Turkey has a checkered history with democracy. Since adopting a multiparty parliamentary system, the country has suffered periodic military coups – including a failed putsch last July – designed to reassert the control of traditionalist military and political elites. Now, Turkey faces a new attempt to consolidate power, but not one orchestrated by a military cabal.
On April 16, the Turkish people will vote in a proposed constitutional referendum that could completely transform the country’s governing system. The referendum’s amendments propose to move Turkey from a parliamentary system to a new executive-led government, which would concentrate power in the person of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
If Erdogan is entrusted with new controls over the judiciary, legislature, and state finances, critics fear that he will become a full-fledged dictator, legalizing his de facto control over most aspects of Turkish government. They say he is likely to double down on his purge of suspected coup plotters and political opponents, which has already barred more than 100,000 people from public life. However, polls point to a tight race. As this critical referendum continues to split Turkey along hyper-partisan lines, how far will Erdogan go to find his way to Yes? What might be lost in the process?
Turkey’s plebiscite will ask the electorate to cast a simple Yes/No vote on a slate of 18 proposed amendments to the constitution. Turkey has a long history of constitutional referendums – often heavily politicized – but the amendments proposed in this round are by far the most transformative. If Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) win the Yes vote, the position of prime minister will be abolished and President Erdogan will become both head of state and head of government. He will remain head of the ruling AK Party and will gain the power to appoint cabinet ministers.
All this is relatively normal for a presidential system. However, the amendments sought by Erdogan would also grant him the power to issue legislation by decree, to dissolve parliament and to call new elections at will. According to Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the amendments would give Erdogan “strong control over Turkish finances and the judiciary branch.” Under the new system, Erdogan would personally appoint half of the judges in Turkey. A parliament controlled by his AKP would appoint the other half.
The proposed changes would give Erdogan unparalleled authority over the military and security apparatus. He would have the power to declare a state of emergency at will. In fact, the upcoming referendum will be held under a state of emergency, declared by Erdogan after the attempted military coup against him last July.
In short, says Cagaptay, a Yes vote will “crown the process of power consolidation in Erdogan’s hands... [He] will become the most unassailable Turkish politician since Turkey became a multi-party democracy in the 1950s.”
It is no surprise, then, that Erdogan and his political allies have been campaigning vigorously to pass the referendum package, which they claim is necessary to transcend the inefficiencies of parliamentary coalition-building. However, despite their efforts, polls show an extremely tight race. Erdogan and the AKP have a deep, reliable base of support, which they have built on a platform of positive economic growth since their rise to power in 2002. Economic growth appears to be flagging now.
“There is also a dark side to his [Erdogan’s] electoral strategy,” says Cagaptay, “which focuses on demonizing, brutalizing, and cracking down on electorates or demographics that are not likely to vote for him.” This strategy has been bolstered by Erdogan’s purge of more than 100,000 military officers, civil service members, academics, and journalists who, he claims, were behind last year’s coup attempt.
However, though effective, Erdogan’s tactics seems to have run their course in Turkey. At this point, Cagaptay observes, Erdogan has run out of supposed adversaries to target. Erdogan “can’t cast any more groups as ‘enemies of the people’,” Cagaptay says, “... [because] if he uses the same attack on any new group, the opposition will become the majority.”
This reality has led Erdogan to turn towards another target, the European Union. Over the past month, already-tense relations between Turkey and the European Union – particularly Germany and the Netherlands – have taken a nosedive. After Dutch and German leaders cancelled political rallies designed gin up support for Erdogan among Turkey’s large expat community in their countries, Erdogan called the Netherlands “the capital of fascism” and accused Germany of “fascist actions.”
Turkish officials have threatened to end the Turkish migrant deal with Europe and to hold a referendum on “Brexiting” from the Turkish EU accession process.
Such grandstanding seems designed to burnish Erdogan’s nationalist credentials as he tries to peel away key votes from the nationalist minority opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). But why is the president willing to damage critical Turkey-EU relations for this vote?
True, the referendum will confer historic authority upon Erdogan. Yet these are powers that he already possesses in a de facto sense. The reason, says former Turkish parliamentarian Aykan Erdemir, is that Erdogan wants to “legalize that fait accompli.”
Erdemir says Erdogan wants to secure legal protections against any future attack on his rule. The amended constitution would give Erdogan extensive tools to block or sidestep a future effort to impeach him. Even if an impeachment case were to reach the supreme court, says Erdemir, the judges “will be those he himself has appointed, directly or indirectly.” In a country with a long history of political upheaval, Erdemir believes that “Erdogan well knows the importance of lifetime immunity, and the consequences of going without.”
This mindset helps explain the importance of the referendum to Erdogan, as well as the lengths to which he and his aides are going to secure a Yes vote.
If Erdogan wins the referendum vote, Cagaptay says, he will have proven that he can win elections “by casting Europeans the new enemy.” Win or lose in April, Erdogan may find it impossible to resist using this strategy again, against a designated “enemy.” Europe today, perhaps the United States tomorrow.
Fritz Lodge is an international producer at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @FritzLodge.
