The Nordic countries – in particular Sweden, Finland, and Norway – are bolstering defense relations with the United States at a time when Russia had taken a more aggressive stance in Europe. In June, Sweden signed a defense agreement with the U.S., and four months later Finland and the U.S. signed a similar pact. Sigurd Neubauer, a senior analyst at a U.S. defense consultancy, writes Norway is hosting U.S. marines in January 2017 as part of the Black Sea Rotational Force. Neubauer, who is originally from Norway, spoke with The Cipher Brief’s Kaitlin Lavinder about Scandinavia’s relations with the U.S., NATO, and Russia.
The Cipher Brief: Is the observation that Norway, Sweden, and Finland are increasing defense cooperation with the U.S. accurate? And, if so, why are these countries strengthening ties?
Sigurd Neubauer: I want to start by emphasizing that the Norwegian-American relationship goes back further than NATO. During WWII, the Norwegian government-in-exile was aligned with the United States and Britain. The royal family was in Washington under the personal protectorate of FDR. The cabinet was in exile in London. And the king broadcast radio messages from the U.S. and England to the Norwegian people under siege, encouraging them to not give up on their freedoms and to fight for their country. During this time, the Norwegian merchant fleet helped the U.S. carry arms from the U.S. to Britain for the preparation of D-Day. So the relations between Norway and the U.S. are really strong. And if you want to go back before WWII, you’ll see that many Norwegians migrated to the U.S. in the 19th century. Moreover, the U.S. became one of the first countries to recognize independent Norway.
Sweden and Finland also enjoy very robust long-standing ties with the U.S. So it is a mistake for one to frame recent developments in the Nordic countries to the political tension with Russia. These are more long-standing relations.
Finland has been tiptoeing around the issue of whether to move closer to the U.S. security orbit or whether to maintain the status quo of neutrality (Finland during WWII was neutral). Finland and Sweden are both taking steps to upgrade their defense and security sectors. But they are not going to radically change their relationship with the Russians. Rather, their movement toward the U.S. and NATO is based on the decision to upgrade their own defense capabilities. Some of today’s global insecurity is really impacting the security of these countries. Cross-border terrorism, extremism, and migration are real threats. The Finns and the Swedes need better intelligence-sharing capabilities, and that’s really what it is about.
TCB: So to clarify, Finland’s and Sweden’s movements toward the U.S. security orbit are not about political issues with Russia, but rather about upgrading their manpower, their technologies, etc., and the U.S. is better for that than Russia?
SN: It’s not just that the U.S. is better for it. This is really about the fact that Finland and Sweden are unable to manage new cross boundary threats by themselves. They need a wide array of strong partners, and that comes in the form of NATO. Both Finland and Sweden have partnerships with NATO, even though they’re not members.
TCB: Is there a risk that if Finland and Sweden draw closer to NATO and the U.S., even if it is for the reasons you just outlined, the Russians will be provoked? Russia has recently made threatening comments to Norway, in light of its defense cooperation with the West. Are these threats credible?
SN: No, I wouldn’t say they’re credible, although we have seen that Russia is willing to use belligerent rhetoric and to back it up with force – for example in Ukraine and in Syria. But the U.S. presidential election is a game-changer for all of this. What could easily have happened is that general defense posturing and general military operations by the Scandinavian countries and Finland could have fallen victim to the deteriorating U.S.-Russia relationship. But now with what looks like a detente or rapprochement with the incoming U.S. administration and Russia, the Nordic countries will be able to continue their military operations, and they will not be used as a pretext by the Russians to get back at Washington.
TCB: Is there any possibility in the future that Russia could be incorporated into NATO?
SN: Even if NATO were to offer Russia membership, it’s very clear that Russia does not want to be a power in an integrated Europe. Russia will never be another Belgium. It doesn’t want to be another Belgium. Russia under President Vladimir Putin sees itself as a great power, as an alternative to Western multiculturalism. Russia is nationalistic, indeed ethno-nationalistic. It does not support the democratic values of the West. And in some ways, it also sees the West as culturally decadent. I think that these factors would make it impossible for Russia and NATO to find common ground, let alone for Russia to join NATO.
TCB: Do you think there will always be what you’ve called a “precarious but stable” relationship between Norway and the other Nordic countries, and Russia?
SN: The interesting part about the Norwegian-Russian relationship is that it also goes back to WWII, when the Soviets helped kick out the Nazis from northern Norway. This is a relationship that nobody has really forgotten. Even at the height of the Cold War, the Norway-Russia border was very stable.
In 2010, Norway and Russia successfully signed a demarcation agreement, which can partially be attributed to shared history. However, Norway also has a very strong military capability, and Norway and Russia know how to manage each other. There’s a military hotline between Norway and Russia. They understand what the rules of engagement are.
Finally, in Norway there is a consensus on foreign and security policy, which makes it close to impossible for Russia to split the country along partisan lines on foreign policy. Norway has a strong posture, and quite frankly, Norway is not too concerned about a threat from Russia but more broadly about the fractious U.S.-Russia relationship.
Events like Russia’s involvement in Syria and Ukraine have global ramifications. So in this context, Norway remains committed to ensuring there is a strong and unified Europe against these sort of belligerent Russian policies. But Norway is not worried about what could happen on its northern flank.
TCB: There are populist parties in Norway and across Europe that tend to be either funded by Russia or want closer relations with Russia. They use defense alliances with the U.S. and NATO as political rhetoric to say we shouldn’t be in these alliances, because this is going to upset Russia and cause harm to our own security. In the Nordic countries, are these parties gaining popularity? And if so, do you think that the rhetoric on Russia, NATO, and the U.S. should be taken seriously?
SN: Let me begin by pointing out the differences between populist parties in Scandinavia. In Norway, the populist party is known as the Progress Party, and it is part of the governing coalition. It is a largely anti-immigrant party. Yet it has remained, at least at its leadership level, staunchly pro-American. Norway’s experience is quite unique in the European context, because a lot of the populist parties have been denied legitimacy in Europe, unlike in Norway where legitimacy has been granted.
In Sweden, they suffer from extreme political correctness. Over the past couple of years, Sweden has accepted 200,000 new migrants into a very small population. But unlike in Norway, where you have the actual debate on the risks and the opportunities of accepting these migrants, in Sweden, all of that has been neglected by the public debate. Those who raise questions about it are ostracized. You now have the Swedish Democrats, which is a populist party that is much more radical than the Progress Party, that have about 12 or 13 percent support in the population and in parliament. The fabric of society in Sweden has really been torn up by the migration issue. This is not the case in Norway, where the anti-immigrant parties are much closer to the establishment and the political processes.
So with all of that, I would say that the populist parties – whether they’re in Norway or Sweden – do not have sympathies toward Putin or the Russians, like you will see with the National Front in France, for example. That is not the case in Scandinavia.
