BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT – Can war be avoided over Taiwan? It’s a question complicated by the opaque nature of decision-making in China, the global economic importance of Taiwan, and political uncertainty in the U.S., among other issues. It may also be the most important geo-strategic question of our time.
The reunification of Taiwan with mainland China has been a core tenet for Beijing since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, has suggested force may be required to make it happen.
In May, China dropped language from a government paper referencing “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, and following the May inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who is viewed by Beijing as a separatist, China launched “punishment” military drills near Taiwan. For its part, this week Taiwan ran civilian and military drills to plan for a Chinese invasion.
The Chinese government increased its defense spending by 7.2% this year, part of a military buildup and modernization that are widely seen as preparation should Xi order an assault against Taiwan. Experts have suggested that might come as soon as 2027, but Beijing faces mounting domestic challenges that could make Xi rethink the military option.
Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke about these issues with Cipher Brief experts U.S. Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (Ret.) and Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, both of whom say the tensions over Taiwan are reaching dangerous levels.
THE CONTEXT
- China launched a two-day military exercise, Joint Sword-2024A, as a “strong punishment” for Taiwan’s “separatist acts” following the inauguration of the island’s new president, Lai Ching-te.
- Taiwan began its annual Han Kuang war games this week. The drills simulate a response to a Chinese attack.
- Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. is committed to help Taiwan defend itself, but for decades it has adopted a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” balancing support for Taipei with an assurance that the U.S. will not antagonize China by formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation or committing to a military response should China invade.
- The Biden administration has approved $5.3814 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. The Trump administration approved $18.27 billion.
- Admiral Samuel Paparo, the new U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) commander, said recently that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, he wants to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape,” with swarms of cheap drones that would help in Taiwan’s defense.
THE EXPERTS
The Cipher Brief tapped a pair of experts with deep experience to assess the likelihood of conflict – and what might be done to avoid it. Our interview has been lightly edited for clarity. You can also watch interviews with Cipher Brief Experts by subscribing to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube.
The Cipher Brief: Given all the time you’ve spent watching Taiwan, where are we in terms of levels of tension?
Studeman: It’s becoming more unstable in really concerning ways. The Chinese clearly have a view that as they grow stronger, their preferences are the ones that should take the day. They're aiming to resolve all their territorial sovereignty issues, and it seems that as they grow stronger, and they’ve got more hammers, everything looks like a nail.
So it's a deep concern – what Xi Jinping's intentions are and what tools he intends to use to resolve these issues, and under what timeline. Not knowing the answers generates a security spiral that you're seeing in the region – a more dangerous environment that appears to become more unstable with every passing week.
DeTrani: The anxiety is high. The Chinese showed this on the 23rd of May, after Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as president of Taiwan, with two very aggressive military exercises. So there is a lot of anxiety for the people of Taiwan, but also for the region and beyond. Xi Jinping has been very open about incorporating Taiwan. That is his objective, whether it's through peaceful means or military, and he's building his military capabilities.
The Cipher Brief: As you noted, Xi says often, “by peaceful means if possible.” Would a decision to take military action be predicated on military readiness, or domestic concerns? What informs the thinking in Beijing about if and when to act?
DeTrani: Xi is saying by 2027, the military will be ready if necessary to use its military capabilities to unify with Taiwan. And that's aspirational. Whether they're ready or not is questionable, given a lot of issues that are out there, certainly with the military.
Let's assume they do meet that (2027 goal). He's got so many other issues there. He's looking at the economic imperatives within China – the demographics, the unemployment, et cetera. He's looking at Ukraine and the resilience of the Ukrainian people to fight against an invading force.
And this is what Xi has to look at with Taiwan. Are the Taiwan people prepared to respond in that way? And he needs to also look at the United States providing the weaponry necessary, the deterrence necessary to make Xi Jinping think twice about using military force to take over Taiwan. So there's a lot of pieces in play there. That's why I think it's going to be beyond 2027.
But we don't know what his intentions are. Xi is a very assertive leader.
Studeman: All of their (China’s) history says, Don't go. It may be that you're going to be defeated. On the other hand, if you find that the conditions are ripe, then you can see when that opportunity first begins to appear, and move forthrightly because the conditions are more likely going to abet your victory.
If you look at all these conditions – what are the domestic economic conditions within China? What is the level of legitimacy that he has as a leader? Can the regional and global community be over-leveraged by China economically, or is it less likely that China will get the degree of support it really wants? And then you take a look at Washington and ask, Who's the leader? Can I cut a deal with that person?
All these things are going to be judged.
It's a big gamble to resort finally to the huge military option where, as the Ukraine war taught us, uncertainty is afoot and an inferior can defeat a superior, and at a very minimum you can go a very long period of time without resolution of that combat environment. This is one of the major lessons of Ukraine.
The Cipher Brief: Xi is publicly exhorting his military to get ready. China has been building up its military for years. What is it that they don't have now, that they will need to prepare for 2027?
Studeman: If they are going to undergo a major operation like an invasion, even a blockade, it needs to be a slam-dunk win for Xi Jinping, it has to be a guaranteed victory. He has to feel comfortable, and he doesn't feel comfortable right now from all observations. He has a certain distrust that the PLA is up to the job.
The (Chinese military) is getting significantly better in terms of proficiency, except that when you're dealing with a high-intensity warfare environment, there are certain things that are going to slow the Chinese down. And that relates to initiative, having trust in your commanders – that in a fluid dynamic situation, they know how to make the right choices.
This idea of trust is something that doesn't exist in the Chinese military the way it exists in the United States or other advanced militaries. There, it’s a dependence on hierarchy – if you've been told most of your life to do this, that and the other, then to expect that in a fluid dynamic environment somebody is going to naturally demonstrate initiative and problem-solve on the fly, that culture in that system doesn't produce the kinds of people that you'd see in the American military. This will make a significant difference.
I think Xi Jinping fundamentally knows that. And when he takes a look at the exercises, the results sometimes are not as impressive as Xi Jinping wants to see. Thinking on your feet, being able to handle surprise, those are things that the Chinese military is probably not up to now, and it will take years before they get proficient. There is cause for concern, and it can't be compensated by volume of kit alone.
DeTrani: I totally agree with that. I think Xi Jinping is having some problems.
What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.
The Cipher Brief: How does Xi Jinping get to a “slam dunk”, given the military culture and the way you describe it?
Studeman: The Chinese are building in a lot of “pros” to compensate for some of these endemic “cons.” And we would be unwise to underestimate the sheer amount of power that they've developed. And we (the U.S.) haven't swung to the Indo-Pacific, we haven't pivoted the way that we’ve talked about since 2013 and 2014, to anybody's satisfaction.
The Cipher Brief: This brings us to Taiwan's preparedness. Assess if you would, the state of Taiwan's defenses.
DeTrani: I think the Taiwan people — we're talking about 23-24 million people — they don't want conflict, they don't want war, but they're ready. They're prepared themselves. The people of Taiwan are being inculcated with the sense that we have to defend ourselves. We're on the front lines.
The U.S. has to be able to provide Taiwan with the weaponry necessary, and they'll be purchasing it. They can afford this, and the people have to invest in their own defense and so forth, with the weaponry that would come in from the United States and allies and partners.
I think the U.S. is resolved to provide that military equipment and weaponry, but also the training and the advice that's necessary. And all these pieces are coming together.
The Cipher Brief: Admiral Studeman, you spoke with The Cipher Brief about your recent visit to Taipei, and you introduced a balance – that the new president and his administration knew they needed to invest more in terms of defense and preparedness, but also felt a wariness to go on a war footing and do things that might unnerve the population. How do you see that playing out?
Studeman: Based on the way that the executive and the parliament are going to have to work together, it may be hard for President Lai. Even if he wanted to push for more military spending, that would be a big debate issue. He'd have to use up a lot of political capital there.
But in the interim, they've already had plus-ups to the military and they've taken seriously the idea of becoming a more hybrid force that is taking a hard look at the small missiles or drones or other capabilities.
Their military is on a journey. Taiwan is fortunate because although they have smaller amounts of equipment in every area, the defenses of Taiwan really advantage it in very significant ways. We talked about the sea – the first protective buffer that Taiwan can really depend on. There are only certain months that are really conducive to conducting an invasion using amphibious forces – late spring, early summer, maybe some parts of fall and September, depending on weather.
Secondly, when you take a look at Taiwan's terrain, very few beaches are suitable for landings.
The Chinese also are going to have to face a Taiwan that is more committed than ever to civilian-military defense. They have a new agency called the All-Out Mobilization Defense Agency. They are connecting the communications people, the emergency services people. They're talking about building up more first responders. They're asking for the first 8,000 volunteers for that.
And so the Chinese are going to have to face, potentially, a Taiwan that has mobilized its population. You're not just facing the military, but you're facing more of a population-centric defense of the island. And that frankly would be China's worst nightmare. They would be bogged down. And it could become a very protracted thing where China could ultimately still be defeated.
This is the reality of how Taiwan is moving forward. They have a journey which is nowhere near the end, but I still think that some of their natural advantages make any Chinese operation fraught with risk.
The Cipher Brief: Given that risk, would a blockade be a better option from China's perspective?
DeTrani: My view is a blockade is an act of war. It would be an act of war against Taiwan and I think the consequences would follow. We would see the US providing the weaponry. We would see international sanctions. We would see the international community coming down on China.
You're talking about a blockade that would affect over 50% of the semiconductors that support the computers and the iPhones and medical devices around the world.
And China is basically tethered to Taiwan, over 250 billion dollars of annual trade between China and Taiwan each year. So China's GDP would be degraded immediately.
China could do a blockade, but the response would be similar to an act of war against Taiwan.
Studeman: If China initiates a blockade, then they lose something really important that they still value, which is being able to accomplish a victory in a short period of time, that can avoid a major-power war. If you're in a blockade scenario, essentially you've given time to your opponents, time to mobilize, time to respond. So it's a very slow-acting kind of thing, which then would ultimately disadvantage China. I don't think it's a foregone conclusion that a blockade is the preferred choice or that a blockade naturally leads to an invasion.
With a blockade, you lose the surprise of accomplishing your goals before anybody can really respond in a way that's significant. Blockades are hard to implement. And I think you'd find that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is not good enough to do both an air and a sea blockade for weeks on end. It's not that they can't put ships and rotate them in and out and do a number of things with aerial forces, but in the face of resistance, that's a different story altogether. Either course of action – blockade or invasion – is just embedded with significant risk for China or anybody who tries to do it.
There are many courses of action, using instruments that the Chinese have at their disposal, to increase the pain and pressure on Taiwan, and they don't have to have a blockade or an invasion to get there. They can make life on Taiwan very miserable – taking out critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, sabotage, those things are all part of the menu that Xi Jinping would have. But history tells us that you can make life miserable for populations and they will endure and they will suffer and they will be able to withstand it. Most populations in war that have faced the worst that enemies can throw at them tend to dig their heels in and retrench and figure out how best to endure. And this would probably be the case with Taiwan as well.
The Cipher Brief Threat Conference is happening October 5-8 in Sea Island, GA. The world's leading minds on national security from both the public and private sectors will be there. Will you? Apply for your seat at the table today.
The Cipher Brief: What about the U.S. response? Should the U.S. abandon the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” and declare that it will come to help Taiwan?
Studeman: I know people have been pushing for that clarity, and I think it is foolhardy. Essentially this would be a blank check, saying no matter what the conditions, whatever a Taiwan president may do, the (U.S.) military will come in to save the day. And who knows what kind of Taiwan president shows up and what kind of choices they make? You're giving a safety net that essentially empowers another political party to employ the U.S. military.
Secondly, it's not going to deter China. They already assume that we're going to intervene and save Taiwan. You're not convincing them that somehow if they engage in a military act that America's not going to be there. They have built a military designed to factor in our intervention. So you're buying nothing in terms of deterrence and you're essentially tying the president's hands, current and future. So to me, ambiguity still is the proper policy – to be situationally contingent, to make a decision based on the situation that has emerged, and then deploy your capabilities in a way that makes the most sense for those conditions at hand. That's the reason why ambiguity makes more sense.
DeTrani: I would agree, no question. And we also have the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 where we made it very clear (that the U.S. would help Taiwan), and we haven't moved from that. So China knows what's out there.
The Cipher Brief: You mentioned Ukraine. Some have said Xi Jinping is not a disruptor like Vladimir Putin and he's more careful about risk. Do you see Xi taking the sort of risk that an invasion would entail?
DeTrani: At this time, I don't see Xi taking that risk. I would see him taking that risk if Lai Ching-te and the government of Taiwan declared independence, and then he's right in the face of Xi Jinping and Xi has no choice. Short of that, I don't see that happening. He's not a risk-taker in that regard.
But as we get close to 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, there's a red line there. And I think that's when a decision will be made. Because if there isn't unification prior to that, any administration in China, to be legitimate and to have the support of the people, would have to resolve this issue by 2049.
Studeman: Xi Jinping is actually a greater risk-taker in many ways than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, but he's wedded it with a deep pragmatism, so that when you are making a calculation about moving forward, you know that you're more likely to succeed.
This is a very difficult combination for us to deal with. I don't think you're going to have him taking foolish risks, but you're already seeing him willing to take more. It's not as if he's just outlining a vision. He's pursuing it with a capability and intentionality that comes with somebody who's prepared to take risk and create frictions across lots of areas that previous Chinese leaders were unwilling to take.
He talks about daring to fight. He's preparing his people for even tougher environments than today in basic economic de-risking. He is looking at these things through the lens of recovering Taiwan and facing the kind of problems that Russia faced over Ukraine.
That's the danger. When he talks about going after a goal, you need to listen to him. You need to take his words seriously and his actions seriously. And he is preparing his country to be able to actually wage major-power war. I think within the single-digit years, this is going to come to some kind of showdown, when he feels like he's ready and he thinks the conditions are right and nothing else has worked. He's going to consider very seriously taking a military option to resolve this thing, as he's promised the Chinese people.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.
The issue of Taiwan will be front and center at The Cipher Brief Threat Conference October 5-8 in Sea Island, GA. Talk directly with the experts. Apply for your seat at the table today.
