To ask about the state of democracy in Hong Kong is asking the wrong question. The irony is that Hong Kong residents arguably have more voting rights today than for most of the time that Hong Kong was a Crown Colony, which the British ruled with an iron fist, and where universal suffrage of any sort did not exist from 1842 until 1995.
The real question to ask is whether Hong Kong can retain the most important legacy that Her Majesty left behind: freedom and effective liberal institutions. Most important would be the maintenance of rule of law as evinced by a fair and objective judicial system; freedom of expression; freedom of the press; and an effective, impartial, apolitical civil service. It is critically important and a top priority to protect the things that Hong Kong has almost always had.
Instead of focusing on where things are slipping when it comes to freedom and effective institutions, I’d like to look towards the future: How should we think about Hong Kong’s future? One effective way is to understand the key interests of the new colonial ruler—Beijing.
Thucydides once described a state’s primary motivations to act as “fear, honor, and profit (interest).” This resonates with Beijing’s goals for what it wants Hong Kong to look like, which we can describe more specifically as “wealthy, pacified, and patriotic.”
WEALTHY (profit): Although Hong Kong’s contribution to China’s GDP has fallen from about 16 percent in 1997 to about three percent last year, there is more that Hong Kong contributes to the Chinese economy, such as capital raised by mainland companies in Hong Kong’s stock market, and as the largest source of foreign direct investment, not to mention a jumping off ground for numerous foreign companies delving into the China market.
PACIFIED (fear): Beijing wants Hong Kongers to focus on prosperity and leave politics out of their lives, in part, to maintain stability in the Special Administrative Region and avoid spillover –or as the Party propaganda used to say “spiritual pollution”—into the mainland, giving the 1.3 billion Chinese citizens dangerous ideas on civil protest, democracy, and freedom. For this reason, the annual July 1st protests and the Umbrella Revolution raised major concerns in Beijing. The Chinese ideal for Hong Kong is a Singapore-like model, where the ruling party and government maintain major control over political life. As a friend in college told me in 1991, in Singapore there is democracy but no freedom. In Hong Kong, there is freedom but no democracy.
PATRIOTIC (honor): This is Beijing’s ideal end state. Things have changed over the past 10 years. When the Hong Kong economy had slowed drastically in the early 2000s, Beijing permitted an increased number of mainland visitors to help shore up consumption. At first they were greeted as saviors; over time, however, the cultural disparity between mainlanders, particularly poorly educated, rural tourists, and the more cosmopolitan Hong Kong resident, changed the dynamic into resentment.
Ideally, the Chinese leadership would love to see a Hong Kong using the renminbi as currency, with no border controls to the mainland, and with a population educated to love the Party, join the Army, and see the mainland as their political inspiration and source of pride. It also wants to show the world that China and the Communist Party are smart and sophisticated enough to manage the transition from British dependent territory to another Chinese city, which is exactly what we in the West do not want. What made and makes Hong Kong great is its uniqueness among Chinese cities.
In conclusion, if we understand what Beijing wants and needs from Hong Kong, then policymakers, politicians, students, lawyers, business leaders, journalists, and others can focus their work and their strategies on how to achieve the most important and most effective outcomes. To be sure, a representative government that responds to the aspirations of the Hong Kong body politic is the best way to maintain the freedoms the territory currently enjoys. But right now, the critical thing is to work to ensure that civil institutions continue to work in favor of the Hong Kong people. It would be wrong if we ignore these things in favor of singular attention on the vote.
This would take something called “soft power.” But that’s another story.
