Since 2012, there has been a period of diplomatic activity by the Kremlin in the Middle East which is unprecedented since the fall of the USSR. Existing records of diplomatic and political contacts show an increased exchange of multilevel delegations between Russia and Middle Eastern countries. Moscow is attempting to cultivate deeper involvement in regional issues and to establish contacts with those forces in the region which the Kremlin considers as legitimate. If before 2012 the Kremlin’s diplomacy in the Middle East could be characterized as inconsistent and shaped by the opportunism of the Russian authorities, the growing confrontation with the West became the factor which impelled Moscow to intensify its activities in the Middle East. All in all, by intensifying its current activities in the region, the Kremlin is pursuing the following three goals:
- Economic: compensating for the negative effects of sanctions on the Russian economy; securing existing sources of income; protecting the interests of Russian energy companies and their share in the international oil and gas market.
- Political: avoiding complete international isolation; creating leverage which can be used to affect U.S. and EU behavior; propagandizing Moscow’s conception of the “right world order”; shaping Russian popular opinion.
- Security:reducing potential security threats for Russia and the post-Soviet space posed by the situation in the Middle East.
Russian Leverage
Russian strategy in the Middle East comprises several elements. First,Moscow is persistent in defending what it sees as its red lines in the region. Thus, Russia is against any military intervention not approved by the UN Security Council. It does not welcome forced regime change if it leads to the destruction of existing state mechanisms. The Kremlin is also concerned about any change of borders in the Middle East, and it is firmly against any dialogue with radical Islamists and jihadists. Moscow’s flexibility has enabled it to talk to different forces in the region and, if necessary, play the mediator’s role. However, Russia is respected by Syria’s regional opponents, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for the stubbornness it demonstrates when defending its own red lines in the region. Accordingly, the Saudis and Qataris are compelled to take Russia’s point of view into account and retain some dialogue with the Kremlin.
Second, Russia seems to be trying to reclaim its Cold War role as acounterweight to the U.S. in the region. Yet, the Kremlin does not directly oppose Washington, but rather exploits the region’s pre-existing disappointment with the U.S. through practical moves, which contrast American and European behavior. Thus, the reluctance of Washington to protect Mubarak, compared with the Russian support provided to Assad,encourages regional powers to consider Moscow a more reliable partner.
Third, Moscow avoids using ideological rhetoric in its official dialogue with the countries of the region.Unlike in the former Soviet space,the Russian leadership does not impose its views either by force or by means of economic coercion. In dialogue with the countries and political groupings of the region, Moscow tries to focus on existing commonalities rather than differences and contradictions. In all cases, the Kremlin also remains extremely pragmatic. Russia does not raise the question of political freedoms in Iran and tries not to be critical of Israel’s policies in Palestine and Gaza in spite of its support for a two-state solution. Moscow tries to support a dialogue with all countries in the region without expressing obvious support for any particular state or coalition, and, so far, it has been partly successful in doing so.
Finally, in its economic efforts, the Kremlin focuses on those areas where it has market advantages: nuclear energy, oil and gas, petro-chemicals, space, weapons, and grain. At the same time, Russian business in the Middle East is based on the adage of “Chinese price for European quality.”Thus, price and reliability were the main reasons for interest from Middle Eastern countries in Russian nuclear technologies.
Limits of Russian Influence
Nevertheless, Moscow is not omnipotent. Its success is more often than not determined by the policy mistakes made by the EU and U.S. This suggests that “corrections” in Western approaches to regional issues would limit Russia’s capacity to manoeuvre. The Kremlin’s financial and economic capabilities will never match those of the U.S. and EU, so Russia has market advantagein only a few areas – and these are gradually decreasing with the failure of economic diversification and the growing technological gap with the West.
Moscow also pays attention to the formal side of diplomatic relations. Formalities matter in the Middle East, but they need to be supported by deeds. This reality may finally upset Moscow’s strategy of balancing between different powers in the region in order to maintain good relations with them all – which is ultimately impossible. Thus, the intensification of dialogue with Tehran raises Iranian expectations of closer cooperation. Yet, the formation of any alliance with Tehran could harm Russian dialogue with other states, including Israel and the GCC countries.
Russian influence in the Middle East is also periodically challenged by the Middle Eastern countries themselves. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have tangible political and economic capacities to counterbalance Moscow’s influence in the region. Russia’s supposedpartners in the region are also not reliable. Some, such as Egypt and Israel, are using the Kremlin’s interest in closer contact as leverage to shape their own relations with the U.S.: they intensify dialogue with Russia in order to make Washington more flexible on sensitive bilateral issues, but this instrumentalization does not make for good relations. Other ‘friends’ of Russia do not hide the possibility that, in future, they may be rivals with Moscow. For instance, Russian interests in the EU gas market are challenged by periodic statements from Iranian officials regarding Tehran’s supposed willingness to join European-backed projects,which would decrease EU dependence on Russian natural gas.
Is Russia a Problem?
The active Russian presence in the Middle East should not be considered only as a threat to U.S. and EU interests. The capacities of the Russian government in the Middle East are limited, and, in some cases, Russian and Western interests are overlapping. Even in Syria, the Kremlin’s goals are by no means completely contrary to Western interests: currently, Moscow accepts the idea of a post-Assad Syria and simply wants to guarantee the Russian presence there.Moreover, there are a number of issues where Russian interests converge with those of the U.S. and the EU.These include protection of the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East, stabilisation of the situation in Iraq and Syria, and counteracting the spread of jihadism. This should create grounds for cooperation between Russia and the West in the region.
Yet, at the same time, Moscow believes that it has chosen the right strategy in the Middle East. Success in Syria, rapprochement with Iran, the strengthening of ties with Egypt, and the development of dialogue with Israel and the GCC add to the Kremlin’s confidence. Consequently, any attempts to change Russian approaches towards the Middle East will be challenged. While the Russian government will remain interested in dialogue with international players on key Middle Eastern issues, it will try to impose its own vision of the region’s future with little inclination to make concessions.
