In April 1980, Navy helicopters flown by Marine pilots set out to meet Air Force transports carrying Army assaulters at a strip in the Iranian desert called Desert One. Eight servicemen died there. The review that followed blamed an organization assembled for the occasion, in which each Service had a role, and whose lines of authority had never been clearly drawn. The Pentagon’s answer came on January 1, 1984, when it created the Joint Special Operations Agency. The agency had a name and a place on the organization chart. It had neither operational nor command authority over any special operations force, and it did little to improve their readiness. In 1986, Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen wrote a different answer into the defense authorization bill. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs led the Pentagon’s opposition and offered a three-star command instead. Congress refused. The law it passed that autumn established a four-star command with its own budget program. U.S. Special Operations Command stood up the following April, the only combatant command ever created by an act of Congress.
A year before that law, another command was created to integrate forces the Services held separately. U.S. Space Command was activated in September 1985 without a statute to back it. On October 1, 2002, the Pentagon shut it down and folded its mission into Strategic Command. The country rebuilt it in August 2019, seventeen years later. The command written into law still stands. The command created without a law was removed without one.
Desert One taught that integration takes a command. Space Command taught that a command takes a law. Both lessons were paid for. The first cost eight lives and seven years. The second cost seventeen years. The question before this Congress is whether the country must wait for another failure or can charter the Autonomous Warfare Command deliberately and with forethought, while the choice is still its own.
Last week, I argued that the Autonomous Warfare Command must earn its place inside the budget that will actually pass. The command exists by a memorandum the Secretary of War signed on September 30. It promised the command its own people, budget, and authority to buy. None of the three exists in law. Of the $54.6 billion requested for autonomous warfare, all but $1 billion sits in a reconciliation bill the Senate has not scheduled. The command stands where special operations stood in 1984 and where Space Command stood in 2002, with a name the Department gave it and nothing behind it that the next Secretary could not undo.
The authority is a separate question from the money. The leaders of the two Armed Services committees are negotiating the annual defense policy bill, which dies with this Congress on January 3. The Senate’s version permits the Pentagon to establish a four-star command for autonomous systems. The House’s version says nothing. If the negotiators keep the Senate’s language, the command will be permitted, and a permitted command is Space Command over again: it exists until someone decides it should not. The negotiators should write the charter now, before a failure writes it for them. It needs three things a memorandum cannot give.
The first is the word “shall.” Permission leaves the command’s existence to each Secretary in turn and to each budget season. The Services are not waiting. The Army has already named its component for a command that exists only on paper. A command that may exist will be the first thing traded when the Services defend their own lines. A command that shall exist must be reckoned with.
The second is its own money. A command funded through the Services answers to the Services, which is why the 1986 law gave special operations a budget program of their own. I served six commanders at Indo-Pacific Command and one at Special Operations Command. All seven could say exactly what the fight required. Only one could buy it, and he could because Congress said so in 1986. The charter should give this command its own budget line, even if the first year holds only a billion dollars. The amount can grow. Ownership cannot be added later without fighting the same battle again.
The third matters most: the power to decide, which is what integration means. The command needs authority to buy, to set the architecture that every Service’s systems must meet, and to rule when two theaters want the same systems on the same day. Its commander must be confirmed by the Senate. Desert One was coordination, with four Services each assigned a part. Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates. An office created by memorandum can assign tasks among the Services. Only a command with its own budget, its own buying authority, and a confirmed commander can arbitrate among them.
On November 19 in Shenzhen, the President is scheduled to meet with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin together for the first time. Both spent this month operating below the line at which America has used its power, with drills around Taiwan and claimed strikes on merchant ships in the Black Sea. That is the contest this command was created for, and it has already begun. If the next failure comes, it will not come on a rescue mission. It will come in that contest, among systems each Service built for itself, and a charter written afterward will be too late. A memorandum tells adversaries what one Secretary intended. A law tells them what the country decided.
Industry should read the compromise text as it would a contract. Under “may,” each Service maintains its own drone program, interfaces, and buyers, and the rational company builds a version of the same system for each. Under “shall,” with one budget line and one architecture, there is a single buyer who will reject anything that does not integrate. The companies that will matter are already building for the second case, with open interfaces and systems that operate under someone else’s command and control.
Congress wrote Special Operations Command into law despite the Department’s objection, and it has outlasted every Secretary since. Congress was right, and the command still arrived seven years after Desert One. The negotiators have a few weeks and one word to choose. The last charter was written after the failure. This one can be written before it.
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