How We Should be Preparing now for a Russian Collapse in Ukraine

OPINION — The consensus among geopolitical pundits seems to be that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has turned into a slog and that US and NATO policy thinking should thus focus mostly on what to do if progress continues to be incremental or is halted. The Prigozhin mutiny in June, however, was an admonishing reminder of the potential for extreme events on the Russian side and the need to be thinking now about how we would respond if the Russian position began to rapidly unravel politically and on the battlefield.

At the moment, Russia’s defenses seem to be largely holding, but this stabilization is threatened by the ongoing purge of the Russian Army leadership as a consequence of the Wagner event, including the sacking of operationally competent senior commanders like Generals Sergey Surovikin and Ivan Popov, as well as military-connected pro-war influencers popular among the ranks, such as Igor Girkin.

This cannot help but disrupt Russian operations and depress morale on the battlefield. It should moreover be noted that the slowed pace of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is also partly–perhaps even mostly–due to the earlier transition of Ukrainian forces to a more dispersed “recon-pull” posture, with its forces chipping away at Russian positions across a broad front to find or create areas of sufficient weakness against which it can mount a more aggressive and concentrated assault aimed at a deep breakthrough.

The post-Prigozhin political stabilization in Russia is also tenuous and vulnerable to battlefield setbacks. Russian politicians and propagandists have mostly backed Putin since the Prigozhin revolt, even though many openly shared the Wagner chief’s bitter criticisms about the incompetent conduct of the war. Although intertwined, it is more likely that battlefield events will drive political events in Russia than the other way around.

The Russian loss of Bakhmut, for example, which was only recently won at the cost of oceans of Russian blood, or a significant Ukrainian military success elsewhere, could easily re-ignite public expressions of frustration and anger at the military high command, and by extension Putin, who backed them against Prigozhin.

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The prospect of a sudden cascading cycle of events that would dramatically undermine the Russian position thus cannot be discounted. We should prepare for it because not preparing risks responding on impulse. An example of a natural but impulsive reaction to such a turn of events would be abruptly pressuring the Ukrainians to hit the brakes to avoid the possibility of humiliating Putin out of fear this might lead to irrational actions by the leader of a nuclear-armed power. The Russians already play on this anxiety by wildly irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling as part of its “reflexive control” messaging playbook, apparently assigning former Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to the role of chief messenger. He ominously reminds us that while Russian military doctrine precludes first-use of nuclear weapons, there is an exception in the event Russia’s survival is threatened, suggesting that a Russian defeat on the battlefield would mean the end of Russia, thereby putting first-use on the table.

The US, NATO, and the Ukrainians must aggressively counter this narrative and warped rationale by making the following positions loud and clear:

–         Despite the apocalyptic warnings of Russian propagandists about the consequences of defeat, Russia does not remotely face the “unconditional surrender” situation confronted by NAZI Germany in WW2. There is no scenario in which Ukrainian or NATO forces would march on and occupy Moscow, or any pre-2014 Russian territory for that matter. If the US or the West had any ambition to forcefully subjugate or enslave Russia, we would have done so in 1991, when Russia was prostrate. Even if defeated in Ukraine, Russia will still exercise full sovereignty over its internal affairs. Russia’s form of government is a matter for Russians to decide. We have our preferences, of course, but if Russians wish to keep their autocracy, they are free to do so.

–         While free to keep their Tsar, Russians are not free to keep their empire. This is the fundamental unifying principle behind the support of the US and its allies for the Ukrainian cause: an end to the age of empires, at least in Europe. And similarly: an end to the day in which big powers could make backroom deals at the expense of smaller ones. We should openly and unequivocally back Ukraine’s demand that Russia return to its 2014 borders. If there is any horse-trading to be done in eventual negotiations involving territory, that is something for Ukraine to decide on its own, with the role of outsiders limited to being at most advisors or guarantors.

–         We should prepare the Russian public and elites for the reality that any lasting resolution involving a return to normal relations must include reparations for damages done and justice for war crimes via the ICC. Misdeeds on this scale must have consequences, both in terms of rectifying damages and simple human justice.

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The battlefield situation in Ukraine may appear deadlocked, but it’s the role of leadership to be prepared for unexpected events. If Ukraine succeeds in producing a breakthrough that causes the Russian position to crumble, we must not let anxiety about what a panicky Putin might do lead us to block Ukraine’s rightful objective of liberating all its occupied territory by force if Russia fails to concede by agreement. When push comes to shove, Putin is a coward.

The man who comically distanced himself from even his closest advisors out of fear of COVID and froze like a rabbit in the face of Prigozhin’s rebellion will not risk his certain fiery annihilation should he unleash a nuclear war. Russian popular and elite support for Putin is broad but weak and unenthusiastic. The muted reaction to Prigozhin’s revolt clearly demonstrates this. Much of his support is likely grudging and driven by the drumbeat of TV propagandists equating a battlefield defeat in Ukraine with the end of Russia as a nation, and even as a people. More than anything, Russians fear the consequences of defeat. The consequences will be serious, to be sure, but far from existential as alleged by regime mouthpieces. Defeat may indeed spell the end of this regime, but it will not spell the end of Russia. We need to counter these absurd Goebbels-esque accusations by spelling out the boundaries of our objectives at the highest level and reassuring Russians of our disinterest in deciding their political future.

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