OPINION — No one should lament the passing of Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin. According to Russian officials, Prigozhin was a passenger on an Embraer Legacy 600 aircraft which crashed in the Tver region of Russia while en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg, Prigozhin’s hometown.
Prigozhin ran the Wagner Private Military Organization, which, in effect, is an overtly military organized crime group sponsored by the Government of Russia. Wagner is responsible for atrocities in Ukraine, Syria, Mali, Sudan, and likely other geographies. It has been designated a terrorist organization by several countries and organizations, including France, Ukraine and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Cry no tears for Prigozhin or the other leaders of Wagner who perished in the crash. Certainly, they were “honest” men in the context of Putin’s Russia.
The Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet has an exemplary safety record. According to a preliminary US intelligence assessment, the crash was intentionally caused by an explosion. Russian President Vladimir Putin sent his condolences to Prigozhin’s family the next day and pledged a thorough investigation. He observed that he “had known Prigozhin for a very long time, since the start of the 90s. He was a man with a difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life.” But Prigozhin was an “honest” man.
One of Prigozhin’s serious mistakes to which Putin likely referred was speaking truth to power in Russia, being honest about the conflict in Ukraine and the competence of the Russian military. This proved a fatal error. Prigozhin had been a frequent and outspoken critic of the “Special Military Operation” (SMO) Putin launched on 22 February against Ukraine. Prigozhin was particularly critical of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov. But in the weeks before his “mutiny” two months ago, Prigozhin directed criticism at Russian elites whose children were vacationing at Red Sea beaches while other young Russians were dying in Ukraine. Prigozhin also aimed criticism at an unnamed “Grandpa”—presumably Putin who was in charge and allowed the corruption plaguing the SMO to happen in the first place and allowing Shoigu and Gerasimov to keep their jobs and their lives. But Prigozhin was an “honest” man.
Prigozhin’s honesty and the relative effectiveness of his Wagner forces fighting in Ukraine made him popular with many in the Russian military and pro-war conservative circles in Russia. Many Russians may oppose or be tired of the conflict with Ukraine and the cost being paid in sanctions against Russia, but the majority of Russians do not want to lose the war and cannot understand how the vaunted Russian military is having such a difficult time subduing a much smaller country, Ukraine. These Russians believe the narrative that Russia is fighting the war without using all the tools at their disposal. This was part of the truth Prigozhin spoke. A fatal error.
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There is an old adage: if you are going to strike a blow at the king, you must kill him. Prigozhin’s most serious mistake surely was launching what started to be a successful mutiny, allegedly with the goal of marching on Moscow and taking Shoigu and Gerasimov into custody. To the outside world, and certainly to Putin himself, the march on Moscow by Prigozhin’s Wagner Group looked like an attempted coup. Likely exacerbating Putin’s fear was the lack of resistance shown by the Russian Army as the Wagner Group captured Rostov-on-Don and the Headquarters of the Southern Military District, apparently with little or no resistance. Wagner forces then began to advance toward Moscow through Voronezh, encountering some resistance but nothing significant. Two days into the mutiny, Prigozhin halted Wagner’s advance after agreeing to a deal allegedly brokered by Belarusian President Lukashenko. On 27 June, a couple of days after the end of the mutiny, criminal charges against Prigozhin and the other mutineers were dropped. But Prigozhin was an “honest” man and accepted for himself and his men the deal offered by Putin. He believed his loyalty and friendship with Putin would save him. A fatal error.
Prigozhin’s movements in the weeks after the end of the mutiny are a bit mysterious, and they certainly don’t seem rational for someone who should have known better than to trust any promises made by the likes of Putin or Lukashenko. If his fate wasn’t already abundantly clear, Prigozhin should have heeded the clear message Putin sent when he arrested another prominent critic of the conduct of the SMO, Russian milblogger Igor Girkin. Another warning signal Prigozhin clearly missed was the disappearance of General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, a former Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the SMO until demoted to Deputy Commander and replaced by Gerasimov. Surovikin was allegedly arrested for involvement with the Wagner Group mutiny. He has not appeared in public since late June. According to some accounts Surovikin was Prigozhin’s friend. Surovikin was arguably one of the more competent Russian generals in the SMO. Surovikin and Girkin were honest men in that they had the courage—or lack of judgment—to criticize the SMO. Their ultimate fate is still unknown and it will undoubtedly be grim.
Prigozhin’s honesty was rewarded by Putin in the way that has now become customary. One should not pity him. One might wonder why it took Putin so long. The answer to that question is likely that Putin needed some time after the mutiny to first assure himself that he had the continued support of the army, the security services, and Victor Zolotov and his National Guard. At the same time, he would have been investigating the extent of the mutiny and its links to power structures in Moscow. This takes time. As brutal as he is, Putin probably is not in a position to do to his military what Hitler did after the 20 July 1944 plot although sanctions probably have not created a shortage of piano wire in Russia. Putin is an admirer of Stalin and will remember his comment, “No man, no problem.”
Secondly, Wagner served and continues to serve an important role as Putin seeks to expand the conflict with the West beyond the context of Ukraine. In addition to operations in Ukraine, arguably one of the more effective Russian military forces in the SMO, Wagner played a key role in operations in Syria in support of Putin’s friend and ally Bashar Al Assad. More recently and ominously, Wagner is a key player in Russia’s disruptive actions in the Sahel. Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and soon Niger, Wagner has brought its specialized form of violence, disruption and corruption. This geographic focus for Wagner creates problems for France and the US as they engage in counterterrorism operations in the region. Putin certainly wanted to ensure he eliminated Wagner’s capability to create further trouble in Russia, but preserve its utility as a disruptive tool elsewhere. Putin likely has a view to expand Wagner-style operations to South America using Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua as springboards. Prigozhin is no longer the Capo or Don running Wagner, but Putin will find another “loyal” member of the kleptocracy to take over. The mission is too important to let Wagner’s international trouble-making capabilities be dismantled. The geographic expansion of the conflict with the west is important for Putin who recognizes, even if we do not yet, the conflict he initiated is now existential and global.
Lastly, let us not forget Putin runs a kleptocracy. Money matters not only to Putin personally, but to the structure that supports his regime. It will have been important for him and others of his cabal to ensure a continued revenue stream from Wagner, and that likely took a couple of weeks. Putin had time; he could let Prigozhin have a bit of leash before the taking the final fatal action.
So now the question many will ask is what impact does Prigozhin’s death have on Putin’s hold on power? In my view, with Prigozhin’s death, the arrests of Girkin, Surovikin, and certainly many others, Putin will have eliminated a source of criticism of his initiation and execution of the SMO. For nearly 18 months, Putin courted the favor of the pro-war conservative faction in Russia, but the event of late June showed Putin the risk of giving that group too much latitude. These were competent and popular people (Girkin reportedly was a key player in the Crimean takeover and establishment of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Surovikin is reportedly responsible for the defense in depth that has created problems for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. And Wagner was effective in Ukraine, Syria and Africa.) Putin has continued the elimination of the honest and competent players in Russia. This should be cheered by all who wish Putin’s failure. There is no reason to believe Shoigu, Gerasimov or anyone else in the Russian military is willing to take the risk of speaking honestly to Putin about reform and a more competent approach to the Ukraine conflict, or speak to Putin about the cost of the war to Russia’s future. They would be unwise to commit Prigozhin’s fatal error.
One hopes there are others in Russia who see the direction Putin is taking their country and will act, but remember the old adage about striking at kings.
Diogenes has his work cut out for him.
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