EXPERT INTERVIEW — Has the nearly eight-decade post-World War II transatlantic alliance just seen a paradigm shift, in a single week? Or is it more of a blip, a bump in the road for one of the globe’s most robust geopolitical relationships? Those are among questions facing the U.S. and its European allies after a dizzying series of recent developments: President Donald Trump’s outreach to Russian President Vladimir Putin; Trump’s public criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — calling him a “dictator” and blaming him for for the war in Ukraine; the sidelining of the Europeans in U.S.-led talks about ending the war in Ukraine; and a blistering attack on European democracy put forth by Vice President JD Vance.
European leaders have responded with confusion and anger. “We will decide for ourselves what happens to our democracy," German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said in response to Vance's remarks. French President Emmanuel Macron, who is due to visit Trump on Monday, said he planned to tell the American president that “You can’t be weak in the face of President Putin. It’s not you, it’s not your trademark, it’s not in your interest. How can you then be credible in the face of China if you’re weak in the face of Putin?”
Across Europe, meanwhile, there were pledges to bolster support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, and to plan for a future that relies far less on Washington.
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker said Trump's comments had echoed "Putin's narrative" and were well off the mark. "When you think about dictators, Putin's been in power for 25 years," Volker said. "I think he qualifies far more than Zelensky does." But in a wide-ranging interview with The Cipher Brief, Volker also said doesn’t believe that the damage to the U.S.-Europe alliance is irreparable.
"There's a lot of structure and underpinning to the U.S.-European relationship, including through NATO," he said, "that doesn't just go away overnight just because the president wants to make deals."
Ambassador Volker spoke with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity. You can also watch the full interview at The Cipher Brief YouTube channel.
Nagorski: Let me start with a fundamental question that would have seemed like hyperbole a few days ago: Are we witnessing a truly historic shift here – and maybe even the end of the transatlantic alliance as we know it?
Volker: I don't think so, but we are seeing some troubling things. There's no doubt about that. But we'll have to see how this plays out. I have followed all the Ukraine developments very closely and have had a few conversations with some people who've been involved in that on the European side.
Let's start with President Trump's outburst against President Zelensky. He called him a “dictator without elections.” He said he had better change things soon or he won't have a country. And he said that Ukraine should have never started the war – and of course, Ukraine didn't start the war.
I have a couple of reactions to that. First off, it is 180 degrees from where President Trump was on his first day in office, when he tweeted that Putin needs to end the war and he's prepared to escalate through sanctions or otherwise if Putin doesn't. Here, he didn't mention Russia or Putin at all. When you think about dictators, Putin's been in power for 25 years. I think he qualifies far more than Zelensky does. And it was Russia who started this war. And as President Trump has said in the past, it was started largely because, as Trump perceived it, as I think Putin perceived it, there was a lack of resolve in the West, a weakness in the Biden administration that Putin wanted to exploit. So [Trump] has completely gone in the opposite direction in the most recent set of exchanges.
One thing I can think of to explain this is that he's irritated with Zelensky. And so he is ramping up the pressure on him. Irritated because he presented this draft deal on access to Ukraine's natural resources as payment for U.S. support for Ukraine. And it was an amateurish, one-sided proposition. It looked like it was written by a New York law firm intern. And it was rejected by Zelensky saying, No, that's not how this is going to work. [The draft] basically said the U.S. gets 50% of all the revenue from Ukraine's natural resources in perpetuity, full stop. No commitments from the United States, no time limit, no dollar limit, just, you give us. So of course that's unreasonable. It even said that if there are disputes, that they get resolved under New York law, which of course in an international treaty is nonsense. So these are things that can still be done, but they were not done well at all. In the first draft here, Zelensky rejected it, and I think that got Trump irritated.
And Zelensky was irritated at the Munich Security Conference, partly because of this and partly because of Vance's speech. So he also poked at Trump a little bit. And then just the other day, he said Trump was living in a disinformation bubble. So I think that's what Trump is lashing out against.
Now, there's other things too, because in what Trump said, he is repeating Putin's narrative – about Zelensky not being a democratically elected leader, and Zelensky having started the war and Zelensky needing to end the war. And that is troubling, because that is the opposite of what's really going on here.
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Nagorski: In terms of the damage done over the last several days to the alliance with the Europeans, I heard Anne Applebaum, with the Atlantic, who was also at Munich, and she said that fundamentally, Europe can no longer count on the United States right now as a friend. Do you think that's an exaggeration?
Volker: Well, that's a careful phrase. "Count on the U.S. as a friend.” I think Donald Trump is very transactional, so the fact that he may like you doesn't necessarily mean he's going to do what you want him to do. He wants to make a transaction. Whether the U.S. can be counted on in that sense – OK, We're allies, we're partners, we have interests, you have interests, I think generally yes. And there's a lot of structure and underpinning to the U.S.-European relationship, including through NATO, that doesn't just go away overnight just because the president wants to make deals. So I think it's deeper than that.
About the feeling in Munich. I was surprised that our European allies were surprised. JD Vance was not going to go there and talk about foreign policy and national security. That's not his lane in the Trump administration. He is the Appalachia guy. He's the guy who's leading on recovering our country from a progressive left and culture wars against the American people and anti-globalism and all that. So I fully expected him to go and make a political, philosophical speech along those lines — how Donald Trump is making America great again, and Europe needs to do the same thing because they are also going through that same cultural battle, political battle and, as he sees it, Europe is losing its identity, it's losing its Westernness, if you will, through what he described as lack of freedom, lack of free speech through political correctness and that progressive ideology. Most of the people in Munich are part of that center-left, center-right establishment, so they took offense at this. So it did create a lot of friction in Munich.
But I think the proper response from Europe would have been just to say, Well, thank you very much. We're glad to have your opinion. We're dealing with these issues too. And in fact, here in Germany, we have an election this week and everything's going to be fine. That would have been the right way, but they got too emotional.
Nagorski: You've been the American ambassador at NATO. For all the ups and downs, unity within the NATO alliance has been, I think most would argue, a great silver lining in the last three years [since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine]. And in one fell swoop, we've gone from that knitted-together support for the Ukrainians against the dictator, as you said, Vladimir Putin, to a whole new engagement with the dictator, and calling the other guy [Zelensky] a dictator. How would you assuage the Europeans about all that?
Volker: That's a great question. Fortunately, I don't have to do that. [Ukraine envoy retired Lt. Gen.] Keith Kellogg was at NATO on Monday and he tried to do that. Keith Kellogg is now the president's special representative for Ukraine. He has a very solid understanding of the facts and a solid understanding of who's who and what's what with NATO and Ukraine and Russia. So he was talking them through where we are.
If it were me and I were talking with Europeans, I'd say, look, I think what Donald Trump tweeted overnight is more out of pique and certainly not based on the facts. It may reflect his attitude, and if so, that's a concern, but it's not irredeemable. But when you look at the real world, we have differences here, but I think reality has a way of bringing things back to ground zero. I think we're going to have a ceasefire in Ukraine, hopefully this year. But once you have a ceasefire, you need to make it permanent. That means deterring Russia from future attacks. Deterrence requires NATO, or least NATO countries, and the ability to use force. President Trump is hoping for greater burden sharing, and he talks about this all the time. He wants European allies to spend 5 % of GDP on defense. So, he's hoping that Europe takes the lead in providing that deterrence against future Russian attacks.
So – a ceasefire, deterrence, burden sharing, that's where I think things are headed, kind of inexorably in that direction, even though we have these emotionally charged differences right now.
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Nagorski: Speaking of deterring Russia, it was President Zelensky who said that there should now be an “Army for Europe." And I guess from his perspective, he’s not sure Europe can count on the United States. When you hear that phrase, "Army for Europe," what comes to mind? What do you think is needed and can it be done?
Volker: I was there and listened to his speech and it struck me as being almost equal measure, We Europeans, meaning Ukraine and Europe, we have to protect Europe against the Russians, and against the Americans. And that is probably one of the reasons that Trump got angry.
If Europe produced an army or a military capability and it were unified in whatever way, I think Trump would be happy about that. That's kind of what he's been agitating for – you guys, you Europeans, should take care of your own security. So it's one of those cases where you see Europe perhaps moving to do the right things, but for the wrong reasons. They should have been developing the European security capability for decades because it's their responsibility and their interest. And yet, if there's any momentum to do it now, it's only because of their anger with Donald Trump.
Nagorski: I saw reports that France and Great Britain are considering a force of 30,000. Do you have any thoughts – if the idea is to deter the Russians, and clearly now we're not just talking about deterring another assault on Ukraine, but perhaps on the Baltics or Poland or what have you – on the size of such a force? And politically and militarily, how prepared do you think the Europeans are to come up with something that can do that job?
Volker: What is interesting here is that the French called this meeting after the Munich conference with the British, Germans, Danes, and others to talk about just this very thing. And they left without any common view, which was kind of disappointing. I thought this was a moment where they could actually be defining what their contribution [to a security force] could be. That would be a very constructive way to engage the Trump administration, but they didn't manage to do that.
As for numbers, it starts with the mission. What is the purpose of a force? And the purpose is clearly to deter new Russian aggression in Ukraine, but potentially elsewhere as well. And what therefore is required for that deterrence to be credible? And in a serious capacity, it's going to have to have some backup from the United States. It doesn't have to be the U.S. in the lead, but enablers like intelligence and reconnaissance surveillance and so forth. And it's going to have to have some potential for air power response. And it's going to have to have a rule of engagement about what to do if fired on by Russia, or if Russia fires on Ukrainians and breaks the ceasefire. So it's going to have to be prepared to fire back. Those are tough decisions to make. And that's what the Europeans are going to have to think through.
And when you talk about mission, Zelensky was assuming you'd have European forces lined up all along the front line, which I don't see as a useful mission. There's plenty of Ukrainians who are better capable and battle-hardened and they're ready to be there. I think the European role would be more training, equipping and assisting, and particularly assisting with air defense, and then the ability to provide additional backup as needed, including from others in NATO. So that means a size of 30,000 could be about right, if the mission is defined properly and if they answer that question about what to do if Russia violates.
Nagorski: We've had folks telling us that even if there are no U.S. boots on the ground, that it's quite important that there be some U.S. involvement. What are your thoughts on that? Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, said that from the Kremlin's perspective, if there isn't any American backing, involvement, command and control, what have you, that would send a pretty weak signal to the Kremlin. Do you agree?
Volker: I completely agree. That's the political and the symbolic argument, which I think Ben is right about, that Putin pays attention to that. But then there's also a practical argument on things like satellites, things like intelligence, things like logistical support. Europeans don't have everything they need, and so some U.S. backup support like that would be important. And then from an American interests point of view, if we participate, we have influence. That should be something that I think any administration would want, so that we're not seeing Europeans by themselves go do something and not have any influence over how that goes, and then potentially having liabilities if it goes badly.
Nagorski: Bottom line, back to where we began: how high is your level of alarm or concern about this rupture over the last eight days?
Volker: Not as high as others. I think that there's a lot of emotion in the air right now. But I also think you have some steady hands like [National Security Advisor] Mike Waltz or [Secretary of State] Marco Rubio. I think you have interests that will drive us in a certain direction, even if some of the static is still in the air. But it is going to take a lot of work and a lot of effort. And I hope too that we stay focused on what Trump says and has said for months: peace through strength. I hope we stay focused on establishing that position of American strength rather than doing the opposite, rather than giving things away preemptively or rather than selling out Ukraine and letting Putin have what he wants, because that's going to be perceived around the world as weakness.
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