OPINION — On 19 December 2018, President Donald Trump announced a withdrawal of American Troops from Syria, setting off fierce criticism that led to the resignation of Special Envoy Brett McGurk and Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis. This criticism paled in comparison to the 6 October 2019 statement from the White House declaring the US would not interfere in the Turkish military operation to establish a 30 km buffer zone within northern Syria.
If the December 2018 decision saw a flurry of criticism, the October 2019 decision brought on a firestorm of condemnation from the US foreign policy establishment, the press and within Congress. After declaring “100% of the ISIS Caliphate defeated”, the US would step aside to allow Turkey to eliminate a group of predominately Kurdish fighters that Ankara considered terrorists, but had served as key US allies on the ground since 2014. Supporters of President Trump’s decision cited the completion of the mission set out by President Barack Obama, support for a key NATO ally and an example of ending “forever wars”. Critics claimed it was betrayal of a close ally, damaging to US prestige and would result in the return of the ISIS caliphate.
Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote of “The High Price of Trump’s Betrayal”, The New York Times editorial board characterized the claim that ISIS was defeated as “absurd”, and both wings of the parties in Congress spoke out against the decision. No less than Republican Congressman Dan Crenshaw (TX-2), a decorated Navy SEAL, and Democratic Congresswoman Maxine Waters (CA-43) were united in opposition. Senator Lindsay Graham summed up congressional opinion noting the move to withdraw from Syria was "the most screwed up decision I've seen since I have been in Congress."
As to the concerns expressed, four seemed to lead the pack. America was abandoning the YPG and northern Syria to a rapacious Turkish military who would invade and then slaughter US allies; by leaving, America would lose credibility in the region and the allegiance of its allies; an influence the US had in a post-war Syria would be lost and, more crucially, ISIS would renew and return to its campaign of terrorism. Yet, at this point, few of these warnings have played out as predicted. It may be too early to pass judgement, but ISIS has not returned in a meaningful way, American influence (such as it is) does not appear to have shifted dramatically nor has stability in northern Syria gone into a tailspin. This may change in the future, but after 13 months since the first announcement the scorecard is generally positive.
The initial accusation of “abandoning the Kurds” seems to overlook a fundamental principle of the Coalition-YPG partnership – the policy was always intended to be temporary, transactional and tactical. There is a reasonable argument on the timing and manner of the disengagement, but there was never an intention of a long-term relationship given the limited mandate set out by President Obama and ratified by President Trump. From the beginning, there was a recognition of the inherent tension between satisfying the security concerns of a NATO ally and those of a PKK-affiliated separatist movement aspiring for international recognition on its border. While the Turkish military did occupy a 30km buffer zone resulting in 100,000 Kurds displaced, hundreds of YPG fighters (and some civilians) killed, this was far less than the predicted “ethnic cleansing” and wholesale slaughter.”
Another concern was the fear that the United States would lose credibility with its allies and partners. This, too, has not been demonstrated by any particular decision or declaration. The number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises in Europe against a Russian threat continue to multiply, and in the February 2020 NATO meeting of Defense Ministers, NATO partners agreed to expand its NATO training mission in Iraq, “reaffirm(ing) their support to Iraq (and) taking on some of the Global Coalition’s current training mission… (while) exploring what more could be done”.
In the wake of the operation against the IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassim Soleimani, one would have expected that nations might “push back” on the US decision to deploy additional troops in the region, but aside from Iraq no nation publicly condemned the operation nor the subsequent troop deployments. While difficult to measure, there seem to be few concrete examples (save rhetorical comments) where allies or partners are less inclined to support US interests in the wake of the northern Syria withdrawal.
Next, there were those that argued the departure would forfeit US influence in post-war Syria. Yet, one is hard-pressed to assert that the US could ever influence events in the 13-year civil war, much less force the departure of Iranian troops and proxies. Diplomatically, the US had only an observer status in the Astana and Sochi diplomatic conferences and the mere presence of an American flag in a small corner of Syria was seen as a tepid contribution yielding little more than minor influence. The original mission set out by President Obama had proscribed a limited mission – the defeat of ISIS – and with this limited mission came limited impact. The late Senator John McCain was blunt on this point: “President (Obama) continues to have no realistic strategy to address the removal of [Syrian leader Bashar] Assad, the growth of Russian and Iranian influence, or the increasing strength of al Nusrah". This policy upended an earlier, more ambitious goal that “Assad must go”, one reaffirmed by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at the beginning of the Trump administration. Yet, once the major players in the crisis recognized that neither President Obama nor President Trump were willing to go beyond the anti-ISIS mission (despite a number of instances where the military engaged in some creative “mission creep”), a seat at the negotiating table became unlikely. President Obama ceded any significant US diplomatic impact with a limited mission going in, and President Trump merely ratified that decision going out.
The most significant criticism of the decision to leave northern Syria is the assertion that “ISIS will return”. While it is certain that elements of ISIS dangerously remain both in Syria and Iraq, two major considerations must be taken into account. First, the mission of the anti-ISIS coalition was never to destroy ISIS, a military definition somewhat akin to the apocryphal salting of Carthage. Coalition and local forces could destroy the physical caliphate by occupying its capital(s), and defeat the ISIS forces to a level where local forces could prevent the return of large military formations. This is what has happened in Iraq and to a great extent in Syria, and Coalition nations must be mindful and prepared to handle any resurgence.
For almost two decades the US has been fighting conventional ground combat operations in the Middle East. Those operations are now coming to end. Subject to radical policy changes or black swan events, large-scale military interventions in the region are unlikely to return in the near future. The current administration and the presidential candidates are clear on this point – as are the American people. The tolerance for open-ended missions with largely ephemeral goals is low, even if the commitment is small and casualty rates minimal. In their stead, the US will continue a policy of forward basing, targeted drone operations, the deployment of advise and assist teams to support local forces, and selective high- end special operations.
Fourteen months on, the Syria scorecard is generally mixed, yet a mixed result is far better than the dismal predictions of a US sector overtaken by a resurgent caliphate, an opportunistic Russia, wholesale slaughter of Syrian Kurds and a significant loss of US influence abroad. Nothing has changed the humanitarian and moral disasters in Idlib, but at no time could the limited US mission impact that catastrophe. The entire mission was haphazard from start to finish – the US went into Syria with limited goals that were over time stretched by mission creep, commitments to NATO partners were broken, mission termination was sudden, and withdrawal was sloppy. For those who argue that the timing and manner of the US withdrawal were shambolic have a point. But it has yet to be shown that the US mission or its aftermath have failed.
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