At least nine people were killed in three weekend explosions in Kabul, and more than 24 more were injured.
The Cipher Brief sat down with expert, and retired Four-Star General David Petraeus (Ret.), who served as commander of Coalition and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, to talk about the prospects for peace and the future of Afghanistan.
The Cipher Brief: Last month, The Long War Journal published a piece describing a recent video published by Al Qaeda, meant to emphasize Al Qaeda’s alliance with the Taliban. It’s noteworthy because of Al Qaeda’s practice over recent years to not publicize their role in Afghanistan, preferring to operate under the shadow of the Taliban. How do you view the timing of this video and what does this communicate about one of the core issues of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks, that of counterterrorism assurances from the Taliban?
Petraeus: Before addressing that question, I want to offer a few thoughts up front to provide the context in which that question is situated. In particular, it is always important to recall why we went to Afghanistan and why we have stayed. So, let’s revisit that and a few other developments in Afghanistan before discussing the video.
Gen. David Petraeus (Ret.), Former Director, CIA
Former Director of the CIA
"We went to Afghanistan, of course, to eliminate the sanctuary Al Qaeda had established in eastern Afghanistan in which the 9/11 attacks were planned and in which the initial training of the attackers was conducted. And let’s not forget that that sanctuary was established when the Taliban controlled the bulk of the country."
We have stayed in Afghanistan to ensure that Al Qaeda – and now also the Islamic State affiliate in the Af/Pak region – cannot re-establish such a sanctuary. We have also stayed to maintain the platforms from which the regional counter-terrorist campaign is conducted. Certainly, there are many other important reasons we have stayed in Afghanistan, but our core interest has to do with preventing AQ and IS elements – whose objectives still include the promotion and conduct of terrorist attacks in our homeland and in the homelands of our allies – from re-establishing sanctuaries in the Af/Pak region in which such attacks may be planned and from which such attacks might be guided, encouraged, promoted, etc. And given Al Qaeda and IS activities in eastern Afghanistan, we should have no doubt about the continued desire by elements of those groups to establish such sanctuaries in that area of Afghanistan as well as in areas of western Pakistan, of course.
The big development in recent years is that we have been able to achieve our core objectives while significantly reducing U.S. and coalition funding and forces provided to Afghanistan (though, to be sure, over the past 2-3 years there has been a deterioration of the overall security situation, and that is quite concerning and does require some mitigating measures). This has been possible because Afghan forces and institutions have taken over the bulk of the security missions and governance responsibilities (albeit with Afghan forces conducting the frontline fighting helped by various forms of coalition assistance and so-called ‘enablers’). This development seems to indicate that we can sustain a campaign that stretches much longer than we certainly hoped would be necessary at the outset, though the sacrifices of the Afghan forces have been substantial and we need to do all that is possible to reduce their casualties. This development is not trivial given the emerging reality that the threat of Islamist extremism is likely to be generational in nature and duration and thus requires a sustained comprehensive commitment by U.S. and coalition forces and other capabilities, though certainly one that is “sustainable” in terms of the expenditure of blood and treasure.
One final point before turning to the question about the video. The challenges to Afghanistan come not just from elements under control of the Taliban. Many other extremist and insurgent groups also conduct frequent, significant attacks on Afghan forces and the Afghan people. Most prominently, these include: the Haqqani Network (sometimes referred to as the Haqqani Taliban, as they have an affiliation with the Taliban; nonetheless, they have generally been seen as “irreconcilable” and unlikely in large numbers to sign on to an agreement reached by the Taliban); the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the Terek e Talibani Pakistani (TTP) (distinct from the Afghan Taliban and generally focused on Pakistan, though also active in eastern Afghanistan, as well); and, of course, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliate, as noted earlier. Each of these groups, like the Taliban, has its headquarters and some bases on Pakistani soil. And then, of course, there are various illegal narcotics smugglers (many of whom are also Taliban elements or in league with them) and major criminal enterprises. I recall all this to illustrate that were a reasonable agreement with the Taliban to be achieved – and I think this unlikely to be the case, despite the considerable capabilities of U.S. Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad – it would not represent reconciliation with all of the groups seeking to undermine peace and stability in Afghanistan.
In sum, Afghanistan still matters a great deal to the U.S. and the coalition, though the country is beset by numerous enemies, not just the Taliban, and the prospects for a reasonable peace agreement do not seem particularly propitious.
So, to the question about the video: most significantly, the video should not be reassuring to those trying to develop conviction around the idea that the Taliban could be trusted to ensure that Al Qaeda (and now the Islamic State, as well) would not re-establish a sanctuary in eastern Afghanistan. Frankly, I have never shared that conviction and the video reinforces my assessment of the situation.
As to the timing of the video, it certainly does not help the Taliban negotiators, at a potentially sensitive time in the negotiations, assure their interlocutors that there will not be an Al Qaeda (or Islamic State) sanctuary in Afghanistan should they regain power.
The Cipher Brief: If the U.S. decides to keep a counter-terrorism/special operations presence in Afghanistan, will a ceasefire with the Taliban ever be realistic?
Petraeus: I don’t think that the possibility of a ceasefire with the Taliban should be ruled out. We did, after all, see a ceasefire in the past year that lasted several days. That said, I do not think that any ceasefire would ultimately prove sustainable, as I am skeptical that any durable and acceptable agreement can be reached with the Taliban – and that, presumably, would be the basis for an extended ceasefire (even if the final agreement was still to be fully resolved). Beyond that, as I noted earlier, such a ceasefire is not likely to be universally observed by the various groups outside the control of the Taliban. Moreover, our counter-terrorism operations would likely have to continue, in order to prevent AQ, IS, and other extremist elements from carrying out attacks and achieving their objectives in eastern Afghanistan, in particular.
The Cipher Brief: Are you seeing any signs of progress with respect to the internal political situation in Afghanistan?
Petraeus: The internal situation can, as we have often seen in the past, best be described by that wonderful British term “fraught.” In fact, the infighting is even greater than normal, as the jockeying intensifies in the lead-up to the Afghan presidential elections scheduled for late September. President Ashraf Ghani, supported by a judicial decision, has stayed beyond his five-year term to provide stability until the elections – while his critics have argued for an interim, caretaker government (the formation of which would itself undoubtedly be very challenging). Meanwhile the new parliament is consumed with various ethnic disputes and other issues, and the economy is fairly stagnant as well, with security challenges compounding the difficulties in the political and economic realms – and resulting from them, to a degree, as well. So, the overall situation is quite challenging.
The Cipher Brief: Are you confident of the long-term sustainability of the Afghan National Army?
Petraeus: I have reasonable confidence in Afghanistan’s security forces if and only if we continue to provide the necessary funding and enablers (especially intelligence platforms and analysis, close air support, training, equipping, and advising). But we have to recognize that Afghan forces have sustained considerable losses on the battlefield in recent years as they have taken over the bulk of the country’s security missions, including the fighting on the frontlines.
Gen. David Petraeus (Ret.), Former Director, CIA
Former Director of the CIA
"Needless to say, this creates considerable challenges for them when it comes to recruiting and retention, as does the reality that the war is likely to continue and be quite protracted. Consequently, as I noted earlier, we need to seek ways that we can do more to support our Afghan partners and mitigate their vulnerabilities and shortcomings in combat support assets, in particular, while still ensuring that our commitment is sustainable."
The Cipher Brief: The most recent Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report stated that since 2002, the U.S. has invested in excess of $9 billion in counter-narcotics, yet despite that effort, “Afghanistan remains the global leader in poppy production”. Where do you think the U.S. policy on the drug trade in Afghanistan failed in the past, and what should the U.S. and Afghan policy be moving forward?
Petraeus: The principal failure in this area has been the inability to provide Afghan farmers a sustainable, viable alternative to poppy production – keeping in mind that poppy cultivation is the optimal agricultural option for the climate and soil conditions in several provinces. There have been periods when there was measurable progress in our counter-narcotics effort through a comprehensive approach (including crop substitution programs, poppy eradication initiatives, and intelligence-driven combat operations targeting illegal narcotics operations, infrastructure, and organizations).
Ultimately, however, the difficulties of building a value chain for crops like pomegranate or other substitutes for the poppy have proven insurmountable due to the cost of such efforts and lack of comparable compensation for farmers, not to mention the challenges of building the value chain for alternative crops – especially given that poppy cultivation is considerably easier for farmers than most substitutes, as well.
That reality notwithstanding, counter-narcotics operations and initiatives do need to continue, as opium products are a plague on Afghanistan itself, not to mention on its neighbors and countries beyond Central Asia. But these efforts likely need to be carefully focused geographically.
The Cipher Brief: What do you foresee being Afghanistan’s biggest challenges 2-3 years down the road?
Petraeus: I fear that Afghanistan’s challenges over the next few years will be fairly similar to those confronting the country at present. In terms of Afghan politics, one might hope that the presidential election later this year may resolve some of the infighting over political power in Kabul that has gone on since the last presidential election and the subsequent agreement on the power-sharing deal that satisfied neither the President nor the Chief Executive and their respective coalitions. But, of course, given the fractious nature of Afghan politics and continued struggles over power, it is entirely possible that the election outcome may not settle the various issues and they will continue to undermine effective governance in the country.
I am afraid that the quest for an acceptable agreement with the Taliban is likely to prove elusive. The fact that the Taliban will not even allow a representative of the elected government of Afghanistan to be a party to the negotiations does not bode well. And, frankly, if we could not achieve any real progress in the 2010-2011 time frame, when we had the formidable Ambassador Richard Holbrooke spearheading the effort, 150,000 coalition troops (whom I was privileged to command), and battlefield momentum against the Taliban, I think it very unlikely that we can get an agreement when coalition forces number less than 20,000, the Taliban have been gradually increasing their control in rural areas and encroaching on some major urban areas, and the commitment of the U.S. has been called into question.
Gen. David Petraeus (Ret.), Former Director, CIA
Former Director of the CIA
"I also suspect, regrettably, that is it highly unlikely that Pakistan will conduct operations to eliminate or even disrupt the headquarters of the major Afghan insurgent groups that are located in Baluchistan and the mountainous tribal areas of western Pakistan. And without such action, of course, it is very difficult to bring the kind of pressure on Afghanistan’s adversaries that one would like to see."
Finally, of course, we have repeatedly been reminded in Afghanistan and some other countries that it is very difficult to establish the rule of law in a country whose major export crop is illegal. And, as noted earlier, sadly, the challenge of poppy and opium production is likely to persist.
Despite those challenges and the frustrations of the past 18 years of war in the shadow of the Hindu Kush, we nonetheless need to remember what I recalled at the beginning – that we went to Afghanistan for a reason and we have stayed for a reason. And I believe that those reasons, the difficulties in Afghanistan notwithstanding, will make a continued commitment to Afghanistan an imperative for the U.S. and our coalition partners.
Be briefed by the experts at The Cipher Brief Threat Conference in Sea Island, GA March 22-24, 2020. Seats are limited. Request your invitation today.
Read more from General David Petraeus (Ret.) in The Cipher Brief
