As India and Pakistan near the 70th year of their separation, contention over Kashmir shows no signs of abating. Border clashes between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC) have increased in tempo since an attack on an Indian army base left 19 Indian soldiers dead in September. The Cipher Brief spoke with Seth Oldmixon, founder of Liberty South Asia, to learn more about the origins of the recent spike in violence and the prospects for mediation.
The Cipher Brief: What are the origins of this most recent tension in the Kashmir-Jammu?
Seth Oldmixon: The origin of the current escalation in Kashmir dates back to at least 2013, shortly before Pakistan’s present government was elected that June. In January of that year a delegation of Kashmiri separatist leaders traveled to Pakistan where they met with the heads of jihadi militant groups Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Hizbul Mujahideen as well as Pakistan’s military leadership, including then-Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani.
While Gen. Kayani reportedly ruled out support for armed escalation in Kashmir, he was also set to retire a few months later. Other military officers, particularly those in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under then-Director General Zaheerul Islam, may have been more amenable to their plans. In fact, two months after these meetings, the head of Hizbul Mujahideen, Syed Salahuddin, told reporters that, “The coming months and years will see a tremendous surge in mujahedeen's activities in Indian Kashmir.” Similar statements were given by sources from Lashkar-e-Taiba, the armed wing of Jamaat-ud-Dawa.
During this same period, two other militant groups, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, began recruiting and re-activating fighters in areas of Kashmir under Pakistani administration. A few months later, in February 2014, Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammad, addressed a massive rally comprising thousands of people in Pakistan-administered Kashmir during which he called for a renewal of jihad in Kashmir. Azhar addressed the rally by phone from his home in Pakistan’s Punjab.
Since that time, we have seen the promises of these jihadi leaders materialize. Militant attacks and “cross border firing” within Kashmir have escalated, and we have seen renewed militant attacks against India more broadly, including the attack on the Pathankot Air Base this year, widely believed to have been perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammad.
Pakistan claims that the uprising in Kashmir is entirely indigenous. While this is not true, it is undeniable that India’s heavy-handed and indiscriminate response has angered the local population. The use of pellet guns for crowd control has left overt 10,000 Kashmiris injured; curfews have restricted both business and daily life; and mass arrests and reports of extra-judicial killings, common in the region, have all fueled domestic unrest and reinforced jihadi propaganda.
At the core of the conflict, however, is the uncompromising ideological maxim that Kashmir is and will be a part of Pakistan. This belief is an entrenched part of Pakistan’s foreign policy, as is demonstrated by the constitution governing Pakistan-administered Kashmir which requires all public officials to sign a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan. It was also explicitly stated in a recent article for Hilal, the official magazine of Pakistan’s Armed Forces, authored by the head of the International Relations department at National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan. Dr. Khan wrote that, Kashmir’s “final destination is Pakistan, indeed, Kashmiris and Pakistanis have historical relationship, which dates back centuries.” Leaving aside for the moment the bizarre chronology (Pakistan is only 69 years old, not centuries), this premise leaves no room for negotiation.
TCB: Are there non-military points of conflict, such as disputes over the Indus Water Treaty, that could continue escalation of tensions?
SO: India’s recent review of the Indus Water Treaty is most likely a bluff, but one that certainly raises tensions by feeding Pakistani insecurities. The greater non-military point of conflict, however, is likely to be the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $50 billion development project intended to create an economic corridor that connects China to the Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. India has raised concerns with China about the project, which Pakistan’s military believes India is actively trying to sabotage.
TCB: Both countries have just announced they will eject one of the other’s diplomats. Is this a tit-for-tat or a sign of a greater breakdown in diplomatic relations?
SO: This was a fairly routine tit-for-tat. Pakistan has had several of its diplomats ejected from countries in the region – usually under charges of espionage – to which it typically replies in turn. Earlier this year, Pakistan ejected a Bangladeshi diplomat after a second of its diplomatic staff had been ejected from Dhaka on charges of facilitating militant groups. Islamabad was unable to provide any reason for ejecting the Bangladeshi diplomat, and it was widely understood to be a face saving retaliatory move.
What’s more concerning is Pakistan’s decision not to send a representative to an Asian conference on disaster relief scheduled to be held in India next month, and India’s decision to boycott a regional economic summit in Islamabad last month. These moves limit the space available for Track II diplomacy, which can play a critical role in conflict resolution. Even if the issue of Kashmir remains unsolved, bilateral cooperation on other shared issues can help to build trust necessary to eventually tackle harder cases, but only if both sides are present.
TCB: What are the available avenues for negotiations and reducing tensions at this point?
SO: This is a difficult question, as available avenues are quickly shrinking. On the Pakistani side, there seems to be a consensus decision to prioritize an uncompromising position on Kashmir above all other issues. Pakistan suffered a mass casualty attack carried out by jihadi militants against a police training camp in Quetta on October 24th. Within days, the government was sending out nationwide text messages containing slogans not about militant extremism, but about Kashmir.
On the Indian side, there does not appear to be much appetite for compromise either. India has responded to attacks militarily, though the scope of the response is unclear. The isolation of Pakistan during the SAARC Summit, the review of the Indus Water Treaty, and the tone of recent statements by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, all indicate a preference for a punitive strategy toward Pakistan.
The most effective avenue for negotiations at this point is probably for the international community to bring pressure on both sides for a resolution via China. Pakistan and India both view China as an important regional power and economic engine. As Pakistan tries to pivot away from reliance on the U.S., it sees China as its best hope as an alternative economic and military patron. So far, the Chinese have been willing to support Pakistan vis-à-vis India by, among other things, blocking attempts by the UN to blacklist Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Masood Azhar. China stands to lose from an Indo-Pak conflict, though, and there are reasons to believe China’s patience with Pakistan is wearing thin. The international community may be able to persuade Beijing to convince both sides that continued escalation is in no one’s interest.
TCB: Are there any other issues the media or the international community is missing at this time?
SO: We should be paying more attention to the rise of religious nationalism in India. This not only poses a threat to India’s hundreds of millions of religious minorities (India is expected to be home to the world’s largest Muslim population by 2050), it reinforces the frame of an apocalyptic religious conflict for regional issues such as Kashmir (recall the suggestion that Pakistan has existed for centuries) that promotes militant narratives and closes the door to opportunities for reasoned compromise.
