OPINION — “Operations to deny adversary hostile use of space could originate in any domain and target on-orbit, ground, cyber, and/or link segments to reduce the full spectrum of an adversary’s ability to exploit the space domain.”
That’s a quote from the Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites, a Congressionally-mandated report, released at the Pentagon last Thursday, which describes — using its own words — the Defense Department’s (DoD) “approach to protecting and defending space systems and protecting the [U.S. and allies] Joint Force from adversary hostile use of space.”
In short, it is an unclassified notice that the DoD. has prepared plans to fight in space to defend its satellite systems – as well as those of its allies — with the understanding that this public report is accompanied by a classified annex that contains additional secret details.
The U.S. preparation to fight in space is backed by the fiscal 2024 Defense budget request for $33.3 billion, the largest proposal for space spending ever.
In a briefing for reporters last week, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said, “Our ability to share this policy and strategy is a key step towards normalizing space as an operational domain. And I’m glad we have an opportunity to publicly articulate this approach more clearly.”
As a reminder, the DoD report points out the importance of U.S. space-based capabilities, noting they include “positioning, navigation, and timing, satellite communications, missile warning and missile tracking, and other missions [that] are critical to overall military effectiveness across all domains and therefore to successful homeland defense, deterrence, and countering aggression.”
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The war in Ukraine also has shown the importance of space-based capabilities for any future fighting. At the same time, as the report points out, the Chinese and Russians have developed, tested, and fielded counter-space systems that could target U.S. and allied vehicles in space and their ground control facilities.
As a result, according to the DoD report, there is a need for a “space architecture shift, where possible, from dependence on high-value, specialized satellites to resilient-by-design architectures. Prioritizing the ability of space-based services to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption” is the goal.
DoD currently tracks approximately 47,900 objects in space, according to the report. That is a 16 percent growth in objects from 2021 to 2022. Of those objects, 7,100 are active payloads, a 37 percent increase from 2021 to 2022. Expended rocket bodies, inactive satellites, and debris further congest the space environment.
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The report identifies Space Command’s leader, Air Force Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, who serves as the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), as “the singular authority responsible for presenting coordinated recommendations to the SecDef [Defense Secretary] regarding force design options to satisfy the space mission requirements of the entire Joint Force.”
Saltzman, in the report, has listed five capability priorities to achieve the objectives for the battle in space.
“Enhanced Battle-space Awareness for Space Warfare” is one that that involves what the report describes as “near-real time, comprehensive understanding of the congested and complex space operational environment.” What is required are “more accurate, robust, resilient, and timely space domain awareness and operational intelligence data from all interoperable sensors to produce highly accurate, rapidly available detection, tracking, and characterization of space objects, regardless of their origin.”
The report says, “Current space domain awareness systems are stove-piped and disaggregated.
Space Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Space Force are partnering to
enhance sensor integration into a C2 [command and control] program.”
The first capability area to be redeveloped is Missile Warning, Missile Tracking – essentially providing battle-space awareness capabilities for the warfighter. Recommendations include raising the numbers of satellites along with diversification of capabilities across orbital regimes.
“Resilient, Timely Space Command and Control” is another priority. Here the need is for “a resilient C2 architecture to synchronize space effects for operations in the contested space environment and as a critical enabler to terrestrial [land-based] maneuver forces. Rapid and robust communication among space assets, space operators, and partner combatant commands enables decisive action and is therefore key to deterring and defeating hostile action in space and terrestrially.”
“Integrated Space Fires and Protection Capabilities” is a third Saltzman priority. Resilience, which is discussed below is “fundamental,” but DoD requires joint military space
capabilities to protect and defend U.S., and as directed, allied, partner, and commercial space assets to protect the Joint Force, allies, and partners from adversary hostile uses of space.”
“Modernized, Agile Electronic Warfare Architecture” is also a Saltzman priority. “Denial of adversary freedom of action in the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS),” the report says, “requires an integrated and distributed capability to support the EMS superiority strategy.” Protection measures include use of both attack and defensive EMS operations; movement and maneuver of satellites as well as hardening against radiation.
“Space Systems Cyber Defense” is the final initial priority. “Effective response to cyberattacks against space and space support mission systems demands a robust ability to detect, track, and defend. Space Command must maintain the ability to provide critical space capabilities globally in all phases of conflict and therefore requires persistent detection and monitoring of threat activity.”
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According to the report, “The transition to resilient architectures – both through new ‘resilient-by-design’ architectures and additive solutions to existing architectures – is underway.”
Resilience, the DoD report says, can be gained through six methods:
*Disaggregation by separating different capabilities into different platforms or payloads, i.e. separating tactical and strategic communications.
*Distribution by using multiple satellites and ground stations to perform the same mission.
*Diversification by having alternative means to perform the same mission using different platforms, different orbits, or systems i.e., leveraging both government and commercial satellite communications systems.
*Protection using active and passive measures such on-board jam protection and nuclear hardening.
*Proliferation by deploying large numbers of the same platform, payload, or systems of the same types to perform the same mission.
*Deception by confusing or misleading an adversary on the location, capability, or operational status of a system or payload.
Additional force design studies are planned, to include: “fire control to address long-range threats; tactical ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] to enable forward operations; a space data network to ensure data throughput for decision-making and battle management; and protect and defend vital infrastructure and space-based capabilities.”
The fiscal 2024 Defense budget now before Congress seeks $33.3 billion, the largest space budget ever and a roughly 13 percent increase over the fiscal 2023 request.
The 2024 budget requests $5 billion to develop new Missile Warning and Missile Tracking satellites, including the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR).
The Next-Gen OPIR program includes four satellites, two of which are polar satellites with infrared sensors to detect and track heat signatures of ballistic and hypersonic missiles and with target launch dates of 2028 and 2030. The other two are geosynchronous satellites to provide persistent coverage of mid-latitude regions with target launch dates of 2025 and 2027.
The two Polar satellites will travel in highly elliptical polar orbits which would give them full-time visibility over the Northern Hemisphere and the ability to transmit data about any incoming missiles to ground stations through secure communication systems.
A June 2023 General Accountability Office (GAO) report raised questions: “delays in delivery of the payload prototype [may] increase the risk that the integration activities planned for the first GEO [geosynchronous] will not complete in time for the scheduled first launch in 2025.”
Other plans in the fiscal 2024 budget include fielding 39 Low Earth Orbit, and up to nine Medium Earth Orbit satellites with capabilities to provide additional coverage for all phases of missile warning, and missile tracking capability. The budget also adds $131 million to produce accurate, rapidly available detection, tracking, and characterization of space objects, regardless of their origin.
With the land war in Ukraine continuing and Russian threats to use tactical nuclear weapons if Moscow faces defeat, control in space may be the one advantage that rules them all.
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