EXPERT ANALYSIS — Almost no one saw it coming.
Early on the morning of October 7, 2023, thousands of Hamas fighters broke through Israel’s southern border in a violent raid that became a long day of carnage and terror. When it was over, 1200 people were dead, and the killers had taken 251 others back to Gaza as hostages.
But in many ways, it wasn’t over. And it still isn’t, one year later.
Even as Israel mourned its dead, it struck back, with an aerial bombardment and then a ground war in Gaza, with the stated aims of destroying Hamas and rescuing the hostages.
One year later, Hamas is a badly battered organization, and many of its leaders are dead. But the group survives – and roughly 100 of the hostages are still believed to be in Gaza.
Meanwhile, Israel’s war has come at a staggering cost.
One year later, more than 40,000 Palestinians have been killed, and another 95,000 injured. The Gaza Strip has seen its hospitals, housing and food supply decimated.
And one year later, Israel is fighting multiple wars. Its campaign in Gaza still rages, and now Israel has launched aerial and ground campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In just two weeks, Israel has killed the longtime leader of Hezbollah along with several other senior figures, and struck significant military targets as well.
And as the anniversary arrives, a new war looms between Israel and Iran, the longtime patron of Hamas and Hezbollah. This is the regional conflict – the “wider war” – that the U.S. and others have feared since last October 7th. And it would put the region in truly uncharted territory.
In the runup to the anniversary of the October 7 massacre, The Cipher Brief spoke with four members of our expert network – all of whom have extensive experience in the Middle East: Ambassador Gary Grappo and three long-time senior officers at the CIA – Paula Doyle, Ralph Goff and Glenn Corn. We asked them to reflect on the year that has passed – their early impressions after the massacre, the Israeli military response, the seismic changes that have come to the Middle East, and where they believe the region may be headed in the year ahead.
THE EXPERTS
The interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
Aftermath of the terror
Corn: It caught so many of us off guard. I can't say that I ever anticipated such a large-scale terrorist attack against Israel by Hamas. I would have thought that an attack would have come from the north, that Hezbollah was a much stronger terrorist organization or proxy for Iran.
Doyle: I think back to October 9 of last year. October 7 was the shocking day, of course, but on October 9, Netanyahu laid out his plan. He said this was going to change the Middle East.
So one year later, when people express surprise about the next steps that unfolded, I always think of what [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu said then. And for me, that October 9 statement was directed at multiple people. It wasn't just directed at Hamas, it was directed at Hezbollah, at the Houthis, and it was super directed at Iran.
And Netanyahu has acted as he said he would. He has been very bold and brazen about the goal.
Grappo: It's worthwhile to note, one year later, that there has not yet been a full accounting on the part of Israel on how it could have been caught the way it was, so unable to defend its residents in southern Israel when it was attacked by the Hamas forces. At some point, obviously, there will have to be a full accounting. We have not seen it yet. I know that Netanyahu has not accepted responsibility and has actually blamed his military commanders and some of his intelligence folks as well. And that needs to be thoroughly investigated.
Corn: One of the things that really has struck me, and it's been painful to watch, is the level of antisemitism in this country, which has bubbled to the surface. I think we have a very serious problem. Many Jews would say that they've known that it existed for a while, but in my life, I've never seen it so bad in this country.
Israel’s military response
Doyle: I think what we have seen from Israel is years and years of planning, years of capacity and capability building, for Israel to be in a position to act quickly in the event of an attack. Israelis have always centered on their definition of existential threat – and “existential threat” for Israel has always had a different urgency, a different proximity than what we feel in Washington. That helps explain their response.
Corn: The Israelis have been very effective tactically. The efficiency with which the Israelis have gone after Hezbollah's leadership and Hamas leadership, within less than a year – it’s impressive. And against Hezbollah, they've waged a war that I think U.S. military leaders should pay attention to and learn lessons from. Their targeting of Hezbollah's leadership has been phenomenal. I'm not a violent person, but what they've been able to achieve in a short amount of time demonstrates that they have been doing some very effective collection and targeting work and preparation over the years.
My assessment is that [Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah and his leadership team completely overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the Israelis.
The unexpected
Grappo: I certainly didn't envisage the level of devastation we've seen in Gaza. We knew we were going to see something on a scale greater than any of the past confrontations between Israel and Hamas, but this is orders of magnitude greater, imposing extraordinary levels of suffering on the people of Gaza. I
Goff: I was surprised when the Israelis hit an Iranian diplomatic facility in Syria, when they took out the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] targets there. We could say we were surprised by the pager and walkie-talkie attacks against Hezbollah, but we knew that Israel has a very deep bag of tricks in this area.
The main thing that surprised me was the restraint on the part of the Iranians after the hit on their people in Syria. Iran responded, but they telegraphed their rocket, missile and drone attacks on Israel. I was really surprised at the lengths to which they went to telegraph that strike. And then what didn't surprise me was how that strike failed utterly, because of the robust defensive capabilities of Israel, with help from the United States, Saudi Arabia and the [United Arab] Emirates.
The Iranians were probably horrified at how poorly their weapons systems did in their attacks on Israel. Their missiles are the pride of their force. They parade those through downtown Tehran, and they can continually remind the Iranian people that the reason why their economy is so difficult is because they have to put all this money into defense. And now it’s been shown to be not a very good investment.
Grappo: Another development I did not anticipate is the level of engagement from the Houthis in Yemen. I didn't know that they had the capability to launch ballistic missiles. And this is a threat that Israel cannot ignore now. And we’ve seen that even sporadic attacks by the Houthis have had devastating effects on maritime commerce.
Paradigm shifts
Doyle: There’s a whole new question in the region, one year later: Are Hezbollah and the other groups now nervous that Iran does not have their back? And that they therefore cannot re-equip, cannot rebuild, cannot retrain fast enough to keep up with the pace of Israel's actions?
Israel is not sitting back and waiting for everyone to reconstitute.
And then the next real question is, What's Iran's play? Hezbollah in Lebanon is not going to suddenly get restocked from somewhere else. Gaza is not going to get restocked from somewhere else. Who's the supply chain? Their supply chain has always been Iran. This is a major change.
Corn: This past year has really exposed the alliance between Iran and Russia. Iranian weapons systems are killing Ukrainians, they're killing Israelis, they're killing Lebanese citizens, they're disrupting trade in the Red Sea, and we should not underestimate the influence of that alliance and how dangerous that is for the United States.
We knew that there was a relationship, but the amount of weapons systems that the Iranians have given to the Ukrainians — the Shaheed drones and other weapons systems — these are killing Ukrainian civilians every day.
Losing the information war?
Grappo: Israel is certainly winning this war to the extent that you can say that. On the other hand, in the PR war, if you will, Israel is suffering huge losses worldwide. Basically, with the exception of the United States and a few countries in Europe, the world is categorically opposed to what Israel is doing in Gaza. And there's not much chance of persuading them otherwise. And the knockoff of that, given our support for Israel, is that we in the U.S. are suffering too, in terms of our influence and image around the world.
Doyle: Israel has struggled with the fact that Hamas was hiding in hospitals and schools and civilian populations. And so when the Israelis made their objective the elimination of Hamas, that came at a huge cost. Because the rules of warfare don't permit attacking non-combatants.
Corn: I think Hamas knew what they were doing. They were willing to sacrifice a lot of people, including a lot of Palestinians, to win a public information war against Israel, which they did. They knew they would get a reaction from Israel, which was going to be stark. And of course, the images coming out of Gaza have not been pretty. There's been a lot of death.
People often forget that the Israelis are responding to attacks from their enemies that have been attacking them for years. So with the information war, I think the Israelis knew that they were going to lose no matter what, and they didn't care. It's unfortunate, because it does create problems for the U.S.
No exit strategy?
Goff: For months, this was the criticism of Israeli actions in Gaza – that there was no plan for governance afterwards. And now there are similar questions elsewhere. What's the plan for the West Bank, which has been kind of shoved off the front pages? And the worse things get in the West Bank, the more that negatively impacts Gaza and Lebanon. And it's a mystery as to where the Netanyahu government intends to go following any kind of ceasefire in the North, following any kind of ceasefire in Gaza, and of course the Israelis will have to deal with the fallout from both those struggles.
Grappo: The Israelis have not had [an exit strategy] in Gaza from day one. I'm not sure they have one with respect to Hezbollah either, except that they do want to clear out a buffer zone near the Israeli border with Lebanon. We've heard casual statements from some Israeli authorities about what they anticipate, but I don't think they've given much thought to this.
There is no vision for Gaza, none whatsoever. There's no vision for the West Bank, other than Netanyahu digging in his heels even further by insisting there will be no Palestinian state, which is bollocksing up this whole effort, because were he to change his position, I think it would change the outlook of many countries – certainly Arab countries, but also the rest of the world, with respect to Israel.
What comes next
Grappo: Assuming the Israelis are not overly distracted by what's going on in southern Lebanon, I think they will be able to wear Hamas down to the point where they will have achieved their objective. They may have achieved it already, or are close to having done so. Hamas is no longer a very effective fighting force. It's still a threat, but much less of a threat.
I won't predict what's going to happen in the war in Lebanon against Hezbollah because we have to ask the question, Where does Iran stand in all of this? And that really is the major question here. How assertive do the Iranians want to be in ending this? I won't say it's totally in their hands, but they have a major hand in this, unquestionably.
Doyle: Iran has to decide if they have already escalated to the point of, “No, this doesn't work anymore.” And I believe this represents the real opportunity. Iran's armies — I don't want to call them proxies, they are armies — are failing. And if Iran felt protection by having Hezbollah do the dirty work, by having Hamas do the dirty work, by having the Houthis do the dirty work, they are not finding effective fighting forces anymore. They're going to continue to be lethal, but they're not going to be able to project power in the way they have in the past.
Corn: One thing I hold out some hope for is that in Lebanon, there may be a constructive role ultimately for the Lebanese government.
The United States has invested $3 billion in security assistance for the legitimate government of Lebanon, including the Lebanese Armed Forces. In my opinion, now is the time for the Lebanese Armed Forces to seize control of their country, to seize the area where they have failed up until now to stop Hezbollah from attacking Israel, which according to U.N. resolution 1701, they committed to doing and never did. I understand that the caretaker Prime Minister. [Najib] Makati, has said that they're ready to do that. And if this happens, it will help us convince the Israelis not to launch a long-term occupation effort in southern Lebanon, which has never worked out for Israel in the past.
Goff: I don't have any grounds to predict any peaceful resolutions anytime soon. The best I could imagine is that the parties will become exhausted and be forced at some point to find time for a ceasefire. And in Iran, with the new president there, they've been kicking the can down the road of their demographic time bomb in their country, so I imagine they wouldn’t be against having a breather while they try to figure out where their country is going. All the countries in the region would benefit from a period of calm and rebuilding — but this is the Middle East, and it doesn't take much to knock any or all of that off kilter.
Doyle: We have to be prepared for this war to go on for a very long time. But when we reach that inflection point, of Israel’s enemies having been sufficiently degraded, that may bring an opportunity to switch gears. If Hezbollah is degraded enough, if Hamas is degraded enough, if the Houthis are degraded some, will Iran stop the supply chain? Will Iran stop the training, equipping and guidance on how to go after Israel, and the U.S.? Then we have a completely different opportunity to shape negotiations.
And the question then is, Can we finally get to a peace process?
Our country has had a two-state policy on Palestine and Israel, going back to the Camp David Accords. The main thing Israel can do is get back to a two-state solution.
And unless and until Israel comes forward and says, “We're back at the table for a two-state solution,” they will struggle. I just don't see any other way forward. We could just do war for the rest of our lives, but I really don't think that's the right answer.
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