EXPERT INTERVIEWS — It’s a warning Russia has issued repeatedly since the first days of its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine: Don’t forget that we are a nuclear power.
The latest iteration of that warning came via the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in a speech to world leaders that was loaded with bluster.
“I’m not going to talk here about the senselessness and the danger of the very idea of trying to fight to victory with a nuclear power, which is what Russia is,” Lavrov told the U.N. General Assembly Saturday – and he then proceeded to talk about exactly that. Lavrov warned of the “senselessness and the danger” in any attempt to defeat a nuclear power like Russia, and accused the West of preparing Europe for a “suicidal escapade.”
Lavrov’s speech followed the Kremlin’s latest revision of its nuclear posture. Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin broadened a list of scenarios that could lead to Russia using nuclear weapons – including one scenario drawn directly from the current war in Ukraine: Russia, Putin said, could use nuclear weapons in response to any major attack on its territory involving aircraft, missiles or drones, adding that if a rival nuclear power supported such an attack, it would be held responsible.
This latest Russian "red line" was aimed squarely at deterring the U.S. and its allies from allowing Ukraine to strike Russia with long-range Western missiles. And as with the Kremlin’s prior red lines and nuclear threats, which have come and gone, the key questions are: Would Putin really use a nuclear weapon? And from a policy standpoint, should the West be deterred by the threat?
The answers are hugely consequential for Ukraine and its supporters. If Putin’s warnings are merely rhetorical, then the case for lifting those weapons restrictions is strong. If the threat is real, then the fears of a major NATO-Russian conflagration may be real as well.
Ukrainian officials and many of their European supporters have made their views clear.
"In my opinion, this is yet another bluff and demonstration of Putin's weakness,” Anton Gerashchenko, a former adviser to Ukraine's internal affairs minister, said on X. “He will not dare to use nuclear weapons because that will make him a complete outcast."
Even U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was dismissive of Putin's latest warning, noting this was not the first time the Russian leader had taken to "rattling the nuclear saber."
In Russia, meanwhile, a chorus of politicians and commentators have been clamoring for Putin to use the nuclear option. Sergei Karaganov, an influential Putin ally, argued recently for a limited nuclear strike in Europe that would force Russia's enemies to take its nuclear deterrent seriously. And Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, said on his blog that Putin’s latest statement meant that “the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered. The West is sure that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons first. Russia is now saying it is ready to do so."
Cipher Brief chief international correspondent Ia Meurmishvili spoke recently with two experts on Russia’s nuclear posture — Ian Brzezinski, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy and Glen Howard, former President of The Jamestown Foundation for the weekly program The World Deciphered. Both believe the Russian threats have helped the Kremlin soften the West’s response to Russian aggression. As Brzezinski put it, “Putin has effectively used nuclear coercion to limit our support to Ukraine.”
The interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
The Cipher Brief: Do you believe Russia is using its nuclear weapon status only as a rhetorical threat – or do you think there is a real chance that Russia will use nukes at some point?
Brzezinski: What Russia has done is set new precedents in the exercise of nuclear coercion. Putin has moved some nuclear weapons, for example, into Belarus, but we haven't heard evidence of him doing anything that has dramatically said that we're on the cusp of a nuclear war. And nothing that changes our understanding of the strategy and tactics of how they actually employ those systems.
But when it comes to nuclear coercion, that is different. Nuclear coercion has been a key element of Russia's strategy in the invasion of Ukraine. And that coercion has had an effect. You know the red lines — no Western boots on the ground, and you've reported regularly on how slow our assistance has flowed to the Ukrainians when it comes to critical munitions, long-range strike weapons, air defense systems and such. So Putin has been able to exercise nuclear coercion with effect. And that, to me, is incredibly worrisome.
First, it has weakened Ukraine's ability to respond to this war. Second, it's a message to other countries around the world that nuclear coercion can be exercised with effect. And that has a proliferation dynamic, not only among our adversaries, to say, Oh my goodness, we can exercise nuclear coercion in the same way. Think of China and its plans for Taiwan. Think about Iran. All of them saying, What do I need to do to prevent the West from meddling in my imperial ambitions? It affects the debate over the role of nuclear weapons among our allies.
Look at the debate that's going on in South Korea. It’s a democracy that's a close ally, and there’s a debate over there as to whether they should have nuclear weapons to deter North Korea and China.
If you reward nuclear coercion, you will see nuclear coercion exercised again and again. And that's what we've seen, in the course of these last two and a half years in Ukraine. And I fear that's human nature, that when you constantly repeat a threat – and that's what nuclear coercion is – you increase the likelihood of exercising that threat.
Howard: Right now there's a period of great uncertainty and debate in Russia. They're currently updating their nuclear strategy doctrine. Recently, the Kremlin strategist and well-known personality, Sergey Karaganov, wrote an article in Kommersant that was basically nuclear saber rattling. But his audience was not in the West, it was in Russia. He was arguing that Russia's not doing enough, and needs to take a tougher position on its own nuclear doctrine. And I think part of it was timed to what is happening inside Russia, as Ukraine continues its ongoing operations in the Kursk region.
Part of Ukraine's strategy, meanwhile, is to show the West that there are no red lines for Russia, that Russian threats of nuclear escalation are very hollow, and to embarrass Russia by suggesting that they don't have a policy for nuclear weapons. So that's the first thing.
The second is that it defies common wisdom that you would want to use tactical nuclear weapons in an area where the forces of Ukraine and Russia are tightly entangled.
So there's a lot of saber rattling and not a lot of action in terms of what Russia is saying. And we become hostage to our fears. This has very much kind of impaired the West, and impeded the Biden administration from reacting in a very responsible way.
The Cipher Brief: But you're not excluding the possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine?
Brzezinski: No, I think you cannot exclude that. Russia is of course a nuclear power. But you can exaggerate that threat, and you can also mismanage that threat, when it comes to shaping your strategy to respond to aggression. And I think that's what's going on today. Putin has effectively used nuclear coercion to limit our support to Ukraine, and that has been to Ukraine's disadvantage.
Howard: There's this vagueness in terms of what Putin is saying and how we will respond. And Putin knows this. He knows that there's a concern among certain sections of the Biden cabinet, including the president, and that they have this inherent concern of World War III. And it's a valid concern, but the facts don't really match.
For example, if Putin was really ready to make a nuclear response and a statement, he could detonate a nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic. There's been years of speculation that they've been wanting to resume nuclear testing again. Conducting a nuclear test in the Arctic would be safe, and it would be a very effective way of showing the West that he's serious. But Putin hasn’t done that.
The threats that he resorts to are in my opinion very hollow and not backed up by facts.
The Cipher Brief: Is there anything that NATO and the West should be doing differently in this regard?
Brzezinski: I think what the West should be doing is to increase support to Ukraine. Enable the Ukrainians to win, to defeat the Russians, thereby demonstrating that nuclear coercion doesn't have an effect. And I think there is room for us to responsibly manage this threat.
Think about the imbalance of power that's at play here. NATO alone has a GDP of $54 trillion as compared to Russia's less than $2 trillion — that’s a factor of 25. NATO spends $1.5 trillion this year on defense budgets. Russia? We don't know for sure, but somewhere between 100 and $130 billion – a factor of ten. So the alliance is in the position to crush this Russian invasion. And if we provided Ukrainians the weapons at the rate they need, the type they need, without the restrictions we’re placing on them on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia, that would have an effect.
If we really amped up our economic sanctions on Russia, that would also have an effect. And if we really stepped up an information campaign, that too would have an effect. If we were making clear to Putin and also to the Ukrainians that we're going to bring Ukraine into NATO, that they're no longer on a in a gray zone of ambiguity in Europe that leads Putin to conclude that he can sweep them off them off the map, place them under his control - that is a factor as well.
Those combined elements would constitute a strategy that could enable Ukraine to win, and to demonstrate that nuclear coercion does not work.
Howard: The overall attitude in the U.S. is to stand down. We won't give Ukraine the authority for long-range attacks. We can't even resolve the decision on whether to allow Ukraine to strike with British Storm shadow long-range cruise missiles inside of Russian territory.
The U.S. has become so risk-averse to everything, and walks on eggshells when it involves Putin and Russia. But Ukraine constantly keeps responding militarily in ways that are very creative, very asymmetric, and in ways that erode this air of invincibility surrounding Russia and Putin and nuclear weapons. And they're doing it by mounting military offensive operations inside of Russian territory.
A year ago, the Biden administration was not willing to give Ukraine F-16s; now they're doing it. They constantly are backtracking in terms of how they respond, and then they end up doing the exact same thing that they were saying six months or a year before that they weren't willing to do. Meanwhile, Ukraine keeps suffering every day.
Brzezinski: President Biden has been clear, and former President Trump was recently very clear that they fear that this war could escalate into a nuclear conflict. They're worried about doing something that would support Ukraine that would provoke Russia into unleashing a nuclear weapon in some way.
I think the threat is a serious one, but it's a manageable one. You can't be flippant about this, but you can make a couple of assertions with a certain degree of confidence: one, that it doesn't make sense for Putin to detonate a nuclear weapon on the very territory he claims is the heart of Russia. What will be the impact of such a detonation on the perceptions of the Russian people who have a lot of relatives in Ukraine? What will be the battlefield impact of such a weapon? Most military analysts and commanders that I talk to say it would be marginal. It would have more of a psychological effect. You're not getting a high military impact through the exercise of such a weapon.
And then, what would the impact be on Russia's allies and supporters? Is Putin going to dismiss them? I don't think that his allies, so to speak, want to see that exercise.
And finally, what risks would he be taking, that such an exercise of a nuclear weapon would provoke an even stronger response from the West?
All these things lead me to believe that even Putin recognizes that an escalation of this sort is not in his own interests and would be counterproductive to his efforts to achieve his control over Ukraine.
The Cipher Brief: You mentioned China. What is President Xi thinking when Russia makes these nuclear threats?
Brzezinski: I think China would like to see this war continue indefinitely. Russia is kind of a guinea pig for the Chinese. One, the Chinese get to observe how Russian tactics and Russian equipment operate against NATO forces, against China’s primary adversary. They get to see how Western military equipment performs, and to see their weaknesses — where they're effective, where they're not. They get to observe and watch what's effective against those systems. And what's not.
Second, they get to see allied inventories get drawn down, get emptied, leaving the United States and its allies perhaps less militarily robust because of the costs of this war.
And then — icing on the cake — they get to see Russia weakened by this, because I wouldn't consider any strategic partnership between two authoritarian states to be a truly stable one. A weaker Russia is to Xi's advantage. And what this war is doing to Russia is burning out the Russian military. So that's the context in which this nuclear issue is playing. Xi wants this war to continue, perhaps indefinitely.
And there have also been indications that the Chinese may have communicated to Putin that we don't support the use of a Russian weapon in this conflict. Howard: China has restrained itself in some ways. They have not turned their arms production fully to help Russia. And there are reports that China has warned Russia behind closed doors not to use nuclear weapons. But China is a very dangerous factor in the war, because of the supply lines – there's a report out that China has opened one of its production lines for ammunition to Russia. But the main thing that I would say about China and Iran and even North Korea is that Russia can use Iran and North Korea as alternative arms industries to its own, to offset its own disadvantages, its own arm industrial production.
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