CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The United States is undergoing a “reluctant” Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which emerging combat technologies are either autonomous or commanded by humans at safe distances rather than in the immediate proximity of conflict.
The country faces an imperative to “uncrew” considerable portions of power projection and defense in order to mitigate risks and costs and is doing so in the cyber and space domains. In our physical domain on Earth, however, defense professionals do not fully embrace this imperative when it involves replacing heavier, more traditional maneuver forces. The root causes of this paradox include intangibles such as hubris, tradition, and emotion. We are dragging our feet through an important portion of this RMA-and unless we lose our reluctance, we risk losing our warfighting advantage over less industrialized adversaries (including terrorists).
This series of perspectives focuses on four objectives. First, to describe the RMA and test its legitimacy. Second, to test whether we are reluctant in embracing the RMA. Third, to identify factors behind our reluctance (which few, if any publications have done thus far). And fourth, to conclude by recommending steps to reverse the reluctance so we can move on with twenty-first century military readiness.
Scholar Dima Adamsky defines RMA as “a major military innovation in which new organizational structures, together with novel concepts of operations, usually but not always driven by new weaponry, change the conduct of warfare.” The term regained traction in the writings and testimonies of Andy Marshall, who served as Director of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Department of Defense from 1973 to 2015. In fact, Adamsky cites Marshall specifically with a more detailed checklist of “profound and multi-dimensional change” in command and control, organizational structures, doctrine and weapons. Adamsky also suggests that an RMA involves the “changing character of war”, which will be an important descriptor once we begin testing our theories with current scholarship.
But before testing anything, we need to better describe this RMA. This revolution is the advent of uncrewed attack and defensive platforms, which remove combat’s proximate risk to humans who (a) actively control these uncrewed platforms, or (b) program them to operate autonomously. Admittedly, that is a mouthful. For a revolution of this complexity and importance, we will abridge its nomenclature to “drones, codes and spacecraft,” offering three brief descriptions.
“Drones” refer to uncrewed assets that operate within the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans and land masses. “Codes” refer broadly to computer programs that beget their own attack and defense vectors in cyberspace – or enable understanding, efficiency, and autonomy during the operation of other uncrewed assets. “Spacecraft” connotes a burgeoning satellite constellation of sensors and communication relays that enables all of the above. Likewise, the space domain provides a potential attack vector for adversaries who choose to violate the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
For a decade following the 1990 Gulf War, scholarship scratched incrementally at the surface of this RMA as our newest warfighting domains of space and cyberspace emerged and matured. Consider the Fall 1999 Airpower Journal” article by Colin Gray and John Sheldon, “Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs.” Gray and Sheldon, while lamenting an overuse of the RMA moniker, cite as many as eight RMAs that vied for academic traction between 1991 and 1998. These included revolutions in information warfare, precise intelligence for strike warfare, and information on cyber war, air power, space power, strategic affairs, security affairs and political affairs.
Our proposed RMA in “drones, codes, and spacecraft” touches upon several of Gray’s listed revolutions, now informed by three decades of technological development and practice. Although the “RMA” moniker lost popularity at the turn of the century, while the United States led a global war against terrorists such as al Qaeda and ISIS, the time is right to bring back the parlance – particularly given our defense policy shift toward strategic competition. In a 2024 Foreign Affairs article, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Army General Mark Milley, identified the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and drone technology as reflective of the change in the character of war. As cited earlier, Adamsky cites that a change in the character of war is, indeed, indicative of an RMA.
We can better judge whether this series correctly applies “RMA” to the use of uncrewed and remotely or autonomously controlled military capabilities if we briefly evaluate this revolution with Marshall’s checklist:
Command-and-Control (C2): For the most prevalent “drones” in our arsenal, the United States Air Force has invested command authorities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operators who will never be physically proximate to combat but who can have target engagement authority (normally delegated by a combatant commander). While proving reluctance is the topic of our next section, the C2 portion of this RMA checklist does provide one early glimpse of sluggishness. Specifically, the United States has delayed public discourse on autonomous (i.e. without human intervention) positive-identification and target engagement for drone attacks against unwitting enemies. This is juxtaposed against our comfort with defensive autonomy as demonstrated by fully automatic modes in Patriot and Aegis ballistic missile defense as well as Close-In Weapon Systems on ships. If this RMA runs its course, there may be fewer commanders making offensive decisions in a vertical sequence.
Regarding the “codes and spacecraft” portions of this RMA, the C2 block of Marshall’s checklist is satisfied based on the emergence of two related Combatant Commanders in the last 20 years. While neither United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) nor United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs physical contact between human combatants, these four-star commanders exist to direct offensive and defensive uses of force. Similarly, C2 in these domains is occurring at lower levels, as space components and cyber components (typically three-stars and lower) now have roles in the services and other geographic and functional combatant commands.
Organizational structures: In the “spacecraft” portion of our proposed RMA, there is an entirely new service (the United States Space Force, or USSF) dedicated to training and equipping those military members (referred to as “Guardians”) assigned to the domain of space. Their writ is to protect United States interests both in space and from space – but without being physically located in the vast domain.
As for “drones and codes,” there are now designations and career paths for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) pilots and unmanned surface fleet operators, as well as for Interactive On-Net (ION) professionals, Exploitation Analysts (EA), and cyber architects. While there has been congressional debate over whether a new “Cyber Force” should train and equip our cyber warriors, there is no equivalent debate regarding a “Drone Force” – as the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines choose to treat their drone capabilities as integral elements of maneuver in their own domains. [Note: the intention to form an Autonomous Warfare Command announced nearly two years after this paper was first penned.]
Doctrine: Doctrine for technology “from afar” is evolving rapidly – particularly for the application of models derived from Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML). There have been National Security Memorandums for AI, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) launched the Department of Defense’s (DoD) first pilot program to accredit AI models along a risk-continuum. The Accreditation of GEOINT AI Models (AGAIM) governs visual models and inferences needed for targeting, warning, and safety of navigation. NGA was the first defense agency to standardize and implement responsible AI training for all members of the enterprise who touch AI-related code. As for space, the first Chief of Space Operations, General Raymond, considered the doctrinal codification of “space control” to be a cornerstone of launching the Space Force itself.
Weapons: This RMA may have begun in earnest in the 1990s with the acquisition and utilization of General Atomics’ MQ-1 Predator. That platform, with its wing-loaded Hellfire missiles, captured public attention in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom – only to give rise to the larger, more capable MQ-9 Reaper. With its longer range, faster speeds and heavier combat load, the MQ-9 remains the United States’ UAV workhorse. Uncrewed technologies have entered the maritime domain as well, with Unmanned Surface Vessels playing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance roles for extended periods. New, remote weapons in the cyber realm are tough to pin down, as they are rarely confirmed in unclassified annals. Most agree that Stuxnet malware (which reporting suggests was used against Iran’s nuclear program as early as 2007) became the first cyber weapon known to the public, although never officially acknowledged.
This series of articles could dedicate considerable detail to each of Marshall’s criteria in every facet of our proposed RMA – but that exceeds our intent of identifying and diagnosing sources of reluctance. Marshall’s criteria are satisfied for our purposes, and we will continue applying the “RMA” nomenclature to non-proximate combat involving “drones, codes and spacecraft.”
Part Two of this series focuses on identifying and testing our reluctance as this special series continues all week in The Cipher Brief.
Editorial note: This is the first in a four-part series from former National Geospatial-Intelligence Director VADM Frank Whitworth (Ret.) on the reluctant revolution in military affairs and what it means for future intelligence and defense. This series of perspectives was adapted from a previous white paper written by the author two years ago, while he was on active duty. Read all four parts of the series exclusively in The Cipher Brief this week and please note that the views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or endorsement of factual accuracy of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or the United States.
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