China’s summit with Russia last month and the reported likely upcoming visit of President Xi Jinping to North Korea are tactical moves that ignore the historical tensions between China, Russia and North Korea.
That tension threatens a meaningful strategic partnership.
The meeting between Mr. Xi and Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, convened immediately after President Trump’s summit with Mr. Xi, resulted in a joint statement highlighting a strategic partnership between Russia and China. Meanwhile, it criticized the current “law of the jungle” — a not-so-subtle dig at the U.S.
The 1991 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China was extended for another five years, memorializing the quasi-alliance between these two countries.
The summit’s message was clear: China and Russia will continue to strengthen their strategic partnership and pursue a multipolar world opposed to unilateralism. That is another not-so-subtle criticism of the U.S.
Despite Russia’s efforts, China did not agree to the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would carry roughly 1.8 trillion cubic feet of Russian gas annually from western Siberia through Mongolia into China. This is an important project for Russia, owing to Europe’s sharply reduced purchases of Russian gas because of its invasion of Ukraine.
Given the loss of European revenue, Russia hoped to redirect gas eastward to China. China, however, has been cautious, not wanting to become overly dependent on Russia, while pressing for lower prices and more favorable financing terms.
Also of concern to Russia is China’s inroads into Siberia and Russia’s Far East. The country is concerned about Chinese nationals migrating to Siberia in search of economic opportunities.
There are powerful historical reasons why Beijing and Moscow will always be wary of each other. These include the 1969 border clashes on the Ussuri River and Russia’s threat during that decade to launch nuclear strikes against Chinese nuclear sites. They also point to deeper historical wounds, such as Russia’s 1860 seizure of Vladivostok from the Qing Dynasty under the Treaty of Peking — one of the “unequal treaties” imposed on China. Decades later, Beijing retaliated by providing military support to Afghan fighters resisting the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Pro-Kremlin Russia Today expert Alexey Martynov argued in a recent commentary piece that China can no longer treat Moscow as a junior partner. He wrote, “Beijing behaves as though it can preserve a carefully managed partnership in which China remains the senior partner while minimizing its own obligations.”
A no-limits strategic partnership between a revanchist Russian Federation — a pariah state because of its invasion of Ukraine — and a China determined to be a model world leader is a partnership that will not endure.
North Korea is China’s only ally. More than 90% of North Korea’s trade is with China, and more than 90% of North Korea’s crude oil imports come from China. China is North Korea’s economic lifeline.
Yet historical distrust of China is still deeply embedded in North Korean strategic thinking. Korea has a long history in the Chinese tributary system. For centuries, Korean dynasties operated within the Sinocentric regional order, with imperial China as the dominant power.
Many Korean nationalists viewed this as unequal and humiliating. Former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung balanced between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War to avoid subordination to either, though North Korea depended on China economically.
North Korea will always be concerned about Chinese influence and its ability to pressure North Korea economically or support reforms like China’s. China is concerned with North Korean nuclear brinkmanship and potential refugee flows in the event of instability in North Korea.
Most important, if there is instability or war on the Korean Peninsula, China would be concerned that the U.S. would be there for its ally, South Korea.
After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took power in 2011, he kept his distance from China and did not show the respect China expected. In September 2025, however, Mr. Xi invited Mr. Kim to Beijing to stand with Messrs. Xi and Putin at Beijing’s Victory Day parade, commemorating the end of World War II.
If Mr. Xi visits Pyongyang in the next few weeks, it will be obvious that China is working hard to improve relations with North Korea.
North Korea’s new allied relationship and mutual defense treaty with Russia and its military aid to Russia for the war with Ukraine have no doubt motivated China to be more energetic in bringing North Korea back into the fold.
Despite visits and joint statements, China’s relations with Russia and North Korea remain fragile. A strategic partnership will not endure.
The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
This story appeared in The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.
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