In 2012, the European Parliament commissioned and published a study entitled: “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organised crime groups in the European Union.” The report comprehensively argued that variations of the crime-terror nexus are evident in Europe, with trends strongly suggesting the presence of a “marriage of convenience” between criminal and terrorist operations. Most interestingly, the report noted a rise of militant recruits who simultaneously display a criminal and terrorist profile (e.g. Mohammad Merah, Rifa’I Bassam, and the Garsallaoui network). The report also viewed Greece as an emerging point of vulnerability that could impact the immediate European crime-terror trajectory.
Over the past three years, the trends identified in the European Parliament report have noticeably continued. Although Europe has not become a significant staging ground for the crime-terror nexus – as exemplified in other global pockets of instability, like Libya, Mali, Afghanistan, and Syria – it has shown that political stability alone does not guarantee against a convergence between crime and terrorism. Unlike the threat that emanates from the crime-terror nexus that has evolved in places like Afghanistan and Mali, the threat that emerges when crime and terror converge in Europe is comparatively opaque and thus difficult to monitor.
With growing concerns that Europe is increasingly becoming a terrorist target, the need for terrorist cells to operationalize will have a growing dependence on the ability to access criminal expertise – whether that be specialised services (e.g. forged documents), operational support (e.g. access to smuggling networks), or financing through petty or organised crime. It is in the context of operationalizing terrorist cells that the nexus is most concerning to security.
Where the Criminal Becomes Terrorist
The January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the March 2016 Brussels attacks all incorporated ties between crime and terrorism. For example, several of the attackers exemplified the criminal/terrorist profile identified in the 2012 European Parliament report. The profile, compiled from various European law enforcement and security sources, is summarised as follows:
- Predominantly of North African or South Asian descent, with no clear embedded societal ties to the countries in which they live (i.e. disillusioned and/or disassociated members of society).
- Increasingly 3rd generation with limited (or no) direct experience of terrorist training camps or operational experience in “traditional” theatres of instability; although, this changed with European Islamist militants finding their way to Iraq and Syria.
- Decreasing centralised support (logistical and operational) has meant that militant Islamists in Europe have fewer qualms about justifying engagement in crime with their ideology. Crime has, in essence, become “theologically” justifiable when used for financing or operational needs.
The most commonly cited criminal/terrorist profile is that of Jamal Ahmidan and his involvement in drug trafficking prior to the 2004 Madrid bombings. Other examples in Europe abound. Between 2007 and 2010 there were several cases of British militant Islamists involved in crime as a source of financing. One such example noted that a website for al-Qaeda in Iraq was financed through a series of fraudulent credit card transactions, the total value of which was more than €2.5 million.
Most recently, this criminal/terrorist profile was reflected in the biographies of several Paris and Brussels attackers. Omar Ismail Mostefai, the first attacker named by French authorities, had a criminal record and had been arrested for petty crimes. Saleh Abdeslam and suspected Paris mastermind Abdelhamid Abaaoud were both jailed for armed robbery in 2010. And Brussels bombers Ibrahim and Khalid El Bakraoui were known to police for their involvement in armed robbery and car jackings. A Belgian court sentenced Khalid Bakraoui for criminal conspiracy, armed robbery, and possession of stolen cars and weapons in 2011. His brother Ibrahim was sentenced in 2010 to nine years in prison for attempted murder, but was paroled in October 2014.
In the past, this tendency for militant Islamists to exemplify both a criminal and terrorist persona was an idea largely overlooked within the European theatre. Analysts through the early 2000s were adamant that criminals and terrorists simply made “strange bedfellows,” or militant Islamists would not fundamentally engage in criminal activity on the grounds of ideology and vulnerability to law enforcement. This stance has been proven otherwise.
The decentralisation of terrorism has meant that a large percentage of terrorist cells operating in Europe must primarily be self-sufficient. Historically, the de facto “parent” terrorist group of a militant Islamist cell operating in Europe would have provided logistics to carry out attacks. Now, terrorists are increasingly turned toward organised crime groups to help with false document procurement, access to weapons and explosives, training, border crossings, and so forth.
The Vulnerabilities of Geography
Over the past several years, Greece has arguably become Europe’s new “Spain” – a smuggling crossroads for criminals and militants. Although this has been exacerbated by the current migrant crisis, as early as 2010, European law enforcement was aware of terrorist networks using Greece as a transit network.
For example, terror suspects were arrested in Italy in 2010; they were involved in smuggling individuals from Afghanistan and Pakistan through Greece. In February 2011, a Greek police raid uncovered 500 fake travel documents and several “stolen” official stamps. There are also indications that groups from South Asia have become established in the country and are involved in smuggling immigrants. Interestingly, although Greece has never been known to host a significant Islamic community, there have reportedly been rising numbers of unofficial mosques and evidence that hawala is being used to move money.
Combined with rising political and social instability in North Africa and the Middle East that has driven the demand for (illegal) migration to Europe, Greece is caught in the middle. The ongoing domestic economic situation in Greece itself, its proximity to countries that export illegal migration and social unrest, and a growing alienated Muslim community mean Greece could catapult into a staging ground for both criminal and terrorist activities.
Among the November 2015 Paris attackers was a suspect who reportedly entered Europe via Greece with a fraudulent Syrian passport. A “common ticket” to Europe in the current migrant crisis, fraudulent passports have become readily available for purchase from criminal entrepreneurs operating in both Greece and Turkey. Leveraging a criminal opportunity emanating from mass need, these emerging criminal networks have clearly taken no interest in the possibility that the false documents they are providing may facilitate the movement of terrorists.
In addition to relatively ad hoc criminal operations that have sprung up in Greece and Turkey, more sophisticated operations have periodically been discovered throughout mainland Europe – showing the extent to which criminal opportunity has been hijacked for the purpose of terrorism. For example, in early 2016, Italian police arrested Algerian Djamal Eddie Ouali on suspicions that he was part of a criminal network that produced fake documents for illegal immigration. A “documents factory” was subsequently raided, in which a reported 600 papers were found to have had relevance to the Paris and Brussels attacks, including to Salah Abdeslam (Paris) and Najim Laachraoui (Brussels).
Future Trajectory & National Security Implications
It would be an analytical exaggeration to suggest that the crime-terror nexus is entrenched in Europe and has the potential to develop along similar trajectories as it has in unstable conflict zones. Current and historical cases that have played out in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Mali, Iraq, Syria, and the tri-border area of South America are not likely to play out in Europe.
However, this is not to say that relative socio-political and economic stability will not lend itself to various forms of the crime-terror nexus. It is evident that instability in Europe’s southern neighbours has created an environment susceptible to illicit penetration, with the emergence of ad hoc alliances – “marriages of convenience” – between criminal and terrorist networks.
Furthermore, given the trajectory of how militant Islamist cells are evolving in Europe, there is ample evidence that some cells have successfully leveraged the criminal history (and network) of recruits to fulfil operational functions needed to plan terrorist attacks. Recruits with criminal histories have been used to access forged documents, acquire arms, and engage in crime (e.g. robbery, car theft, small-scale drug smuggling, credit card fraud, etc.) to self-finance.
This trajectory of the crime-terror nexus in Europe is likely to continue, while slightly adapting to the immediate economic and socio-political environment in peripheral states. It is therefore worth monitoring developments along the southern borders of Spain and Greece and also along the borders of the Balkans.
Where the crime-terror nexus exists, there will always be concerns for national security. The greatest concern for the foreseeable future in Europe is that the successful terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels will be replicated in other European cities over coming months and years. To a certain extent this may be expected, but any heightened activity will inevitably impact political stability throughout the region. In extreme cases, this could feed the rise of the far right and further division in communities that have otherwise been integrated for decades. Although this could fundamentally impact American interests in Europe – both political and commercial – in reality, the threat remains relatively low-level and ad hoc. For the moment, Europe remains relatively stable, albeit increasingly vulnerable.
