The North Korean Scenario That Should Keep You Up at Night

By Joseph DeTrani

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence.  He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.  The views expressed represent those of the author.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE/OPINION — It should be obvious that North Korea’s recent launches of three Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) is a message not only to the U.S. – but also to China and the region – that North Korea will continue with its ballistic missile launches and eventually with its seventh nuclear test, knowing there are no consequences, and seemingly convinced that a strong nuclear arsenal will ensure the survival of the Kim Jong Un regime and Kim dynasty.

Understandably, there is concern in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington with North Korea’s July 12th successful launch of a solid fuel ICBM (Hwasong-18) with a range of 15,000 kilometers (9,320 miles), capable of targeting the entire U.S.  This was the third successful ICBM launch in 2023, preceded by a solid fuel ICBM (Hwasong-18) launched in April and a liquid fuel road mobile ICBM (Hwasong -17) launched in March.

On July 10, Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un and his likely successor, accused the U.S. of reconnaissance flights that entered North Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zone, threatening “shocking” consequences if the U.S. continues reconnaissance activities in the region. North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) previously had criticized the planned deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea as “nuclear blackmail” against North Korea, and a grave threat to regional and global stability.

Given North Korea’s recently announced nuclear doctrine of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in response to an imminent – or perceived to be imminent – threat to the leadership or command and control, there should be concern that North Korea may intentionally or accidentally provoke conflict on the Korean Peninsula.  A first-use preemptive nuclear policy requires exquisite intelligence to monitor and know your real or potential adversary.

North Korea’s recent failure to put a reconnaissance satellite in orbit is further proof that Pyongyang’s intelligence capabilities are not at a level to ensure that they do not misinterpret an event or communique and respond provocatively, precipitating a response that could escalate quickly.


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It’s this scenario that should keep us awake at night.  We’re talking about the potential use of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or tactical – they’re nuclear weapons with catastrophic consequences.

In 2003, China, at the request of the U.S., got North Korea to attend the Six Party Talks hosted by China. Although disbanded in 2009, the Talks did result in a September 2005 Joint Statement that committed North Korea to complete and verifiable dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons and ongoing nuclear facilities, in return for security assurances, economic development assistance and a path to the normalization of relations with the U.S.  China was able to get North Korea to join the Six Party Talks because China is North Korea’s only ally and a neighbor that provides North Korea with over 90% of its trade and crude oil and petroleum requirements.  In short, North Korea is tethered to China politically and economically.

I recently joined a Track 2 (former officials and academics) with China to discuss developments with North Korea. I suggested that China should use its unique leverage with North Korea to convince Kim Jong Un to return to negotiations and halt its nuclear and missile escalation.  What I got was a resounding “no”.  I was politely told that the tension in U.S. – China relations prevented China from helping with North Korea.  I heard this before, but I thought that with the somewhat successful visit of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China, and talk about areas where China and the U.S. can cooperate, North Korea would be on the top, or close to the top of the list.


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This is unfortunate, because it’s also in China’s interest to ensure that there’s peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Indeed, convincing North Korea to denuclearize also is in China’s interest, if they don’t want a nuclear arms race in the region, with South Korea and Japan, despite U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments, acquiring their own nuclear weapons capabilities.  Or if China is concerned, as is the U.S., that North Korea may provide nuclear weapons to a rogue state or terrorist organization.  North Korea’s previous nuclear assistance to Syria at Al Kibar should be a wake-up call to all who are concerned about nuclear proliferation.

Failure to get North Korea to halt its missile and nuclear escalation eventually will lead to greater instability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.  This is one issue that demands immediate attention. It’s an issue that China should help resolve.

This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. 

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field?  Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.


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