KREMLIN FILES/COLUMN: As Washington's attention continues to be diverted with an Iran unwilling to come to a comprehensive peace, a more dangerous question lurks in the strategic shadows: what if America's most daunting rivals, one of whom is already at war, and the other not, decide to act with what they see as a historic imperative to change the global order? A Russian attack, for instance, against the Baltics and a move against Taiwan might not require a secret Sino-Russian war plan—only the same strategic conclusion in Moscow and Beijing that the moment is ripe. In such a scenario, would Russia and China share intelligence, coordinate contingency planning, or align potential operational timelines? Or is the greater risk something subtler: parallel opportunism fueled by intelligence miscalculation about U.S. resolve and capacity.
These questions are no longer theoretical. They spark lively debates among think tanks, military leaders, and allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The idea of simultaneous crises, one in Eastern Europe and another in the Taiwan Strait, has become a common thread in war games and policy papers. War with Iran now also raises the specter of whether one or both of our adversaries may act opportunistically if the U.S. becomes bogged down in a prolonged campaign. However, the debate and war games are often focused on the wrong factor: whether Beijing and Moscow would officially coordinate an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
History suggests a more unsettling possibility. Great powers with converging interests do not need an integrated command structure to complicate American and allied strategy. They need only recognize opportunity when it appears. Could the U.S. and its allies respond effectively if challenged by both China and Russia, or, given recent heavy U.S. involvement now in Iran, might one or both engage in aggression while the U.S.is already at war?
On the eve of the conflagration that became World War II, the United States was content to sit in isolation, and debate raged over whether to pursue those policies or to stand with Europe against the Axis. The UK was fighting for its survival since 1939, France had surrendered to Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union was on the brink of complete annihilation of its armies by the end of 1941. The Germans in December were 20 km from the Kremlin's towers on the very approaches to Moscow. That same week, Japan attacked the United States in an unprecedented event that FDR labelled "a day which will live in infamy." Americans have not forgotten that day, and we never should.
But we should also not forget, as was revealed after the war, that there was no meaningful collaboration between Nazi Germany and Japan on their war policies, nor on strategy more broadly. Hitler acted on what he saw as an opportunity and declared war on the United States within days of Pearl Harbor, despite little to no consultation or joint planning with Japan. It is an example of two expansionist powers that had an alliance but still acted independently, taking advantage of each other's actions. Similarly, Japan decided not to go to war with the Soviet Union, knowing it could potentially be overwhelmed by China and the USSR in Manchuria. Countries will do what is in their own interest, despite alliances.
Both axis powers suffered from poor strategic intelligence. Hitler had no idea Japan was about to attack the United States, nor did he anticipate the ire and resolve of the American people. In turn, Joseph Stalin would have known more about Germany's attack on the USSR than Japan did if he had only listened to his spy Richard Sorge, who was well placed in Japan among Nazi circles. Sorge, a Russian “illegal” posing as a German, gained the trust of the Nazi ambassador in Tokyo. He accurately reported on the German attack to come but was caught and executed by Japanese counterintelligence. Tragically for the USSR, Sorge’s intelligence, which did not fit the dictator's view of events, was ignored. It is a lesson for our time as well.
Russia and China are not formally aligned like the Axis powers were. Among their intelligence agencies—the Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) on one side, and the Ministry of State Security together with the PLA's Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau on the other— there is very little trust. For decades, and despite their claims of an "alliance without limits," they have distrusted each other nearly as much as they do their "main enemy," which the Russian agencies still refer to as the United States.
Fortunately, China and Russia have never had any intelligence-sharing relationships or broad agreements like the U.S. has with NATO, nor anything close to our extensive intelligence-sharing alliances under "Five Eyes." What they do share stems from a common intelligence culture, rooted in the early Cold War, when Moscow served as a training ground for generations of Chinese intelligence leaders, hosted at NKVD and later KGB academies. This tradition persisted throughout the Cold War and continues today, with the SVR keeping long-term training relationships at its "AVR" foreign intelligence academy for students from countries they consider allies, including China. In turn, the Russians try to recruit these guest intelligence students as penetrations into their allies' services. The Chinese do the same with Russian delegations.
Despite their distrust, intelligence systems in both countries could still drive their powers to war against the U.S., even absent joint military policy and potential "war plans." Crucially, internal pressures within both systems may heighten the current risk of global war more than at any time in decades. Russia's intelligence services remain under scrutiny after serious misjudgments that preceded the invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s intelligence agencies, especially the FSB, fed the Kremlin overly optimistic assessments about Ukraine's weakness, in part because institutional incentives discouraged delivering unwelcome truths. Additional embarrassment—from failures surrounding Venezuela and other foreign ventures which have blindsided Putin—has intensified pressure within those same services (for example, Putin reportedly was furious at SVR Director Naryshkin over the latter's failure to give any warning how far the U.S. would go in Venezuela; it continues Putin's long-term dissatisfaction with his foreign intelligence service and its head, as witnessed in February 2022 when he embarrassed Naryshkin publicly, asking him to "speak plainly, Sergey!").
Russia has been at war for four years. If one tunes in to one of the many state-run TV channels any given night, the Russian people are fed a narrative that they have been in a state of war, allegedly with NATO directly, for years. How much of a stretch is it for the SVR and their sister intelligence services —beaten down with Russia's military after four years, but adapting and recovering still from heavy losses —to convince Putin to take advantage of a distracted United States and potentially fractured NATO to make a move, even a limited one, in the Baltics?
There’s another aspect of the three main Russian intelligence services that is not fully understood in the West. They are constantly at each other’s throats, competing for any light from their great leader, and undermining each other at every turn. And in an atmosphere of constant distrust, they are forever in a game of one-upsmanship. This contributes to the risk that, in an effort to impress the boss, the Russian services will continue escalatory hybrid war actions in Europe that could stumble them, and NATO, into a much larger conflagration.
China faces a different but related problem. Purges within the People's Liberation Army and security apparatus have shaken the institutional confidence of Beijing's intelligence community. Analysts in their military intelligence arms tasked with judging whether China is truly ready for war over Taiwan may feel pressure to validate political timelines rather than challenge them. The removal of Xi's "big brother" from the leadership leaves few willing to challenge Xi's decision-making. His services are more likely to tell him what he wants to hear, now more than ever.
When intelligence becomes politicized, the danger is not simply miscalculation. It is acceleration. The United States has experienced this problem in its own history; our own intelligence community did not provide its best analysis for the American people in the pressure-cooker environment after 9/11, and the lead-up to the start of the Iraq war in 2003. Our rivals are hardly immune. The result can be decisions based not on reality, but on what leaders want to hear.
That dynamic—combined with global distraction—is precisely how great-power crises cascade. Germany's decision to declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor was not a coordinated strategy so much as an opportunistic escalation. The lesson endures: wars spread when adversaries believe the moment is ripe.
Chinese leaders might conclude that the moment to coerce Taiwan (by blockade, for instance), or move directly for reunification has arrived if the U.S. continues to deplete key weapons' stocks in Iran, and with Europe focused on a resurgent Russia. The logic would not require coordination with Moscow or Tehran, and coincides with the 100th year of the PLA’s founding in 2027, a date Xi has long marked on the calendar. Indeed, the scenario is more threatening with sequential opportunism: Russia moves first against the Baltics, even in a limited fashion over some false pretext or minor land grab; but, and this is key, creating a European crisis beyond the already fractured alliance touch points over Ukraine. China then exploits the distraction, or the scenarios are flipped. Both now, regrettably, are equally plausible. Both might also be fed by poor intelligence on all sides.
Certainly, Russia and China would love to divide the world between their aggressive and imperialist ambitions, just like Japan and Germany dreamed of ninety years ago. Their policies demonstrate that. It is up to the United States and our allies to demonstrate a real deterrent, one that will never allow this century to be later termed a Russian century, nor a Chinese one.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
