OPINION — The dynamics of the Ukraine war are changing rapidly, with consequences that are profound and global. The battlefield is the most obvious area of change; it is now clear that Russia has learned enough from past errors to gain momentum and that Ukraine, which has gone without substantial U.S. aid for six months, is at much greater risk of defeat.
Ukraine has lowered the conscription age from 27 to 25, acknowledging a growing shortage of troops, but its most desperate needs are for artillery ammunition and air defense. The top U.S. commander in Europe estimates that Russia will have a 10-to-1 advantage in artillery shells “within weeks.” Meanwhile, Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot and other air defense systems is leaving major cities including Kharkiv and Odesa open to regular attack, including by Russian “glide’ bombs” that are particularly difficult to intercept. Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said for the first time that Ukraine could “lose the war” if U.S. aid remains stalled.
A frightened continent
Beyond the battlefield, the change is less obvious but equally impactful.
The Europeans are scared — scared in a way they have not been since the darkest days of the Cold War and before the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.
In many European capitals, the question of what happens if Russia prevails in Ukraine is no longer a matter of debate. Russia’s persistence there and the disappointing result of last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive have convinced many European leaders that Putin will head for their countries next if he is not stopped in Ukraine.
This is felt most acutely in the “frontline states” – beginning with Poland, Moldova and the three Baltic nations, but including new NATO members Sweden and Finland, and even in Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda almost certainly spoke for many when he said that Russia might attack a NATO country as early as 2026 or 2027. Poland’s national security agency is on record as saying such an attack could come within 36 months.
This is very much in line with what I heard at the Munich Security Conference a few weeks ago. Representatives of the frontline states all talked as though a Putin move on Europe was a foregone conclusion. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called Putin’s behavior “the dictator’s handbook in real life”, adding “we can’t depend on others to defend us”.
Danish Prime minister Mette Frederiksen left the conference pledging to send all of Denmark’s artillery to Ukraine, and European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to appoint the EU’s first Defense Commissioner if, as expected, she wins a second term. Von der Leyen’s aim is for a new EU position that focuses on increasing and coordinating defense production and improving weapons interoperability in Europe.
Europe’s fears are reinforced by a declining confidence in the U.S. as a security guarantor. While Europeans have been impressed with President Joe Biden’s strong support for Ukraine (56 percent favorable), Pew organization surveys in 2023 showed weaknesses in European attitudes toward the U.S. — with only 18 percent thinking the U.S. will lead the world five years from now. This ambivalence rests on deep anxiety about the outcome of the November presidential election; only 1 in 6 Europeans sees the U.S. as a model democracy, and 56 percent believe the transatlantic alliance will be weakened if Donald Trump returns to the White House. Pledges of support from the U.S. congressional delegation at the Munich conference got only rolled eyes and barely concealed disgust.
So Europe is in turmoil over Ukraine – fearing what Putin will do and what the US may not.
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A more confident Putin?
The second major change has come in Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s confidence is only growing.
Putin’s confidence rests on many things, but the key pillar is the gathering evidence that he will be able to outlast Ukraine and its backers. How can he feel otherwise, given the Kremlin’s strength in manpower and munitions, contrasted with divisions in the West, faltering aid deliveries, Ukraine’s dwindling weapons stocks, and its shortage of conscripts?
Putin must also take comfort from NATO’s desire to avoid escalating the conflict or risking direct confrontation between Russia and the western alliance. While the U.S. just used its aircraft and Patriot missile batteries to help defend Israel from Iranian air attacks, Putin knows that the U.S. will not intervene that directly in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s Chinese partners remain solidly with him, much of the Global South hesitates to condemn him, and he has been welcomed on trips to the the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. For their part, African leaders journeyed to meet Putin in St. Petersburg, and his troops have been welcomed in Sahel countries such as Mali and Burkino Faso, where the U.S. is on the outs.
In short, Putin appears – for now – to have escaped the pariah status that many (myself included) predicted for him. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that Putin is, to put it simply, feeling good.
Meanwhile, the Russian public is mostly either with their leader, or too afraid to say otherwise. I admit to having expected more pushback than we have seen, based on the decency of many Russians I’ve known – but many of those people have either left the country or lack outlets for protest, and the vast middle of the Russian public, a majority, has been pushed by propaganda and harsh repression into what one scholar has termed “learned indifference”.
Gauging Russian public opinion is always a chancy game, given the retaliation many Russians fear for expressing their views. Still, the independent Levada organization has managed to capture views that seem reasonably accurate and accord with assessments by Russian scholars I’ve spoken with outside the country. Surveys Levada conducted in 2022 and 2023 show roughly 22 percent of Russians are strongly supportive of the war, and 19-20 percent strongly opposed. Those who are opposed seem disinclined to protest publicly, probably because such protests have a long record of futility – due to harsh repression and penalties such as loss of employment or designation as a foreign agent. Of course the country’s most prominent dissident, Alexei Navalny, has paid the highest price of all.
As for the large group in the middle – roughly 65 percent — one Russian journalist, now in exile, told me that these people would rather not think about the war and take refuge in the constant barrage of pro-war propaganda telling them that the West is the aggressor, hell-bent on crushing Russia. And to the extent that the regime can succeed with this argument, there will always be a tendency, as in most countries, to rally round “our boys.”
Meanwhile, all of Putin’s slippery rationales for the “special military operation” – such as rooting out Ukrainian “Nazis” – have moved into the background. Most Russians probably now see this as just another war — and it’s now just about winning and losing. Most will want to win.
Glimmers of hope?
All this said, the Russians could of course still surprise us – recall the ease with which the late Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin cut through Russian mainline forces during his failed rebellion last June, with civilians standing aside as he marched toward Moscow. But as Putin’s clever manipulation of the rebels and Prigozhin’s ultimate demise attest, the chances are infinitesimal that anti-war sentiment or related protest could achieve critical mass and threaten Putin’s hold on policy and the state.
There are two things that could cut into Putin’s confidence. First, if the U.S. and other key countries put into legislation long-term commitments to substantial Ukraine aid, it would send a message that we are in this for the long haul. Second, if the NATO summit in July provides a clear road map for Ukrainian membership, with achievable steps along that path, that would say to the Kremlin that sooner or later Russia will be up against the alliance directly.
In the absence of such steps, we might as well let go of any hope that Russians themselves will ever stop Putin’s war. He will have to be beaten on the ground the hard way – by Ukrainians in Ukraine. And if he is not beaten there, it might not be long before we learn whether the Europeans were right to be afraid.
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