U.S. and Taliban officials have agreed to a framework for a possible deal that could see a Taliban guarantee that Afghanistan will not be used by terrorist organizations or individuals in the future in exchange for, among other things, a full U.S. troop withdrawal.
In an announcement on Monday, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad said there was still much to work out, but showed optimism that a deal could be reached, leaving many who have spent years in the country, concerned.
Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt (Ret.) writes that what concerns him most is what wasn’t said about a possible deal with the Taliban, and the possibility that the U.S. will ultimately play the Trump card.
On 28 January, an announcement by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad was nothing short of remarkable. Relative to the 2008 Iraq SOFA negotiations and the multi-year Vietnam peace talks in Paris, the extraordinarily short period of time in which he accomplished a face-to-face “understanding” with the Taliban indicates both the importance and the immediacy of his remit. Perhaps it is an indication that the U.S. is on a mandate to leave Afghanistan at any cost, or perhaps an inclination to turn a Nelsonian eye to adverse outcomes.
At a roundtable with Afghan media in Kabul, Ambassador Khalilzad shared a few key comments which seemed to represent the current state of the talks.
On the Doha meetings:
“I can say that we have made significant progress… We have the opportunity to avoid future tragedies, to bring the 40 years of war to an end, to a good end.”
On intra-Afghan talks:
“I have encouraged the Taliban to engage in direct talks with the Afghan government. It is our policy to get to intra-Afghan talks.”
On Afghan government inclusion:
“There is a false narrative that Afghans are not included. That is not true. The Afghan voice is there.”
On the timeline for talks:
“We are in a hurry for the sake of the Afghan people to end the violence as soon as we can. We cannot leave the situation in a state of uncertainty. We need to complete the process.”
As Ambassador Khalilzad notes, he sees an opportunity to end the war. Yet, the details not yet made public, are extremely important. Three stand out.
First, the withdrawal of foreign forces. Ambassador Khalilzad made no mention of future force levels as this is seen to be the most problematic agreement to achieve. According to a source close to the talks, the only option other than full withdrawal under consideration by the Taliban is a peacekeeping force from Muslim countries. Even so, there is little to point to in recent history to suggest that even fully-trained and equipped security forces would be able to fend off a renewed offensive by insurgent forces. And while Vietnam, Iraq and other conflicts are not perfect analogs, “history ….often rhymes”. Regardless of agreements at the negotiating table, it is unlikely that a monitoring force, even with robust enforcement authority, would be sufficient to hold back an offensive in the absence of western intelligence, air support and logistics. It is also important to note that the U.S. envoy can only commit U.S. forces to that agreement. He cannot make decisions on the part of the other countries such as those that comprise the NATO-led mission which terminates in 2020.
Second, negotiating a deal to prevent the reemergence of a terrorist sanctuary is a fool’s errand. According to Ambassador Khalilzad, the commitment by the Taliban “to our satisfaction…to prevent Afghanistan from ever becoming a platform for international terrorist groups or individuals” is feckless and implausible. Even if the Taliban and the Afghan Security Forces were to successfully merge into a single national security service, the sheer size of Afghanistan limits the prospect of extending central control throughout the country. In recent years, at least 20 armed groups (many globally designated as terrorist organizations) have emerged on the Afghan landscape: the Tahreek-i-Taliban Afghanistan; the Haqqani Network; Jamatud Dawa Ehli Quran; Daesh; Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Hizbul Mujahidin. While it is unlikely that foreign capitals would stand idly by as these groups develop large terrorist camps and extensive training facilities, it is doubtful that the Afghan security forces would have the capabilities to attack those facilities. It is more likely that the task would fall to outside powers regardless of Taliban commitments made at the negotiating table.
Third, Ambassador Khalilzad must sell the deal. While he says the Afghan “voice” is there, few would agree that Afghans speak with one voice, nor is there Afghan consensus on how to bring peace to the country. It is unlikely that the Afghan government would embrace a full withdrawal of U.S. (and other foreign) troops, even if carefully scripted by scores of assurances and dozens of briefings on “a responsible withdrawal”. No matter how many timelines are agreed upon, no matter what local force levels are achieved, no matter how quickly the final training and equipping of the Afghan forces is accomplished, it is hard to believe that the elected Afghan government feels any different than the orchestra on the Titanic – fully knowing the end is near, but showing a brave face to everyone hopping off the decks.
Then there are the other stakeholders. Other “parties to the conflict” will expect a voice and a vote on any final agreement. The NATO and non-NATO partners working for years alongside U.S. forces will have to justify to their own parliaments and citizens that this deal is the best way to conclude their participation. They, too, have spent years, blood and treasure in Afghanistan and not all of them concur with the U.S. strategy for withdrawal.
Finally, it would be foolish to ignore the concerns of neighboring countries, even if they have little overt influence in the talks. Pakistan will attempt to shape any outcome on terms amenable to Islamabad and holds the wild card of significant Taliban presence and leadership inside its borders. Russia and Iran too, will attempt to influence the talks indirectly and can be counted on to play a spoiling role if they are not indirectly included in the process. Sources close to the talks say Khalilzad is cognizant of this fact and knows full well he will have to sell the deal to Iran, Russia and China.
Ambassador Khalilzad will return to the negotiating table in late February. It can be assumed that he will use the intervening time to consult with allies and the U.S. government. As he says, “We are in a hurry”. Allies will want to hear from him and voice their concerns.
Nonetheless, he could be facing another, tougher set of negotiations back in the United States. He should expect strong opposition and resistance from his own State Department and National Security Council, neither of which are likely to agree with the state of negotiations as they currently stand, nor the accommodating position he has taken so far.
But Khalilzad has the “Trump Card”. If media reports on Syria are accurate, President Trump took the views of National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo into account and still made a peremptory decision against their views. President Trump has already made his views known on Afghanistan, namely that he wants to bring the troops home. He, too, is likely to be unimpressed with reams of studies, historical analogies and dire warnings on the danger of an Afghanistan on the verge of collapse.
Looking through that set of conditions, it is important to recognize that Zalmay Khalilzad is a seasoned diplomat, used to carefully considering arguments on both sides of the table and then persuading all sides as to the wisdom of his approach. And, as long as he has the support of the president, he will approach the negotiations with the president’s views in mind. For at the end of the day, Ambassador Khalilzad may be able to change the minds of the Taliban, the Afghan government, the neighbors and the U.S. government, but he will be unlikely to change the mind of President Trump. And President Trump wants out of Afghanistan, with few conditions, and possibly, with little regard for the consequences.
Read more from Kimmitt here…
