The Numbers Suggest Ukraine Can Sustain the Fight

OPINION — According to recent U.S. government estimates, approximately 315,000 Russian soldiers have either been killed or wounded in the ongoing war in Ukraine. In comparison, Kyiv has lost a smaller number of troops than that on the battlefield—as many as 200,000—but has probably suffered just as many overall losses when civilian casualties from Russia’s indiscriminate bombardments and shellings are taken into account. The pace of the bloodshed in 2023 appears, by the best unclassified estimates, to have been similar to that of 2022.

For some, these numbers would suggest that Ukraine, with only about 1/4 the population of Russia within its borders today, cannot achieve victory or even sustain this conflict much longer. As a BBC journalist put it flatly, “time is not on Ukraine’s side.” Reports of corruption within military recruiting commands have intensified concerns, prompting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to replace many of his senior military recruiters this past year in response. By November 2023, after 20 months of fighting, the average age of a Ukrainian soldier had risen to around 43 years old—a stark shift from the average age of 30 to 35 years old just one month into the conflict in March 2022.

Ukraine is now considering lowering its minimum draft age from 27 to 25 and whether it should try to grow its nearly million-strong military by an additional 50%. Ideally, the proposed mobilization could break the current military stalemate in 2024 or 2025, while also allowing some of those who have been on the frontlines over the last two years, to get a break or finally conclude their service and return home to their families.

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Our reading of the demographics and of military history suggests that Ukraine does indeed have a serious problem on its hands. Demographic trends aren’t in Ukraine’s favor and wavering Western support casts a huge cloud. Yet, despite these challenges, Ukraine is not facing an acute and immediate manpower crisis and is not at short-to-medium-term risk of losing the war due to a hollowed-out army.

It’s crucial to acknowledge that troops and society-as-a-whole, are exhibiting signs of fatigue. Yet tiredness must not be misconstrued as readiness to surrender, nor should lower morale be mistaken for irresoluteness. This is not the moment to make Ukraine’s projected long-term challenges a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat.

Consider some analogies from past wars. By summer 1864, Union troops in the American Civil War were due to reach the end of their three-year enlistments en masse. General Sherman had yet to take Atlanta; Generals Meade and Grant were losing battles to General Lee on a regular basis. Relative to Ukraine’s current plight, Union forces represented twice as large a share of the nation’s population and were suffering fatalities at roughly five times the annual rate per capita. As historian Bruce Catton wrote of the nation’s military manpower system, “Once it brought in the country’s best men, and now it brought in the worst.” Yet the Union prevailed.

In World War I, a conflict of which the current Ukraine war evokes memories for many, loss rates for each of the major parties were several hundred thousand fatalities a year—roughly ten times greater than in the current catastrophe. Yet no major military started to break until three years into the struggle. No one is wishing a similar fate upon Ukrainians or even Russians today. Nevertheless, the capacity for human resolve in the face of immense suffering should not be underestimated, especially when the cause is just, and national survival is at stake.

Kyiv does not disclose official troop or casualty numbers, but Ukraine is believed to have raised nearly one million troops out of a population of about 37 million (excluding refugees who have left the country) by relying on volunteer fighters and a draft that includes healthy men between the ages of 27 and 60. Meanwhile, it has been losing about 100,000 troops per year as casualties. Sustaining the force at its current size—or even enlarging it—will likely not be possible absent a change in policy.

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Approximately 215,000 Ukrainian men will turn 27 this upcoming year. However, many of the most qualified individuals have already volunteered, while many others have health issues or nationally required professional specialties that preclude service. And yes, some will try to game the system to avoid service, as we have seen in most of America’s wars, too (even the most righteous, like the Revolution and Civil War). Considering these factors, Ukraine will most likely struggle to find 50,000 recruits this upcoming year, based on past trends.

But the situation is a far cry from the prospect of imminent defeat. Kiev has options. Lower the draft age to 25, as officially proposed in a draft bill by the Ukrainian cabinet. This change could potentially render up to 395,000 men turning 25 and 26 this coming year eligible to be conscripted, in addition to the approximately 215,000 Ukrainian men turning 27. Lowering the draft age to 21 would make approximately 685,000 more men potentially eligible and lowering it to 18 another 490,000. Create more incentives for women to join. Address claims of mistreatment of soldiers. And, if Western aid will support it, pay troops better so as to increase the proclivity to serve (we do not consider it inappropriate to employ such tools within America’s own military, nor should the Ukrainians). With such steps, Ukraine could, if necessary, sustain the current fight through the decade.

None of this is to suggest Ukraine should fight this war indefinitely, of course, and at some point, Ukrainians may decide that an imperfect peace (if negotiable with Russia) is preferable to more carnage. But in a fight for Ukrainian national survival, we should be reticent to make that judgment for them just yet. And nothing about core demographic fundamentals suggests they should feel forced to reach it themselves anytime soon.

Co-author Alejandra Rocha is a senior research assistant at Brookings and a graduate of Georgetown University

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