Global Challenges for 47th President: Two Major Wars, and Avoiding Conflict With China

By John McLaughlin

John McLaughlin is the Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).  He served as both Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. McLaughlin served as a U.S. Army Officer in the 1960s, with service in Vietnam.

EXPERT OPINION — As Americans vote, and an anxious nation awaits the results, we turned to a member of our expert network with extensive global experience for a look at the consequences of the vote beyond U.S. shores. John McLaughlin is a Cipher Brief expert, a former leader of the Central Intelligence Agency and a longtime student of American foreign policy. Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski asked McLaughlin for his views of how a Harris or Trump administration might deal with the major global security issues of the moment — in particular Russia’s war against Ukraine, the multi-front war raging in the Middle East, and American policy towards China.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Nagorski: Let’s go first to Ukraine and Russia, because there it does seem that there is a pretty stark difference between the two sides. What’s at stake for Ukraine and for the war generally?

McLaughlin: The first thing I would say is that Ukraine is the keystone of all of these problems we’re dealing with in the world, because if we didn’t have the war in Ukraine, there’d be very little motive for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to be involved this deeply with North Korea. Iran would not be as deeply involved inside Russia as it is. North Korea would not be sending troops into Europe if it weren’t for Ukraine. This so-called new “axis of authoritarianism” would not be as tight – and perhaps wouldn’t even exist in the form it does – without the Ukraine war. 

In terms of the consequences of the election, with Trump, it’s always hard to know because he says things like, I’ll have this problem solved before I’m even inaugurated. He could mean one of three things by that. First, nothing – in other words, it just may be something he’s saying. Second, he may mean that he’s going to withdraw his American support from Ukraine. And third, it may mean that he’s already talked to Putin about it and has some other negotiated solution up his sleeve. But no matter how you cut it, it looks like a bad deal for Ukraine. A lot of what he does will depend on who is advising him at the moment. Maybe someone will come into government who will take him in a different direction. But if any of those things come to pass, we’ll find ourselves wondering what we should have done differently. We’ll find ourselves in an argument about who lost Ukraine. And this “axis of authoritarianism” will tighten.

If Harris wins, it’s pretty clear that she will persist in supporting Ukraine, but she’s going to face some tough decisions, too. Will we finally yield to the Ukrainian and European desire to unleash Ukraine, in a sense? Let them go deeper into Russia with the weaponry that we’re giving them? So far, we’ve made some concessions on that front, but we haven’t gone as far as they would like or as many Europeans would like. That’ll be on her plate right away, with all of the attendant risks that have to be calculated. 

The differences are pretty stark. The bottom line: if Trump is elected, things look bad for Ukraine. If Vice President Kamala Harris is elected, she has some very tough decisions coming up to implement her commitment to Ukraine.

Nagorski: What’s your take in terms of the impact for the NATO alliance? 

McLaughlin: If Trump and Vance are elected and if they maintain the posture that they’ve articulated, we’re going to see a separation between elements in NATO who want to stick with Ukraine and help the Ukrainians and defeat the Russians, and an American administration that is pulling back. In other words, we’ll start to see for the first time a truly European defense posture that is tougher and more European, and less dependent on us. Because when I talk to the Europeans, I come away with the sense that they are genuinely worried that Putin will come after some part of Europe — whether it’s the Balkans, Poland, or one of the other frontline states, Moldova perhaps — if he prevails in Ukraine. They are seriously worried. And so I don’t think they will follow an American lead when it comes to less attention to Ukraine.


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Nagorski: There’s of course another major global war going on — a multi-front war in the Middle East. Donald Trump has said he’s Israel greatest friend than him, and there are some who think Kamala Harris might be a little more sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians. Do you see any daylight here, between a Harris administration and a Trump administration?

McLaughlin: Here again, with Trump you never know what he really means, but he clearly is friendly toward [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu. He clearly would be less inclined to put pressure on Netanyahu. 

Harris would be closer to Biden in her approach, but probably tougher on Netanyahu than Biden has been. Tougher in the sense of using American leverage more fully to press for a ceasefire. For example, I think you could argue at this point that Israel has accomplished 80 to 90 percent of what it needs to accomplish to take out the most dangerous elements of Hamas and Hezbollah. And therefore a case can be made that it’s time to have a ceasefire and focus on the hostages, and get the guns to stop and the dust to settle. I think she would push for that. With Trump, I think he would give a freer hand to Israel.

If Harris is elected, I think her issue will be this: Most people in the world, and certainly many American politicians, and Harris herself, say we have to push for a two-state solution. 

A two-state solution is still imaginable, but so much has changed in the region in recent years. You’d need a new Israeli government. You’d need to dismantle some settlements. There are now 650,000 Israelis living in the West Bank. That’s 6% of the West Bank, compared to 2% in 2000. You would need some help from the Arab states. When we got close [to a peace agreement] all those years ago, the Egyptians and Jordanians were very helpful. And nothing can happen unless the parties to a negotiation feel security, and right now they feel no security. 

So when we routinely say, “let’s work for a two-state solution,” I don’t know that anyone advocating that has really thought through how hard that’s going to be. Doesn’t mean it can’t be done, but they need to understand that we’re talking years and major diplomacy. So the question for a new administration – either one – becomes, How much priority do you want to give to the Middle East? Because when the U.S. government is handling two or three major crises at the same time, you get stretched awfully thin in terms of energy, resources, money, and time.

Harris will want to give more priority to the Middle East, but will find that it’s probably more costly than she is imagining. And Trump will probably want to give less priority to the region, and simply say to Israel, Do what you guys have to do, and get back to me when you’re done. That’s my guess for the Trump policy. 

Nagorski: A huge priority on the foreign policy front for either president will be China. At the moment, a tough stand against China is a bipartisan position in the U.S.  

We know Donald Trump has proposed very dramatic tariffs against China. And there’s been some daylight on Taiwan even between Trump and his own running mate, J.D. Vance. Trump has said Taiwan should have to pay for its defense; Vance has been very strong on aid for Taiwan. 

What Harris-Trump differences do you see on China policy? 

McLaughlin: The differences are maybe more nuanced in the sense that Harris starts from a foundation that’s been established. I think [Harris] would continue the trend that [the Biden administration] established, which is to envelop the Taiwan problem in a series of interlocking agreements and alliances in the Far East. And I think they’ve done that pretty cleverly.

There is now a much tighter defensive alliance between the Philippines, the United States, and Japan, and between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. There’s a looser kind of arrangement that they’ve worked out that involves India, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. And there’s the Australia-UK-U.S. nuclear agreement. So they have enveloped this problem in a series of agreements that are designed to reinforce the idea of deterrence with China. That is to say, think twice before you do something rash here, because we have a lot of help lined up to deal with it. 

The one thing the Biden administration has done that I think Harris might try and walk back: Biden has stepped a little outside of the traditional policy of strategic ambiguity, which is always a hard policy to define because it’s ambiguous. But it’s essentially U.S. support for the one-nation, two-country policy when it comes to Taiwan, and stopping short of saying we will defend Taiwan militarily. Biden has said a couple of times we would come to their aid if they were attacked by China. That may be true, but you don’t want to say that. And it’s not ambiguous when you say that. Strategic ambiguity has always been one of those head scratchers, but it’s worked.


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The Trump administration has to be a little careful beating its breast about China and Taiwan. They have people in their orbit who are very bold when it comes to China policy — they need to think through deterrence as distinct from getting into a conflict with China. Any American administration should have as its goal deterring China, while not ever actually fighting with China. Yes, we need to build up our military as part of that deterrence, but we have a way to go. The Chinese have more ships than us. They have cruise missiles that can now destroy some of our naval vessels. Our carriers would not be safe. In a war with China, there’s a strong possibility that we would lose a carrier. That’s a minimum of 2,600 casualties, possibly 3,000. The American public is not prepared for that. 

And so I think we would see Harris continue to envelop China in a series of interlocking alliances and partnerships. I would hope she would walk back towards strategic ambiguity. I would hope and think that she would push hard for more communication with China. 

When it comes to the three C’s of deterrence with China – communication, we don’t have much; capability, we’re falling behind; and credibility, well, you diminish that when you don’t have capability. So that’s how I would think Harris would approach this, knowing the kind of people who she would draw on. And the Trump people would be bolder, I think, and running more risks. 

Nagorski: Any other reflections, in terms of the global impact of one candidate winning or the other?

Mclaughlin: The world is really worried about Trump. I can’t say that that’s 99% of the world, but most people you intersect with say, Well, we’d work with him, but they’re really worried about unpredictability and volatility and all of the consequences of that. America has to be predictable in the world. That doesn’t mean easy or soft or a pushover, but countries have to know where we stand and where we are likely to come out on issues so they can formulate their own positions.

The way I see it historically is that the Trump administration left all of this ragged. The Biden administration has moved it back toward a position of predictability and stability and relations with allies, but that’s not done yet. The world, knowing that Trump can come back, has remained uneasy. So if Harris is elected, the task is one of continued reassurance and continued building of our strength. 

And the other thing is it’s time for new thinking in any American administration. Since World War II, we’ve felt this tremendous burden of leading the entire world and being the responsible nation. And we will inevitably feel that it’s time to start thinking about burden sharing in the world, and about different kinds of broader regional alignments and alliances. 

A new administration needs to take a baseline look at all of our priorities and maybe reprioritize how we deal with things. Of course that’s an easy thing for someone outside of government to say.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.  Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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