Marc Polymeropoulos retired in June 2019 from the Senior Intelligence Service ranks at the CIA after a 26 year career in operational headquarters and field assignments covering the Middle East, Europe, Russia and counter terrorism.
OPINION — Several friends have recently asked me how the myriad of international scandals that plague the current Trump administration have affected the core business of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations — tasked with recruiting foreigners to commit espionage on behalf of the United States.
It is a fascinating question, particularly as I spent my career in the third world and in war zones, where American ideals of freedom and democracy were something tangible that U.S. embassies overtly and correctly promoted. I recall to this day walking to work in a middle eastern country that posed a critical counterintelligence threat to the U.S. and seeing the flag flying over the U.S. Embassy. That flag meant something profound to us U.S. officials who were under the gun from a despotic regime, but I also always believed the flag secretly and passionately resonated with many locals who detested their own political and economically repressive government. This was under the tenure of George W. Bush, and his oft-maligned freedom initiative, but think today of the purely transactional nature of American foreign policy, with a lack of coherent morals other than what seemingly makes the U.S. richer, and it is easy to long for the past.
Thus, the fundamental question: What is the “Trump Effect” on recruitment operations? To answer this objectively and without political bias necessitates a thorough exploration of what in the year 2019 likely will motivate an individual to decide to commit espionage against his or her country. This applies to the general methodology used by all intelligence services, not just those in the U.S., so there is no secret sauce that is being revealed here.
Historically, someone who indeed took such a step did so for several reasons — from purely ideological (during the Cold War, for example, the global struggle between communism vs capitalism); for financial reasons (perhaps a desperation for monies required to give their children a better education or pay for the health care costs of a sick relative); and finally to narcissism and revenge on their colleagues or a system that did them wrong (like a lack of promotion due to artificial glass ceilings based on minority status in their respective countries).
I would also add that in the case of war zone operations, a primary motivation to choose a side was based on whoever had the greatest firepower, such as during the respective U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The role of a U.S. intelligence officer during those conflicts was to identify such vulnerabilities and motivations of a target, and then over time, exploit them so as to convince the individual to provide the U.S. with secret information. Has Trump effected this age-old calculus, given his propensity to disrupt the world order and challenge historic norms? And if the “Trump Effect” does exist, what is the gravity of such a loss of secret information, as long as Trump remains in office?
Compounding this calculus of the “Trump Effect” is the propensity today of leaks in Washington, where the identities of whistleblowers and the location of alleged resettled defectors seems to permeate the press. While not dismissing the argument that a potential recruit may see the American political system as unable to protect his/her identity, I only note that this problem is not in fact restricted to the current administration. The case of Valerie Plame is an example under the Bush administration of similar gross misconduct on the part of a White House, and thus I believe that it is likely no different today. I do not dismiss the challenge today that a U.S. intelligence officer must deal with when faced with a potential foreign recruit who has questions about their safety, but I only note that this is not a new phenomenon and can be overcome by a skilled intelligence officer who shows discipline and discretion in their tradecraft.
As an aside, the Department of State has a far more difficult task in the age of Trump. For a career foreign service officer - vice an intelligence officer - the challenges in the overt world are exponentially more profound. I imagine that it is exceedingly difficult as a public affairs officer or a political section chief at an embassy to explain or defend the schizophrenic nature of Trump’s foreign policy, to include the tweets, the inconsistencies, the embrace of despots, and at times the outright lies. I fear the standing of America in the eyes of the world has fallen precipitously, as I hear from my friends overseas who still do believe in the American ideal, but worry that it may take years to recover from the current administration’s toxic views of alliances and its zeal to adhere to a zero sum calculation on all issues. After years of friendly rivalry between U.S. government agencies, I now greatly admire my State department colleagues, as they have a sisyphean job in defending America to a shell-shocked world who sees us as much better than how we are currently acting.
That said, my somewhat surprising conclusion for the intelligence profession - in the midst of so much repeated public scandal - is that recruitment operations in the age of Trump are not markedly more difficult than during previous administrations. There is no tangible “Trump Effect” that would cause recruitments to diminish in either quality or quantity. In fact, I believe that in 2019, the decision of a foreign target to betray their country or institution is an intensely personal one based on individual needs, vice one based on a greater ideology, a motivation that may have been far more present during the Cold War.
More often than not, a target’s key motivation today is based on simple financial factors, compounded with a dislike of their own system that has caused them hardship, vice some philosophic notion of the American ideal that necessitated them to commit the espionage. Disgust with ideology (communist, socialist, or autocratic) could be a secondary or tertiary motivation, but not enough to swing the calculus in either way. It is more so a corrupt system has caused them loss, leaving them more vulnerable to recruitment. Let me note that I am a true romantic, and so the American ideal does resonate with me. It just is not the same with a recruitment target who needs something far more tangible (money for a house, health care for a daughter with a heart condition, and education at an elite university) than a lecture on the Federalist Papers or a review of our Bill of Rights. A target motivated to spy for the U.S. is simply going to excuse Trump’s many flaws or not care at all. So even under a president whose personal behavior is to so many, highly objectionable, and who apparently cares little for the fundamental American principles of freedom of the press and democracy, the U.S. intelligence professional can still thrive in recruiting foreign targets to spy for the U.S. That, in the end, should be comforting to the American people, as the prosecution of the second oldest profession — and maintaining the overall robust health of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations — is required more than ever in a world with dynamic threats from Iran, China, Russia, North Korea and a resurgent ISIS.
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