In the midst of recent escalatory statements and actions between the U.S. and Iran, a spokesman for the Iranian atomic agency said Monday that within 10 days, the country will pass the allowed limit for low-grade uranium enrichment under the nuclear deal struck in 2015. The U.S. walked away from the deal in May of 2018.
Also on Monday, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani sent a warning to his European partners still committed to the nuclear deal, saying there is limited time to save it. Rouhani made the comment while meeting with France’s Ambassador to Tehran, saying, “The current situation is very critical and France and the other parties to the (deal) still have a very limited opportunity to play their historic role for saving the deal.”
Amid concerns of a potential conflict that many are calling ‘war’ between the two countries, The Cipher Brief spoke with expert Norm Roule, the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence about the U.S. strategy, the potential for escalation, and the role other countries are playing, and can play in efforts to constrain Iran’s behavior.
The Cipher Brief: If one takes the view that "war" between the U.S. and Iran is not inevitable, what happens if the U.S. maintains its current "status quo" strategy with regard to Iran?
Roule: We should define “status quo.” I see this as Washington continuing to demand growing economic pressure against Tehran until the latter releases Western detainees, ends its support for a host of regional terrorist groups, significantly reduces its regional presence, and accepts new restrictions on its civilian nuclear program. Although some now say that the Trump Administration is demanding too much of Iran, all of these points were the foundation of Western policy toward Iran prior to the nuclear deal. Those who claim that the current U.S. demands are excessive invariably fail to suggest which of these behaviors they would accept if Iran undertook the same actions against their citizens or the citizens of other countries. In any case, I see no evidence that Iran would be willing to offer concessions on any of these points in the near future and Tehran likely believes that any concessions on its part will only invite more Western demands.
Beyond this, maintaining the status quo will likely lead to Iran’s continued use of belligerent rhetoric and unconventional acts to threaten Washington’s regional partners and global energy markets. Iran will likely gradually and carefully expand its civilian nuclear program, although there is no evidence to suggest it will engage in weaponization activity at present. It remains in Tehran’s interest to employ these tools. Its adversaries are divided and the U.S. debate on Iran is dangerously partisan.
Looking into the future, negotiations remain unlikely in that engagement means concessions on issues of greatest concern to Iran’s hardliners. It will also become increasingly difficult for Iran to wait for a new and more sympathetic U.S. administration due to the likelihood that sanctions will lead to significant unrest. None of the actors involved in this issue are interested in a conventional conflict, so such a disaster would be inadvertent.
The initiative for conflict rests with Iran and its proxy tools. What will happen if a Houthi missile strikes a Saudi school? What if an Iraqi militia achieves a catastrophic attack on a U.S. or Western military convoy? What if one of Iran’s attacks on Gulf tankers results in an environmental catastrophe or significantly damages a tanker?
The Cipher Brief: How is it in Russia's interest for Iran to be in conflict with the U.S.?
Roule: It is commonly said that Russia exerts more influence in the Middle East now than at any time in the past. I can’t help wondering if this is an overstatement. Certainly, Russia had significant influence in the 1930s, at least until the Soviets withdrew and executed its famous Arabist ambassador to Riyadh, Karim Khakhimov. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Soviet intelligence and foreign policy makers played a significant role in the region. Indeed, some may recall that U.S. forces moved to DEFCON III status on 24 October 1973 in the final days of the Yom Kippur War. Certainly, Moscow’s influence declined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and during the two decades following 1979.
Moscow today has significant levers in the region. First, in Syria. It has sustained the war criminal Bashar al-Assad as well as (although likely not intentionally) the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. But it essentially has responsibility for a broken state still embroiled in war, a pile of rubble which it cannot afford to rebuild. Syria has few natural resources of interest to Russia beyond geography in which Moscow can use to establish an air and naval base, but events have shown Russia to be quite weak. Just as Moscow can’t stop Iran from establishing an aggressive presence in country or on the Iraq-Syria border, it also cannot stop Israel from repeatedly attacking this presence.
Russia’s influence, however, relies on its ability to work with Riyadh on oil issues and to show that it has some ability to at least modestly constrain Iran. Although Iran’s commercial benefits are few, Moscow likely hopes that Iran will purchase Sukhoi SU-30 multi-role fighter aircraft or perhaps Sukhoi civilian airliners.
Moscow will likely continue to block any pressure against Iran from the United Nations Security Council. As long as the conflict continues, Russia will be the focus of regional, European, and U.S. diplomacy to win its support. Washington’s greatest challenge may be overcoming Russian obstructionism at the UN.
The Cipher Brief: What are some specific examples of steps Europe could take to demonstrate they are serious about constraining Iran and reducing the regional threat they pose?
Roule: A simple change in rhetoric would be useful. Europe is within its rights to protect the nuclear deal, but its unwillingness to speak about Iran’s role in Yemen says much about the limitations of European public diplomacy. Europe could also speak about the thousands of Europeans who live under the threat of Iranian-enabled Houthi missiles and how they see these attacks as a force protection issue.
The Cipher Brief: Have the GCC summits produced any observable progress in reducing those countries threats from Iran or in strengthening the U.S.-Gulf alliance?
Roule: Summits are interesting events. Summit statements usually reflect unity, although as in the case of the recent summit, we see this isn’t always true. But those who discount such meetings usually fail to appreciate the importance of side bar meetings. It is here that real coordination takes place. For this reason, the recent GCC, Arab League, and OIC summits, in my view, probably should be viewed as exerting more influence than most commentators suggest.
Read also Limited Options for Dealing with Iran inThe Cipher Brief and more from expert Norm Roule here.
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And join us March 22-24, 2020 for in-person briefings with Norm and other Cipher Brief experts by requesting your seat at The Cipher Brief’s 2020 Threat Conference, March 22-24 in Sea Island, GA.
