BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT – Before the Trump administration takes office, the President-elect and his team have made two major pronouncements regarding the war in Ukraine: they will launch an effort on Inauguration Day to end the war in 100 days; and Trump himself says he plans to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to push the process forward. The latter was something the Biden administration refused to do without some sign that Putin was moderating his aggression against Ukraine. As for the 100-day pledge, while it’s a far cry from Trump’s oft-repeated campaign promise to end the war in 24 hours, it’s still a very ambitious goal.
His own Ukraine envoy, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, acknowledged as much when he explained the 100-day approach. Lt. Gen. Kellogg said the timeline was necessary to help ensure that “this solution is solid, it’s sustainable and that this war ends so that we stop the carnage.”
Can a deal be reached in that time frame for the nearly three-year-old war? What are the core elements that would be a part of any negotiation? And - should Trump meet with Putin before Moscow halts its aggression?
The experts differ on the chances for a deal and the likelihood that the Russian leader will make concessions. But all agree that for all the talk of Ukraine's shortcomings on the battlefield, Russia would come to a negotiation in a weakened position as well. "Russia is having a very difficult time," former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker told The Cipher Brief. "And we see this in two things that happened recently. One of them is their inability to oust Ukraine from Russian territory in Kursk. They were invaded by Ukraine as a pushback against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and they haven’t been able to dislodge the Ukrainians. The second element is their inability to maintain enough force in Syria to prevent the fall of the [Bashar al-] Assad regime...So there’s a lot of weakness on the Russian side as they go into this as well."
THE CONTEXT
- Last year, then-candidate Trump promised repeatedly that he would end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of his inauguration. More recently, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg (Ret.), Trump’s pick to serve as Russia and Ukraine envoy, told Fox News that the new administration would need 100 days to achieve a “solution” to the war.
- Trump said last week, that he would soon meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "He wants to meet and we are setting it up," Trump said, without offering any detail on timing or location other than to say that the two would meet “very quickly” after he returns to the White House. The Kremlin has said there is “mutual readiness for a meeting” and that further steps will be made once Trump takes office.
- Trump’s nominee for Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, said at his Senate confirmation hearing last week, that intensified sanctions on Russian oil are needed to pressure Moscow in negotiations over Ukraine. Bessent’s remarks followed the Biden administration’s adoption of a major sanctions package targeting Russia’s oil sector.
- On the battlefield, Russia has made slow but steady advances in eastern Ukraine, albeit with heavy casualties and losses to military equipment. The latest reports indicate that Russian forces are trying to encircle the logistics hub of Pokrovsk.
- Ukraine has recently intensified its strikes inside of Russian territory; Ukrainian forces claimed responsibility for “massive” drone strikes last week, mostly in southwestern Russia.
- Ukraine also launched a fresh offensive into Russia’s Kursk Province earlier this month, which experts say was aimed at gaining more territorial leverage and to project strength in advance of any negotiations. Russia says it has reclaimed 60% of territory in the Kursk region that was taken by Ukraine in August 2024.
The Cipher Brief spoke separately with former U.S. ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, and the former chief of CIA's Central Eurasia Division Rob Dannenberg, to help better understand the likelihood for a fast deal in Ukraine and the hurdles that stand in the way.
Their comments have been lightly edited for length, clarity and format.
THE EXPERTS
Can the Trump Administration’s really end the war in Ukraine in 100 days?
Lieutenant General Hodges (ret.): I’m very skeptical, because what we still don't have is a clearly defined outcome. Stopping the fighting is not a strategic outcome, because I think anybody who knows Russia and pays attention to what Russia does knows that that won't be the end of it. So I'd much rather hear the incoming administration say our desired strategic outcome for the situation in this part of Europe is “X,” and therefore negotiations are going to get us there. That's why I'm skeptical.
Ambassador Volker: I think what’s significant about General Kellogg saying 100 days is that it’s not one day. You’ll remember that President Trump, during the course of the presidential campaign, repeatedly said he would end the war in a day. I think that President Trump and General Kellogg realize that this is much more difficult than that.
The issue is getting Putin to agree to stop the war. Getting Ukraine to negotiate, getting Ukraine to find a reasonable position here is not difficult. They’re ready to do that. It is Putin who wants to take over and eliminate Ukraine as a separate national identity. Getting him to give up on that goal, that’s the tough part. That’s why I think 100 days here is significant.
Dannenberg: The incoming president should not be led to believe that he can make a deal with Putin. If it ever existed, that time is long past. The “one mafia Don dealing with another mafia Don” paradigm that many have said was part of President Trump’s approach to Putin and Russia during his first term no longer exists. Putin has hardened his view of the U.S. and the West, and has acted on it via his violent aggression against Ukraine, and acts of supervision and sabotage around the world. Putin is all in. The new administration needs to understand that the calculus has changed, and orient itself and its policies accordingly to take full advantage of the opportunity that exists.
What are likely to be the key elements in any negotiations?
Ambassador Volker: I think you have to look to [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelensky’s interview with Sky News that he did before Christmas. This basically laid out what I think are the key elements. One is a ceasefire. Two is a non-recognition of Russia’s occupation of parts of Ukrainian territory, including Donbas, including Crimea, including territories he’s taken since 2022. A non-recognition of that, but an acknowledgement by Ukraine that they’re not going to take this back by military means. It’s going to be a long-term dispute, they’ll seek to get it back by diplomatic, political, and other means. And then finally, genuine, meaningful security guarantees for the rest of Ukraine, so that Putin is deterred from ever attacking again.
I don’t think the Trump team has had the opportunity to really think all this through, to really put together concrete plans. General Kellogg was hoping to visit Ukraine and some European capitals before inauguration. He’s had to postpone that trip until after inauguration. So, I think it is going to take a little time.
Lieutenant General Hodges (ret.): In terms of security guarantees [for Ukraine], there is no guarantee other than NATO membership. I've seen and heard all kinds of different formulas for how that might be worked out, even if part of Ukraine is still occupied by Russia. I think at the end of the day, unless you have U.S. troops that are there on the ground or some kind of European force, then the Russians will absolutely test it. We don't need a bunch of blue-helmeted [UN] guys there; they will not be respected. They seldom are. It needs to be something like the NATO implementation force that went into Bosnia back in 1995.
But the Ukrainians are not going to sit around. They know that they were not prepared back in 2022 when the large-scale invasion started. I was in Kyiv about 2-3 weeks before [the invasion] and Kyiv did not feel like a city that was getting ready for a war. So this time, when and where and however the fighting comes to a halt, I think Ukrainians are going to get to work very quickly on fixing, improving, and growing their own military, growing their defense industry, and fixing all the problems that they have now, so that Russia will not want to attack again.
I was encouraged when I heard General Kellogg say publicly, you cannot trust Russia. That is an excellent starting point for negotiations with the Kremlin. That told me that General Kellogg, who I've known for many years, understands that any agreement will have to have a very strong, compelling compliance protocol. I also was encouraged when I heard him publicly talk about the importance of Ukrainian sovereignty. This is very important.
Restoration of Ukraine sovereignty is important not just because we really like Ukrainians, but because this is a deterrence message to China. The Chinese will see weakness – if we're not willing to defend sovereignty of European countries, then they will not be too impressed with things that we say about the Philippines or the South China Sea and other aspects of international law, particularly with regards to sovereignty.
Ambassador Volker: I believe energy is another one of the key issues. First off, increased U.S. oil and gas production and export can have an impact on global prices, driving them down. That will impact Putin’s war budget right off the top. Second, we’ll have the opportunity then to enforce sanctions that are currently on the books that would inhibit Russia’s oil and gas exports and revenue generation. The Biden administration put a lot on the table in terms of Russia’s energy and finances for sanctions. But then there was not much follow through when it came to secondary sanctions; when it came to the financial transactions that related to energy, those were exempted from sanctions. Closing a lot of these loopholes is now possible. And I think both of these will have a significant impact on Russia’s finances.
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What leverage will President-elect Trump have in pressuring Russia to make concessions?
Lieutenant General Hodges (ret.): Several years ago, Trump talked about Putin being savvy and a genius and a winner and all that. He's not anymore. And so I think how Trump views his relationship with Putin is in a much different place. Hopefully, he will use that leverage to the benefit of the United States, but also for Ukraine and Europe. And here's a couple of things that are already on the table: There's $2 billion worth of aid that was already authorized and appropriated by the Congress. Trump doesn't even have to say a word. Just let that keep going, because that's $2 billion that the Biden administration failed to deliver, did not get it out the door. Then these new sanctions on Russian shadow fleet vessels that are carrying Russian oil to India and China, leave those sanctions in place. And then there’s the recent lifting of restrictions on ATACMS [long-range missiles] by the Biden administration. Leave that in place. So there's boom, boom, boom, three things that are making it a little bit more difficult for the Russians. And President Trump doesn't even have to announce it. He just leaves it place. So he's got so many advantages. And what I hope is that the administration will use that. They don't have to go negotiating with the Kremlin hat in hand.
Dannenberg: Putin is weaker than he has ever been. You would never guess this from his actions and the noise from his fellow travelers, but it is true. The fall of [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad, the stunning success of Israeli operations against Iran and its surrogates, and Russia’s inability to do anything about it has dramatically weakened Russian power in a critical sector of Putin’s imagined sphere of influence.
Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO has weakened the other flank of Putin’s ambition. This has consequences for Russia’s standing internationally, and has rattled many in Moscow’s elite circles. And the campaign in Ukraine has devastated Russia’s conventional military power both in practice and reputation. Three years ago, the general view in professional military circles was that Russia was a conventional military powerhouse in addition to being a nuclear superpower. That view has changed dramatically.
Russia’s economy is buckling under inflation, ruble depreciation, high interest rates and a lack of foreign investment. Not to mention brain drain and a stretched workforce with so many casualties from the war.
President Trump has the opportunity to secure a place in the pantheon of great western leaders if he uses the early days of his administration to remove any illusion Putin may have that the Trump plan to end the war will be something that Putin can portray domestically or internationally as a victory.
Is a good thing or a bad thing for Donald Trump to meet with Vladimir Putin as part of these negotiations?
Ambassador Volker: My view is that he should call Putin as he said he would do, and tell Putin to stop the war. And he should offer a meeting with Putin after the war is over – not before, not as a way of getting there. That would show weakness and Trump being a supplicant, and Trump doesn’t want to be in that position. But to offer that he’s willing to meet with Putin but after Putin stops the war, I think that would be reasonable.
Lieutenant General Hodges (ret.): I would agree with Ambassador Volker. If President Trump has this leverage and this advantage, don't give it away by going to meet Putin somewhere – which is going to be a pretty limited number of places, because he has been indicted [by the International Criminal Court]. Most countries would have to arrest him if he went there. So I think a phone call is not a bad idea. Again, it has to be, “Hey, let me tell you what, Vladimir, this is the deal. You know what? Ukraine is a sovereign country. It is in the interests of the United States and all of our allies that you are defeated, that you leave Ukraine, and you live within your own borders, you're at zero risk of you being attacked by any NATO country. So stop worrying about that.”
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The Cipher Brief: Ukraine has had manpower issues, and slow but steady losses in the East. What position would Ukraine be in, were negotiations to begin soon?
Ambassador Volker: Russia has made steady incremental gains in the East over the second half of 2024 and even into the current day. They have done that. It has not been a lot of land. We’re talking about 4,000-plus square kilometers. And that is at the cost of about 400,000 casualties. Tremendous human cost for Russia to get relatively little. But they are making those incremental gains.
And you’re also right, Ukraine is having issues with manpower. They have had issues with the supply of weapons from the U.S. and other countries. And we know that our industrial capacity is limited, so there isn’t that much out there ready to be given. We have to keep producing it. And Ukraine is, in fact, dependent upon the supply of Western weapons. They’re doing better on their own, but they still need Western supplies. They are dependent in that way, going into any kind of negotiation.
But we also have to remember that Russia’s in a weakened position too. They have high inflation. I would estimate it to be around 30 percent, but official estimates are closer to eight or nine. Interest rates in Russia are fixed at 21 percent right now, so we have to assume that inflation is above that. And this is an aim to try to squeeze down inflation. But the problem is that Russia doesn’t have access to foreign exchange reserves of any great quantity. Their external assets have been frozen. They can’t get new foreign exchange reserves. So they’re drawing down what they’ve got. And this is causing them budgetary pressures.
That’s just on the economic side. On the military side, they also have a manpower problem. They have been losing people on the battlefield at such a rate that they can’t replace them at that speed. We’re talking 1,500 people a day [killed or wounded]. That means that they are working with units that have holes in them. They’ve brought in North Korean troops who are not as effective. They have struggled with how to keep up the tempo while facing a manpower shortage. And then you have the equipment situation. They can’t produce defense equipment at the rate that they are burning through that either. Therefore, they’re relying on North Korea for artillery shells. They are relying on Iran for drones. They are taking World War II-era equipment out of storage and trying to use that.
So Russia is having a very difficult time as well. And we see this in two things that happened recently. One of them is their inability to oust Ukraine from Russian territory in Kursk. They were invaded by Ukraine as a pushback against Russia’s invasions of Ukraine. And they haven’t been able to dislodge the Ukrainians. The second element is their inability to maintain enough force in Syria to prevent the fall of the [Bashar al-] Assad regime. They had whittled it down so much that the Assad regime just collapsed. And now Russia has faced a growing uncertainty about their presence in the Middle East. So there’s a lot of weakness on the Russian side as they go into this as well.
Lieutenant General Hodges (ret.): I think the Ukrainians actually have a degree of confidence, and President Zelensky has been very pragmatic and practical in how he approaches the Trump administration. At the end of the day, the Ukrainians know who their neighbor is, who Russia is, and that if they just quit or they give up or whatever, they know what the consequences are. So they're not going to do that.
I think that the Russians also understand that they cannot keep doing what they're doing, so for the Russians, the only hope is that the West, particularly the U.S., turns its back on Ukraine. Putin believes he can win because he doesn't care about casualties. On the Ukrainian side, of course, President Zelensky has to worry about casualties, but I don't think their problem is manpower. There's probably a million Ukrainians that are military age women and men that could serve without lowering the draft. The problem is that the Ukrainian government has failed to earn the confidence of enough Ukrainian families that their sons and daughters won't be wasted. So this is what the government has to prove to the population – that their sons and daughters will not go to the war until they are properly trained, properly equipped and put in a unit that's properly trained.
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