With the conclusion of the final Nuclear Security Summit, Russia and the United States - the possesors of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals – are both in the midst of comprehensive nuclear weapons modernization efforts. The Cipher Brief spoke to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, Dr. Evelyn Farkas, to see how these modernization efforts fit within nuclear arms control regimes.
The Cipher Brief: Recent reports state that Russia’s additions to its nuclear weapons arsenal put it above the terms of the New START treaty. What does this signal about Russian intentions regarding the posture of its strategic forces on one hand and its commitment to denuclearization treaties on the other?
Dr. Evelyn Farkas: Russia and the United States have until February 2018 to comply with the New START Treaty, so at this point it is premature to draw firm conclusions. Nonetheless, both countries should communicate clearly and transparently with one another regarding their modernization and other changes or upgrades to their strategic forces. It is in the interest of the United States, Russia and the world to have both countries reduce the size of their respective arsenals. This is also a first step towards global reductions, and ultimately, elimination of nuclear weapons.
TCB: What can US policy makers do to improve compliance with New START? Is a new framework necessary?
EF: The Russian record on arms control compliance has been getting worse over the last several years in the nuclear and conventional areas. In the nuclear realm, the biggest issue is Russia’s violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Unfortunately, if Russia does not step back from its new missile and program, the United States and our European allies will need to take action ourselves, including potentially placing our own intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. Compliance with START has been generally good, but if that has changed, I would not be surprised, given the Russian government’s attitude towards arms control compliance.
More alarming is Russia’s perspective on tactical nuclear weapons and the Russian doctrine that allows for first use of a nuclear weapon in response to a conventional attack, if the existence of the state is at stake. Russian statements reminding other nations about their nuclear weapons have also been alarming in tone and frequency, lacking the prudence and respect for the taboo on nuclear use that the United States government models and works to further worldwide. The U.S. government would welcome an opportunity to work with Russia to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, not only to dissuade reliance on them, but also to minimize proliferation and accidents. Unfortunately, the Russian government does not appear interested in such negotiations.
TCB: Currently, there is a debate within the U.S. over modernizing our nuclear forces. In light of Russia’s new interest in expanding its own nuclear forces, what is the potential for this modernization effort to spur a new nuclear arms race with Russia?
EF: As long as the United States and Russia possess strategic nuclear forces, the United States must keep its arsenal safe and modernized. This can be achieved simultaneously with diplomatic efforts to further draw down numbers of strategic nuclear forces. A nuclear arms race is not a foregone conclusion.
TCB: What are the repercussions of allowing US nuclear forces to become obsolete?
EF: If our nuclear weapons are allowed to become obsolete, our ability to deter Russia will suffer, if not disappear. Like it or not, as long as Russia and other countries maintain nuclear arsenals, we must as well.
We should also be mindful of the words of the Graham-Talent Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (of which I was Executive Director), which reminded us “Of all America’s interests involving Russia, none is more vital than reducing the risk of the accidental or intentional use of nuclear and biological weapons from a source in Russia.” While we work to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and to strengthen the nuclear taboo, we should also remain ready to resume work with Russia on securing nuclear material on the territory of the Russian Federation and worldwide.
