Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev is now Uzbekistan’s interim president, following the death of long-time leader Islam Karimov, who had been in power since the country’s independence in 1991.
Uzbekistan’s parliament voted Mirziyoyev into the position on Thursday, even though under the Uzbek constitution, the Senate chairman should have taken over. Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev conceded to Mirziyoyev, apparently in a move to maintain stability within the country.
Mirziyoyev is expected to win a presidential election scheduled for the end of this year. Although Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, notes, “Often in these kinds of situations, the first person who is put in charge will not necessarily stay in charge.”
For the time being, Russia seems to be betting money on Mirziyoyev. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Uzbekistan this week to pay respects to the late Karimov, was shown on television embracing Mirziyoyev.
“The Russians will see Karimov’s departure as an opportunity to try to gain more influence,” says Weitz, adding, “Karimov was a tough person to deal with, from Moscow’s point of view, and they probably hope for more from his successor.”
Karimov “blocked certain Russian proposals,” explains Weitz, and refused to join Russia’s international economic group, the Eurasian Economic Union. This is largely because the Uzbeks view themselves as regional leaders and under Karimov, tried to balance Russian influence.
Olga Oliker, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), tells The Cipher Brief that when the Uzbeks collaborated more with the United States in the early 2000s, they wanted the U.S. to act as a counterweight to Russia. The U.S. was never going to play ball, says Oliker.
“The United States has very limited interests in Central Asia,” she says, and the U.S. using bases in Uzbekistan right after America intervened in Afghanistan “distorted” the perception of U.S. interests there.
Historically, especially before 9/11, the partnership was very limited. “With the United States drawing down in Afghanistan, it doesn’t have a particular dog in the fight for Central Asia,” Oliker comments.
William Courtney, a former U.S. diplomat with much experience in Eurasia, has a slightly different take. He tells The Cipher Brief that the U.S. does have interests in the Central Asian region.
These include encouraging territorial integrity, as the individual countries could play key roles for the U.S. in the future, like Uzbekistan when it became important to develop an alternative supply route to Afghanistan. The U.S. also wants to maintain large American energy investments and to support diversified energy supplies around the world, according to Courtney.
However, Courtney, who is now an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and the executive director of the RAND Business Leaders Forum, points out that U.S. involvement in the region is relatively limited. “Western countries don’t have the leverage to affect the succession issue in Uzbekistan,” he notes.
China, on the other hand, takes a bigger interest in Central Asia. “China has been expanding economic ties with all of those Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan – the Chinese are very eager to get uranium and gas and use the country as a transit for pipelines that connect China to some of the other Central Asian countries,” explains Weitz. Although he notes that security cooperation is limited.
Oliker sums up external interests in Uzbekistan as follows: The Chinese are looking to make money, Russia sees the country as in its backyard and sphere of influence (even though the Uzbeks have tried to stave off Russian influence), and the U.S. goes in and out.
Interim President Mirziyoyev will have his hands full trying to balance multiple interests. This goes for internal interests as well. Uzbekistan is not a place governed by institutions and rule of law, says Oliker, but rather, “This is tribes and fiefdoms and groups jockeying for power.”
This means that the country’s security services are going to be something to watch, because they hold a large chunk of that power. Karimov built up a strong internal security apparatus, used both to tackle terrorism and to suppress domestic opposition.
“Wherever you find authoritarian rule, security services play an outsized role [to support the authoritarian regime] and Uzbekistan’s security services have played a very large role,” says Courtney.
“The security services worked for Karimov,” adds Oliker. Therefore, it is extremely important for the next leader – in this case, Mirziyoyev – to keep the Uzbek security services on his side.
While Mirziyoyev juggles foreign influence, internal power struggles, and a powerful security force, he will need to maintain the support of the parliament and the electorate in order to keep his grip on power past this year.
Kaitlin Lavinder is a reporter at The Cipher Brief.
