As the Trump Administration proposes cutting aid to Central America – and as American, Central American, and Mexican leaders met in Miami last week to discuss development and security in the region – The Cipher Brief’s Kaitlin Lavinder asked Michael Shifter and Ben Raderstorf of the Inter-American Dialogue why Central America is so violent and why the U.S. has an interest in stabilizing its southern neighbors.
The Cipher Brief: Central America – particularly the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras – is highly violent. Why? What are the driving factors of violence and instability in the region? Has this improved or worsened over the past years?
Michael Shifter and Ben Raderstorf: Violence has been entrenched in the Northern Triangle for many years. For El Salvador and Guatemala, much of today’s security predicament can be traced back to the civil wars of 1979-1992 and 1960-1996, respectively. These conflicts greatly weakened the already fragile institutions in the country and contributed to a cycle of violence that has been difficult to break. And while Honduras was spared from the bloody civil wars that swept Central America in the 20th century, it too has a long history of institutionalized violence between the state and various insurgent and criminal groups.
More recently, though, the driving force has been an increasingly potent cocktail of poverty, endemic state weakness, drug trafficking, gang activity, public and private corruption, and organized crime. Central America’s geography all but guarantees a significant amount of drug trafficking – especially for cocaine from the Andean countries passing through the narrow isthmus towards the United States – but there is some evidence that the volume has increased in the past decade. Meanwhile, the three countries remain among the poorest in Latin America. Lack of other opportunities push many young people either into criminal activity or to emigrate. Corruption and state weakness not only make public policy responses more challenging – they have also resulted in governments that are deeply entangled with criminal groups.
The trend lines vary somewhat by country. Violence in El Salvador, for example, is driven in large part by street gangs (known as maras), and homicide rates in that country dipped sharply under a controversial truce in 2014 but have since climbed again. In Honduras, the military coup that ousted Manuel Zelaya in 2009 has been a factor in the precarious governance and violence. Overall, while consistent statistics are difficult to find, it seems that the problem of crime and violence in the Northern Triangle has only become more acute in the past decade.
TCB: What are the top security concerns for Central America? What are the top security concerns for the U.S. emanating from Central America?
Shifter and Raderstorf: The United States and the Northern Triangle have somewhat diverging interests in this regard. For Central American governments, the biggest concerns are high rates of homicides and other crimes, and the economic impact of insecurity – through extortion, corruption, and a chilling effect on investment. For the United States, the biggest concern is drug trafficking and preventing narcotics flows from reaching its own shores, that in turn fuels migration.
As a result, the U.S. and Central American governments are often at some odds on key policy decisions. For example, Central American governments have a greater stake in promoting economic growth, stimulating job opportunities, and reintegrating ex-criminals, while the United States has at times pushed for a hard line on policing, without fully taking into account the consequences. On drugs too, the Northern Triangle countries (like most countries in Latin America) would like to see a solution that addresses demand-side factors – i.e. the voracious appetite in the United States – but the U.S. government is often more focused on halting the supply.
TCB: What have the Central American governments done over the past years, particularly under the Obama Administration’s Alliance for Prosperity, to deal with security issues? Have they been successful?
Shifter and Raderstorf: The Alliance for Prosperity is a program designed and executed by the three Northern Triangle governments, in cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank. Contrary to popular understanding, the three countries are putting their own resources and efforts behind the plan – the U.S. is simply a backer, providing additional financial support and some technical expertise.
Above all, the Alliance for Prosperity seeks to tackle insecurity as part of a larger matrix of economic, social, and governance issues. The belief is that by addressing the issues as interrelated – attempting to spur economic growth and better governance while investing in security and counternarcotics programs – the countries can find a more sustainable path to a safe and prosperous future.
While there have been some criticisms leveled against the Alliance for Prosperity – and it may well fall short of its lofty goals – it’s far too early to fully assess its success. The effort was always intended to be a long-term one, with policies designed to pay off over decades rather than overnight. Second, numerous factors could undercut the effort in the years ahead – above all, if the Trump Administration cuts its funding or (as announced by Vice President Pence last week in Miami) shifts back to a single-minded focus on security.
TCB: The Trump Administration plans to cut funding to the region drastically, while relying more on Mexico to deal with Central America’s security issues. Is this the right approach?
Shifter and Raderstorf: It’s difficult to see how this does anything other than kick the can down the road. So long as economies in the Northern Triangle are sclerotic and governments are corrupt and ineffective, crime and violence will continue to be a problem that impacts the United States. In turn, because migrants are fleeing such a dreadful situation, they will continue to make their way north, regardless of any barriers – physical or otherwise – in their way. Mexico currently cooperates with the U.S. on helping prevent some of that migration (seven in 10 Central American migrants bound for the U.S. are apprehended on the Mexico-Guatemala border), but it lacks the resources to help the three countries bolster their economies and improve their governments. Mexican leaders may also be less eager to cooperate with the U.S. under Trump they were under past presidents.
Still, while the Trump Administration has shown a lack of interest in pursuing economic growth in other countries – and prefers a more defensive approach to security and migration – broad policy changes are still not guaranteed. The Alliance for Prosperity funding as proposed by the Obama Administration had bipartisan support in Congress, and many Republican leaders may try to keep those aid budgets relatively intact.
