As the anniversary of 9/11approaches, it brings a time of deep reflection, not only on what was lost on that day in 2001, but also on what has been lost by the U.S. since (Benghazi, 2012) and how to assess, and stop the global threat of terrorism.
Cipher Brief Expert and Former NYPD Intel Chief Mitch Silber weighs in for this Cipher Brief ‘Quick Take’ on the new challenges ahead, with the spread of global terrorism, and the active cultivation of the next ‘field of jihad’.
At this point, al Qaeda is less of a structured organization with overseas branches that report to a centralized command and more of a series of loosely networked franchises that operate under the same banner, sharing ideology. Al Qaeda is today, nominally led by Ayman al- Zawahiri, but each of the franchises are involved in local conflicts, most notably in Yemen, Syria, the North African Maghreb, the Indian subcontinent and Somalia.
With that in mind, the demise of the Islamic State as a geopolitical entity controlling territory, as a notional Caliphate, and as a brand, provides opportunities for al-Qaeda to renew its reputation in the mind of potential acolytes around the world. Clearly, al Qaeda is in a strong position to argue that the Islamic State's strategy to announce the formation of a caliphate was premature and thus validates al-Qaeda's phase strategy to re-establish the caliphate. As the Islamic State now transitions into an insurgent group in Syria and Iraq, that transition is creating a vacuum when it comes to leadership of the transnational jihadist cause.
It is unclear, nevertheless, if a centrally led al-Qaeda can become the threat it once was. As recent reporting from Afghanistan has documented, the U.S. is no longer really fighting al-Qaeda there, leaving the question open as to where are its central leadership — where is al-Zawahiri and where is Hamza bin-Laden, the heir apparent to the organization and maybe even more importantly — what is the nature of the cadre of followers that surround them? Can they mobilize followers and operatives to conduct deadly attacks globally? The absence of significant al-Qaeda-led attacks out of regional theaters calls into question what command structure surrounds al-Zawahiri and bin Laden.
If we consider al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda of the Indian Subcontinent, al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb and the Syrian splinter organization Tanzim Huras al Din, the al Qaeda affiliates and splinters to be the most robust affiliates, then from that group, AQAP, AQIM and the newly formed splinter Syrian group are the most dangerous. AQAP because it has retained its operational structure throughout the multiple conflicts in Yemen and may be able to take advantage of the chaos there to be operationally potent. AQIM because of its proximity to Europe and because it has the possibility to be a new field of jihad for Western Europeans of maghrebi descent to come to train and then return to Europe and similarly, THaD because of its proximity to Europe, its linkages to senior al-Qaeda veterans from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the likelihood that some Western foreign fighters with connectivity to the group and its precursor organizations, may have returned to Europe.
The most important issue for policy makers and CT professionals today is not to be lulled into complacency because of the strong gains that have been made degrading the Islamic State. During the period of 2012-2014, when many administration officials were applauding the "end of al Qaeda", was precisely the period when the Islamic State was building up its infrastructure and capabilities to burst on the scene and surprise intelligence analysts, CT professionals and policy makers. The question is not if, but what is the next ungoverned area that serves as a"field of jihad" that will attract willing acolytes from the West and around the world and how can it be stopped before it starts?
