Xi Jinping’s Rise Could Improve Sino-US Relations

OPINION — After China’s Xi Jinping consolidated his power this year, private and public-sector China watchers reflexively assigned a negative prognosis for US-China relations and Chinese economic and political reform and development in general. They believe that the belligerent nature of Beijing’s foreign policy will become a permanent norm now that Xi has eliminated potential rivals and critics in political circles. 

I disagree. The concentration of power in Xi’s hands, and the stability of a third term in office, opens an opportunity for him to try to reestablish equilibrium in the US-China relationship. It’s “Only Nixon Can Come to China” in reverse.

With total dominance over the Communist Party and the military, Xi has room to seek a rapprochement with Washington, changing the trajectory of relations and creating space for serious negotiations on matters of vital economic importance, and maybe even foreign policy importance. His main incentive would be to do something this dramatic to rebuild a COVID-damaged Chinese economy, which is interdependent with that of the United States.

Why not before today? Before his formal coronation, Xi had been constrained by the mere presence of powerful leaders unsympathetic to his agenda, any of whom stood ready to pounce on America policy failure or weakness on Xi’s part, to defeat him. Especially if it appeared that China would kowtow to perceived American bullying that emerged during the Trump Administration and continued under Biden. 

That the opposition could not capitalize on this, or on the instability wrought by Xi’s zero-COVID policies that has wreaked havoc on Chinese society and industry, signaled its lack of cohesion and visionary leadership, which Xi’s side has in abundance.

Even before the relative cordiality of the US-China summit in Bali, Xi had already signaled the possibility of compromise with Washington.

First, Xi did not once mention the United States during last month’s Party Congress. That alone was a big deal. But also, when Xi met Putin in September, he offered only perfunctory, even tepid support for “Russia’s core interests,” in contrast to the public declaration of a “no limits” friendship during the Winter Olympics and just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

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In addition, I’ve heard from friends in the business community that Xi is determined to visit the United States. Imagery is important in Chinese politics. A successful visit would put him in the pantheon of Chinese paramount leaders. Of course, the prerequisite for any invitation from Washington would have to be a major improvement in bilateral relations and that means compromise on some issues between both China and the United States. Compromise would be no mean feat; a US Senator recently told me that in this era of partisan division, the only bipartisan issue that exists today, is making China the boogeyman.

If Xi does indeed harbor these ambitions, the onus lies with Washington. And this raises more questions: Will American policymakers recognize a potential diplomatic opening? Can they resist Congressional impetus to keep the doors shut and the pressure on? Does this White House have the agility to navigate pressure from Congress while simultaneously getting buy-in from the American public and offering concessions to make rapprochement possible?

Perhaps, perhaps not. For Washington, its ability to respond to feelers toward rapprochement will not be easy in the near term—if it even recognizes them. There is a good reason why the bipartisan consensus for tougher China policy exists.

Even before the arrival of the Trump Administration, it had become evident that the policy of engagement—a means of nudging the Chinese political system toward liberal institutions, rule of law, and democracy—had failed. IP theft was at an all-time high. Chinese policy had become more belligerent and assertive overseas, at least against American interests. Beijing intensified efforts to position its values and economic assistance in the developing world (via the Belt and Road Initiative), as a better alternative to the West, disrupting the post-World War II order and recreating it into something they design and build. Political warfare in the form of covert influence and extraterritorial silencing of dissidents has exploded and continues.

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Moreover, even with Xi’s position of strength, certain vulnerabilities remain that might compel a more conservative approach to improving US-China relations. Remember former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule: “If you break it, you own it.” Xi’s breaking of the norms of Chinese collective leadership means that he now owns it and must take all the blame for failure. And the blame will come not just from any residual political resistance in the Party, but from the Chinese public.

Maintaining internal stability is the Party’s most critical concern—beyond Taiwan, military superiority, economic leadership. Arguably, Xi has been losing it. The zero-COVID policy he created has resulted in draconian shutdowns of major cities that continue to this day, and quarantines that are enforced violently have created non-trivial pockets of overt dissent in major metropolitan areas.

Indeed, the much-publicized unveiling of a big-character protest banner in Beijing just before the Party Congress began was an audacious, perhaps desperate attempt to get his attention. 

I hope he has our attention now.

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