Syria’s Rebellion Could Be a Turning Point for Axis of US Adversaries

By Michelle Grisé

Michelle Grisé is a senior policy researcher at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. Her research focuses on Iran, Russian foreign policy and military strategy, South Asia, and international law. Before joining RAND in 2018, she clerked at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

By Mike Cozad

Mark Cozad is a senior international defense researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is also a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

OPINION — The Ukraine war has often been characterized as a precipitating factor in the growing alignment of the United States’ key adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—and it is true that the conflict in Ukraine has incentivized greater cooperation between the members of this quartet. The fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria may bring America’s four most dangerous antagonists closer together still, at least for now. 

The growing alignment of these four countries has been driven by a shared perception that the U.S. and its allies have historically acted to undermine their sovereignty, weaken their influence, and cut off their access to markets. In Moscow and Tehran, as well as in Beijing and Pyongyang, the fall of Assad is likely to be seen through this prism, as yet another data point suggesting that the West will do anything to undermine their survival. 

The overnight collapse of the Syrian regime could heighten fears of domestic upheaval, particularly in Moscow and Tehran. As part of the growing military cooperation between the two countries, Russia has already shared advanced surveillance technologies with Iran, but the recent events in Syria could incentivize greater cooperation and knowledge sharing on surveillance and mechanisms for internal control. Assad’s downfall will reinforce once again a key lesson for authoritarian regimes across the globe about the cost of failing to stamp out internal threats to their continued rule. As a result, other countries may decide to pursue greater alignment with Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea if they view the risk of regime change as greater than the costs of cooperation with U.S. adversaries.

The fall of the Syrian government could also lead to greater military cooperation between Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Failure in Syria could prompt Russia, seeking a win, to double down on its war in Ukraine, accepting nothing less than total victory in the conflict. Iran’s supply of drones and missiles, and North Korea’s supply of ammunition and troops, has been crucial in sustaining the Russian war effort in Ukraine thus far, and in the event of an intensification of the conflict, Russia may request increased military support from both Tehran and Pyongyang. In return, Russia could provide Iran with assistance in rebuilding its battered air defenses or expand nuclear cooperation. Likewise, Russia could provide North Korea with the high-end technologies and expertise needed to upgrade its nuclear, space, and missile programs. 


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The Russia-Iran axis

When it comes to Russia and Iran, the roots of this deepening alignment were apparent long before February 2022. Over a decade of propping up the regime of Assad, the two countries became increasingly enmeshed, even as their security interests often diverged. The fall of the Syrian regime may prove to be a turning point in the Russia-Iran relationship—and it may also have broader implications for the growing alignment of the United States’ key adversaries.

Over a decade of civil war in Syria, the Assad regime could count on the steadfast support of two countries—Russia and Iran. In the early years of the civil war, Iran deployed Quds Force personnel to the country, ultimately allowing the Syrian regime to regain key territory from rebel control. The Russian intervention in September 2015—reportedly initiated after Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow—provided decisive air control to Syrian government forces. Without the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime likely would not have lasted as long as it did. 

But then the Assad regime finally collapsed. On December 2, as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fighters took control of Aleppo and then moved south to Homs, Russia and Iran pledged their unconditional support to the Syrian regime. Russian forces conducted airstrikes in support of Syrian government forces, while Iranian officials launched a diplomatic offensive on behalf of the Assad regime. By December 6, however, Iran had begun the evacuation of its military commanders and personnel from Syria. Russian airpower failed to thwart the HTS advance. And as HTS forces swept into Damascus on December 8, Bashar al-Assad escaped to Moscow. In the end, with Moscow preoccupied with its war in Ukraine and Tehran facing the fallout of recent Israeli attacks on its air defenses and its proxies, Russian and Iranian support was insufficient to prevent the end of the 50-year Assad dynasty.

Why Syria mattered

For both countries, Syria was a linchpin for their geopolitical ambitions. For Iran, Syria served as a critical land bridge that allowed it to funnel weapons and supplies to Hezbollah. With the future of that supply route in question, and Hezbollah’s ranks and infrastructure decimated by conflict with Israel, Iran now faces the considerable challenge of rebuilding its once formidable proxy network. With a reduced ability to resupply Hezbollah, Iran may lean more heavily on its network of Shia militia groups in Iraq or on the Houthis. Russia, for its part, is trying to negotiate continued access to its bases in Syria with HTS; in the meantime, it has begun withdrawing troops and materiel from Hmeimim air base and moved some naval assets from Syria to Libya. These bases were critical in facilitating Russian military operations in Syria, but they also had larger strategic purposes, serving as both high-end forward operating bases on NATO’s Southern Flank and crucial logistics hubs for Russian power projection into Africa. To compensate for the potential reduction in Russia’s ability to project power from its bases in Syria, redeployment to Libya or the use of Egyptian facilities and bases could offer Russia  immediate workarounds. Likewise, China could offer Russia increased access to its base in Djibouti, deepening Russia’s dependency on China.

But the recent events in Syria could also threaten this deepening axis of adversaries by exposing the impotence of Russia and Iran. Some in Tehran may have new doubts about the utility of Russia as a partner after Moscow’s failure to prop up the Syrian regime. North Korea may become more wary of contributing its most elite troops to the Russian war effort, particularly as they take significant losses in Kursk. The recent events in Syria challenge an idea that has, until recently, received broad acceptance—that Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are working together not just to achieve military or economic objectives, but rather because they seek to supplant the Western-led international order. The longer-term impact of Assad’s fall remains largely undefined, but leaves open a critical question regarding the future alignment of this quartet—has the chaos in Syria exposed the limits of their cooperation?Going forward, as a transitional government takes power in Syria, the United States’ adversaries will have to renegotiate their respective approaches in the Middle East—and their relationships with each other. This test could ultimately bring them closer together than ever.

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