Saudi-Israeli security combine to maintain its current détente with Tehran. Nonetheless, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel would represent a major diplomatic defeat for Iran and its partners. Tehran would need to worry about the possibility of a future security alignment between the region’s two most powerful, wealthy, and technologically rich countries against which it could not hope to compete. Iran may respond by seeking to expand military ties with Moscow and Beijing, particularly regarding technology.
Significant erosion of Saudi ties with Russia is unlikely. Moscow’s influence in the region has been minimal for years, and it isn’t in a position where it can easily discard partners. Regional leaders focus on Russia’s support for Iran, its role in Syria, and its ability to disrupt energy markets, but that is about it. Even so, Riyadh’s invitation to Ukrainian President Zelensky in May and the upcoming gathering of world leaders (sans Russia) to discuss the war says much about how the Saudis view their ties with Russia.
Last, we should expect that other regional countries that recognize Israel may ask why they don’t enjoy a similar U.S. security umbrella. The Emirates and Bahrain have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to the U.S. relationship and will be among the first to experience Iranian aggression in any conflict. It is hard to say they haven’t earned our most serious political, economic, and military support.
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