In part two of our conversation, we focus on the relationships with allies and partners in getting North Korea to agree to complete and verifiable denuclearization.
Kelly: Have you seen signs that China has increased their trade and assistance to North Korea since the U.S. stepped up diplomatic efforts?
DeTrani: There has been some reporting that certain entities in China were getting coal from North Korea. North Korea had been selling coal to China - that's one of the major products they sell to China - and somewhere between 85-90 percent of their trade is with China. There are also a lot of textile exports that go from North Korea to China.
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Former Director, National Counter Proliferation Center
"But you know, the sense I got certainly from my meetings in Beijing and also in South Korea, is that China is still implementing those U.N. Security Council resolutions that have imposed sanctions on North Korea. Are there elements within the People's Republic of China, maybe even in South Korea or other places, that are not as diligent? That has to be pursued, because what we don't want is any lessening of the impact of sanctions on North Korea because indeed that would encourage North Korea to move in the wrong direction."
The answer to the question is: I don't see China walking away from the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that are sanctioning North Korea.
Kelly:. Joe, you've been talking with South Korean leaders. What opportunities do you see for the upcoming inter-Korean summit?
DeTrani: Originally Suzanne, this meeting was to be focused on inter-Korean relations; the building of roads, the rail line connectivity with South and North Korea. North Korea is really looking for significant economic development assistance from South Korea and certainly economic development assistance. That was the focus. But I think now, with the postponement of Secretary Pompeo’s visit, the focus is also, and primarily, on denuclearization. Is North Korea committed to complete denuclearization? That’s exactly where we are. So I think that's going to be the thrust of the summit, and hopefully Kim Jong Un is responsive to that and will move on that.
Kelly: Do you think the DPRK, the Chinese, the Russians and the Japanese are, in any way, waiting to see the impact of U.S. mid-term elections and the Mueller investigation to help define their next steps? And what role do you think that Xi Jingpin, Putin and Moon will play in the next few months, given Moon and Putin’s upcoming reported summits with Kim Jong Un?
DeTrani: North Korea, and all of these countries probably are looking at these issues. It's pretty hard not to be aware of what's going on. But there’s a momentum there and they see President Donald Trump has taken the lead on this. This is the first sitting President who has sat down with the leader of North Korea and he made it very clear he's got the lead on this issue. And you know, compared to where we were a year ago Suzanne, we were looking at the possibility of stumbling into nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. Now, we're talking about negotiations. We haven't seen any missile launches or nuclear tests. There have been some confidence building measures from both North Korea and from the United States in halting our joint military exercises. So there have been some positive developments.
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Former Director, National Counter Proliferation Center
"My personal view, given that I was involved in negotiations with North Korea since 2003, is that there needs to be an element of patience. To get to the joint statement of September 2005, it took us over two years to do that. And now, we have a special representative to assist Secretary Mike Pompeo. I think we just have to be a little more patient with this, but persistent and focused on the goals and not deviate from that."
So yeah, I think they're looking at the midterm elections. But you know, I think the reality is they know President Donald Trump working with Secretary of State Pompeo, is in the lead and they are orchestrating this approach. And I think North Korea is not going to be distracted from that, knowing that their primary interlocutor as they see it, is the President of the United States, who spent time meeting in a summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore.
But I think the North Koreans have to realize that not only are they working with President Trump and Secretary Pompeo, but they're working with our negotiators, which will be a day-to-day process, a very tedious 24/7 process, to work these issues out so that there are no hiccups and there are no letters that are coming from the vice chairman or the vice foreign minister or from Kim Young Chul, indicating indignation or unhappiness with developments. But this is all being worked through our negotiators and we have progress and we have transparency while we move to the ultimate goal, which is complete verifiable dismantlement.
Kelly: President Trump recently issued a statement linking North Korea's nuclear program to trade tensions between the U.S. and China. If Beijing wants to link pressure on Pyongyang to trade ties with the U.S., could this be effective?
DeTrani: Ninety percent of the crude oil comes from China to North Korea. Literally, China can basically halt any economic development and progress in North Korea just with the crude oil and petroleum trade. So there's no question China has all the levers here with North Korea. And they have a peace and friendship treaty that goes back to 1961. Now, we know China is not going to pull those levers. They may not like some of the things that are coming out, and there may be some tension there at the leadership level, although it's improving, but China does need a friendly North Korea on its border. It's a very necessary buffer for China. So, I don't think China is going to use all the levers but they do have the levers to do that.
Trade is such a significant issue with the United States and is so critical for China and where they are now with their economic programs, for them to commingle trade with the nuclear issue with North Korea, would be a dangerous tack for them to take. My personal view is they would be very cautious in doing that and I think it would be foolhardy to commingle both. And what I'm hearing from the Chinese is that they have not done that. They see trade as a very separate, stand-alone issue, a very important one with the United States, and North Korea and the nuclear issue as a standalone issue that has to be addressed separately. They are not going to even attempt to commingle the two. Now, having said that, that's what I'm hearing from the Chinese and I've not seen anything to indicate otherwise, but certainly President Trump has indicated that they may be looking at trade as an issue that they would use with the United States. It's something that certainly we need to be in discussion with China about.
Suzanne- What role will cyber-attacks and cyber warfare continue to play in the U.S.-DPRK dynamic?
DeTrani: That's an excellent question. You know, we focus on the nuclear issue: starting in 1994 with the agreed framework and then the joint statement in 2005, and then in 2012, we have the Leap Day agreement. It was all focused on the nuclear and missile programs. Well, when we talk about weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is very much in the business of chemical, biological and cyber. And as we saw with Sony Pictures and some of what they did in South Korea with some of the ATM’s and the banks, we know that North Korea has a very significant cyber capability to use cyber as a weapon. This is something we have to be very mindful of. Now, let me just note that in our current negotiations with North Korea, it's not just nuclear. It's not just missiles, but it's also chemical and it's biological weapons. I would think cyber will be on the docket also to be discussed and resolved. So, yes cyber is a significant issue. And North Korea has been working to enhance their cyber capabilities in using them as a weapon. And again, I go back to Sony Pictures because I think that was the first very significant manifestation of what North Korea showed the world that they are capable of doing, by using cyber as a weapon of destruction.
Kelly: Yes, and it also raised the question of what the U.S. will do to respond, fueling the discussion about response to cyber might not be via cyber. Let me get to another question. In the past, North Korea has been able to exploit differences between state and defense about whether to demand special inspections first before resuming negotiations. Is the U.S. unified on its priorities today?
DeTrani: I think the U.S. is Suzanne, from where I sit. You have Mike Pompeo who is orchestrating all these pieces and he did it when he was head of CIA and now as the Secretary of State. And he's pulled a very impressive team together at State Department and an interagency team with DOE, DOD and Treasury and others coming together with State and Intelligence to look at these issues. There's a consistency there and I think that's one of the hiccups we have right now because we're looking at a comprehensive declaration from North Korea of all their nuclear weapons and weapons facilities, but also a verification protocol that will get the monitors into not only declared facilities like the Yongbyon plutonium facility, but also to undeclared suspect facilities.
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Former Director, National Counter Proliferation Center
"We have to remember that going back a number of years ago, North Korea did not declare they had a uranium enrichment program. And it was only in 2010, that they revealed that they had this uranium enrichment program. Of course, we knew this certainly starting in 2000-2002, when we told the North Koreans we knew about it."
So it took eight years for North Korea to be forthcoming on that issue. It speaks to the necessity to be very diligent when we get into the monitoring aspects of any nuclear declaration from North Korea and certainly given the fact that there were thousands of reported underground facility sites in North Korea. So the ability to obfuscate, to conceal some capabilities, would be there and hopefully North Korea doesn't go down that road. We have unique capabilities and unique knowledge and that would be very unfortunate if they did.
Kelly: With the dissolution of the JCPOA, do you expect negotiators will exert pressure on North Korea to cut tight ties with Iran if they begin to resume an aggressive nuclear program? And is there any legitimate concern about future North Korean and Iranian collaboration on this front?
DeTrani: North Korea has always collaborated very well with Iran. North Korea has provided Iran with significant missile capabilities. Some of the missile systems we see in Iran are based on what North Korea has provided to Iran. We've not seen that on the nuclear side, fortunately that would be a bad move on the part of North Korea. But on the missile side, yes, there has been a lot of cooperation. Also, state to state cooperation going back to nuclear tests where reportedly the Iranians were at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site going back a number of years. So there has been a lot of cooperation.
North Korea is very mindful of the JCPOA and that the U.S. recently decided to walk away from the JCPOA, given that the demand was to modify it. I really don't see this impacting North Korea, however. I see North Korea looking at our relations with Iran and what we did in the negotiation with the JCPOA as very separate. When we think about it, with the JCPOA, Iran was permitted to have over 5,000 centrifuges in operation and sunset clauses that would permit any number of capabilities that would persist. So, I just don't see that. The issue of centrifuges with the sunset clause permitting Iran to go as far as they want using as many centrifuges as possible and but also with the other issues that came up regarding ballistic missile technology that Iran was pursuing and continues to pursue with their support to Hamas, Hezbollah and terrorism. These are not issues that immediately touched North Korea. So I think they are separate.
Would we, if we have an agreement with North Korea, then try to get North Korea to sever relations with or inhibit any work with Iran? I just I don't know, but I think that would be a very separate issue. There's so much heavy lifting to be done with North Korea to get them to give up all their nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. And there are other issues with North Korea if we are looking at normalization eventually. I think some of the most visible and immediate tangibles for North Korea would be a liaison office in Pyongyang and a liaison office of theirs here in Washington, but ultimately, they want a normal relationship with the United States. And there are other issues involved here to include the gulags, to include human rights issues, to include their illicit activities issues and there needs to be progress on human rights issues. There are so many issues unique to North Korea. I just don't see bringing the Iranian issue into play with North Korea as something that could divert our focus on being as comprehensive and as successful as possible with North Korea.
Suzanne- Understood. Within the last year, many leaders of South Korea's conservative opposition party have called for ROK to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Could this happen eventually, if North Korean nuclear talks do not lead to denuclearization?
Joe- That's the key issue and an excellent question. I think the concern is, and we've told this to the North Koreans when they would say, ‘Accept us as a nuclear weapon state and we would be a good friend of the United States, a responsible actor’ and they would cite Pakistan. They will say, ‘Look, you have done this with Pakistan.’ Yeah, but we heard it going back a number of years from South Korea that if North Korea retains nuclear weapons, South Korea will persist and pursue a nuclear weapons capability. The same for Japan, and I would think Taiwan. If you think back to the 1970s, Taiwan was pursuing their own nuclear weapons program. There were other countries in the region. So yes, North Korea retaining any nuclear weapons capability would give at least a sense that it would incite others to pursue their own nuclear weapons capabilities, regardless of any extended nuclear deterrence commitment we have with countries like South Korea.
Suzanne- And we haven't talked about Japan.
Joe- Japan is so key on this whole thing. We talked a few months ago about North Korea and that maybe the U.S. was moving too quickly and maybe we weren’t being as forthcoming, or at least the perception was maybe we weren't sharing as much with South Korea as we could, which would be a terrible mistake. That's why the six party talks were so important, because we were all in sync. We had the five countries totally in sync when we were working issues related to North Korea. So this is a big part of our negotiator’s responsibility, to ensure that Japan and South Korea and China and Russia are all in sync and are moving in the same direction. No question about Japan. But Japan is very concerned.
I mean let's look at it. In 2017, when North Korea showed the world that they had an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that could touch the United States and also a thermonuclear weapon that could be mated to a delivery system, we took real notice of that. We said that's enough, they need to stop. We introduced strategic assets to our joint military exercises and we made it very clear to Kim Jong Un, you've gone far enough with this.
Now, let’s think of Japan. The Rodongs have been there for some years. (ED note: Rodong missiles are believed to have a range of approx. 800 miles) There are Rodong missiles in North Korea that can reach Japan and they can mate them up with nuclear capabilities if you will, a weapons delivery system, so Japan is very vulnerable. That's why we see them enhancing their missile defense capabilities with Aegis and other land-based systems. And they have issues with North Korea. Not only are they very vulnerable to North Korea and their nuclear and missile capabilities but also the chemical, biological and the cyber capabilities that we mentioned briefly, but indeed they have the issue that is very critical for Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan and that's the abductee issue.
A number of Japanese citizens going back years, were abducted by North Korea and were taken to North Korea to be used for training purposes and to have to help with language training and things of that nature. For Japan, this is a core issue that North Korea has to be forthcoming with the abductees and admit to all of those Japanese citizens who were abducted. Now, we go back to 2002, with Prime Minister Koizumi's visit with Kim Jong Un when Kim Jong Un said 13 Japanese citizens were abducted from Japan by North Korea, and eight of those were dead. They died of natural causes or accidents and they did return five. The view in Japan is there are more than the 13 that were declared in 2002, and this is something that Prime Minister Abe is working diligently on and he needs to get resolved because ultimately North Korea needs a normal relationship with Japan for obvious reasons and one of them is the amount of money that they would be getting. We're talking billions and billions of dollars but also becoming a legitimate nation state. I keep going back to this - I think this is where Kim Jong Un is. This is a young man who wants to live a good life. He studied in Switzerland and he's saying, ‘We're in bad shape here, so let's work on economic development.’ To do that, you’ve got to get out of the isolation, you’ve got to get these sanctions lifted, you’ve have to bring a halt to these joint military exercises and you have to normalize relations with countries like Japan and the United States and others and become a legitimate nation state and interact. Japan is critical on this and I can't say enough about the Japanese participation and how great an ally Japan is with the United States.
Kelly: Joe, you’ve mentioned that patience is going to be key here. Can you offer closing thoughts on where you think we’re headed? If we can be forward leaning, what do you see developing over the next 6-12 months?
DeTrani: I think between the next 6-12 months hopefully we can get something like a declaration for a declaration. We can get North Korea to say, ‘Okay, we're prepared to give you a declaration of all of our nuclear weapons and facilities and personnel and we'll prepare to sign a verification protocol to permit inspectors, if you will, to leave the declared sites and visit non-declared suspect nuclear sites, but in return, we need security assurances. We need a declaration and ultimately a peace treaty to end the Korean War. We would like liaison offices in our respective capitals. We would like a non-aggression pact between our respective countries.’ And they will say, ‘We would like some of those sanctions lifted, especially on things like petroleum products,’ so they could start moving in the direction of eventually getting assistance from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and some of the others, so that there will be an infusion of investment going into North Korea. And with South Korea, that the inter-Korean relations move forward so that are looking at road development and railroad systems that will connect the two.
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Former Director, National Counter Proliferation Center
"But so much of this is contingent on the core issue - this is the issue that has been gnawing at us since 1994 and even before that - and that's the nuclear issue. A declaration has to be complete and very comprehensive and a verification protocol must permit that. But to expect that from North Korea and not to reciprocate, I think that would be unrealistic."
Conversely, for North Korea to think that the U.S. is going to give them a declaration and eventually a peace treaty, without seeing a declaration and any movement on complete, verifiable dismantlement of their nuclear weapons, is also unrealistic. Both parties need to come together on that. That's why we have negotiators, this is a 24/7 job. It's going to take a lot of patience, but also a lot of hard work and perseverance, because ultimately it has to be complete, verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems.
Suzanne- Mr. Ambassador we're very grateful to have your insights with The Cipher Brief. You’re going to have a lot of work to do helping us understand that all of this means in the coming months and years. Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with us.
