In early March, the Cam Ranh International Port (CRIP) was inaugurated with much fanfare, marking the beginning of its revitalization following decades of post-Cold War neglect as well as quelling speculations as to whether Cam Ranh Bay will become yet another foreign naval base – like it was until the Russians withdrew in May 2002 as per the 1979 treaty.
For now, and in the future, what does CRIP mean for Vietnam and stability for the South China Sea, which has seen much tensions lately?
Since 2002, the Cam Ranh Bay has been developed into a major base housing the most capable of Vietnam’s navy elements. Its centralized geostrategic location facilitates easy access to the contested Paracel and Spratly Islands. The geography of the bay also serves to shelter ships from the harsh coastal elements.
Yet Cam Ranh Bay’s potential as a geostrategically well located, natural deep harbor was mostly under-utilized for the preceding decade, due more to Hanoi's inactivity towards internationalizing its use than any lack of foreign interest.
One needs to remember the context then. South China Sea tensions subsided following incidents in the 1990s. Moreover, Beijing was grappling with an independence-leaning Taipei. In the early-2000s China embarked on what was touted as a "diplomatic charm offensive" in an attempt to exploit what was perceived back then as a power vacuum in Southeast Asia, while Washington was preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Barely six months after Moscow retreated from Cam Ranh Bay in 2002, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations inked a declaration on the South China Sea. Later Hanoi struck a major agreement with Beijing over their boundary dispute in the Tonkin Gulf. Hence, the South China Sea was largely calm for a time; Hanoi felt little pressure to internationalize the use of Cam Ranh Bay.
However, the South China Sea saw resurgent tensions after the Philippines and Vietnam submitted new marine baseline claims to the United Nations – a move China viewed as provocative, and thereby giving it a new raison d'être to start flexing its muscles in the disputed waters. Beijing could direct its attention to this flashpoint, since Taiwan Strait tensions abated following the return of the Kuomintang to power in 2008.
A number of incidents in the South China Sea, notably the harassment of Vietnamese seismic survey ships by Chinese government vessels and in April 2012, the Chinese seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, demonstrated Beijing’s political will to assert itself using its advantage of size and resource capacity at the expense of other, much weaker claimants in the South China Sea.
Having experienced the worst of all Southeast Asian claimants – Vietnam had fought armed clashes with China in 1974 over the Paracels, and in 1988 in the Spratlys – Hanoi sees the writing on the wall. There is no way Vietnam’s naval modernization can close the asymmetry with China, whose military power is much stronger than it used to be.
When Vietnam sought Russia’s assistance to develop Cam Ranh Bay into an international maritime services hub, it was simply turning to a traditional friend who has been its key security partner. But by no means does Hanoi intend for Cam Ranh Bay to become the exclusive facility of any one.
History is instructive: the Americans did not help South Vietnam stop the Chinese from seizing the Paracels. During the fighting in 1988, the Soviets also did little to help Hanoi. In fact, barely six months after the clash, Moscow even proposed to dismantle its Cam Ranh base in exchange for American withdrawal from the Philippines.
So relying on any extra-regional power is foolhardy at best. Vietnam is simply riding on Moscow’s desire to reinvigorate its global naval presence, including access to foreign facilities for its Pacific Fleet, which participates in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This provides a win-win situation for Hanoi, who does not feel beholden to Russia.
In any case, in an agreement signed during Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Cam Ranh in April 2013, Vietnam pledged to give priority to Russian naval vessels (and later in 2014, simplifying access procedures for Russian ships) in exchange for Moscow’s assistance to build the international maritime services hub.
But in no way is Hanoi eyeing a foreign naval base; it is meant to be open to all. It thus falls neatly into Hanoi’s long-avowed post-Cold War foreign policy premised on independence and non-alignment, which emphasizes both collaboration and struggle against domination and exclusion politics (vua hop tac, vua dau tranh).
This has served Vietnam well, facilitating its adaptation to the post-Cold War geopolitical flux and its Renovation (doi moi) process. It is paying dividends for Hanoi – besides keeping Russia as a traditional friend, it has cultivated closer security ties with other powers, including the United States. Notably, in August 2011 the USNS Richard E Byrd underwent routine maintenance and repairs in Cam Ranh – the first-ever visit to the bay by an American naval vessel since the end of the Vietnam War.
Interestingly, the first foreign warship that called on the newly-inaugurated CRIP was Singaporean. A Japanese flotilla including a submarine came next, and others, including the U.S., are likely to follow. Just recently, on the sidelines of a military friendship exchange with China, in Vietnam's northernmost province of Lang Son – a scene of fierce fighting during the Sino-Vietnamese war – Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh invited Chinese navy ships to call on CRIP.
Whether China will accept the invitation or not, Hanoi apparently hoped the gesture would assuage Beijing's concerns of Cam Ranh being used as a bulwark of anti-China containment. But this is unlikely to alter popular perceptions that Vietnam's Cam Ranh strategy is conceived with the South China Sea – not least China's growing assertiveness and force projection capabilities – in mind.
Internationalization of Cam Ranh Bay may reap Vietnam greater strategic and economic benefits beyond the South China Sea. Besides being a major port of call for foreign navies, Cam Ranh’s new international status – to be developed into an international tourism, shipbuilding, and offshore engineering hub – gives Vietnam an added protective umbrella, similar to Singapore giving U.S. Navy access to Changi Naval Base.
Cam Ranh Bay is therefore more than just a bulwark of Hanoi's long-term response to Beijing in the South China Sea. In fact, it will serve as a shining showpiece and possibly a test-bed for its long-avowed foreign policy principles, on which Vietnam premises and nurtures its future stature as a credible regional actor.
