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BLUF: The OSS Is Back — In Name. The Hard Part Is the Authorities.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has given the Pentagon’s top special operations civilian the most storied name in American irregular warfare. Whether the new Office of Strategic Services becomes more than a rebrand — and how it coexists with a CIA that inherited the original OSS’s crown jewels — will be settled on Capitol Hill and in the field, not in a memo.

Bottom Line Up Front


•What changed: A Hegseth memo dated Nov. 2 and released Nov. 12 gives the Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASW(SO/LIC)) a new title — Assistant Secretary of War for the Office of Strategic Services — raises the post to parity with the service secretaries, and adds money, people and acquisition authority.

•What didn’t: Nothing in the memo touches Title 50, covert action, or the CIA’s statutory lane. The new “OSS” is a civilian oversight and resourcing office for special operations forces. It does not collect intelligence, run agents, or command troops.

•Why it still matters: The name evokes an organization that fused intelligence and special operations under one roof. That is precisely the line Washington drew between the Pentagon and the CIA after 1945.

What Hegseth Actually Did

Under the memo, the SO/LIC assistant secretary — currently Derrick Anderson — will be known as the Assistant Secretary of War for the Office of Strategic Services, ASW(OSS), and the statutory Secretariat for Special Operations becomes the “Office of Strategic Services” in all public use. Like the Department of War title itself, this is a secondary name: until Congress amends 10 U.S.C. § 139b, the legal designation stands.

The substance is in the plumbing. The memo places the post on equal footing with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force; reallocates at least $45 million a year to the office; adds 100 billets (75 civilian, 25 military); designates the assistant secretary as the principal civilian advisor and delegated official for special operations-peculiar acquisition, resources and equipment; directs the services to prioritize support to SOF, including replacing equipment lost in combat; and orders consolidated office space in the Pentagon. Hegseth also directed his legislative affairs staff to draft proposals creating a permanent Under Secretary of Strategic Services and writing the OSS name into law.

The rationale is resourcing. SOF funding, according to the memo, lags current operations and posture. “It is time for a bold, foundational change.” On X, Secretary Hegseth was more succinct: “The OSS is back.”

This is the latest chapter in a forty-year fight., and one I was a frequent witness to while serving for the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security during 2023-2025. Where doe CIA activities start and SOF acts end and how do we deconflict the overlap? Congress created U.S. Special Operations Command and the SO/LIC post in 1987 then repeatedly tried to give the civilian a service-secretary-like role — most notably in the 2017 NDAA. Acting Secretary Christopher Miller had SO/LIC report directly to him in late 2020; his successor partially walked that back, and by 2024 the GAO was reporting widespread confusion over the office’s authority and a secretariat that lacked control over its own hiring, space and IT. Hegseth’s memo is, in effect, the most forward leaning attempt yet to finish what Congress started.

The Original: Donovan’s “Glorious Amateurs”

The first OSS was born of a gap. In July 1941, with no central intelligence service, Franklin Roosevelt named William J. Donovan — a Wall Street lawyer and Medal of Honor recipient from the First World War — as Coordinator of Information (COI). On June 13, 1942, a presidential military order converted the COI into the Office of Strategic Services and placed it under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a dual mandate: collect and analyze strategic information, and conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies.

Donovan, modeling his creation loosely on Britain’s MI6 and Special Operations Executive, built something no American institution had attempted. At its peak the OSS had roughly 13,000 people organized into branches that still map onto today’s national security enterprise:

•Secret Intelligence (SI) ran agents behind enemy lines; Allen Dulles’s station in Bern penetrated the German government and negotiated the surrender of German forces in Italy (Operation Sunrise).

•X-2 conducted counterintelligence, working with the British to exploit ULTRA and turned agents.

•Research and Analysis (R&A) assembled historians, economists and geographers — the intellectual ancestor of all-source analysis which currently resides in CIA.

•Special Operations (SO) and the Operational Groups worked with resistance movements such as the three-man Jedburgh teams that parachuted into occupied France ahead of and after D-Day.

•Detachment 101 in Burma raised and led thousands of Kachin guerrillas against the Japanese — a template for unconventional warfare that Special Forces still teach.

•Morale Operations ran black propaganda, a forerunner of today’s psychological and information operations.

How the OSS Was Dismantled — and Who Got the Pieces

The OSS and its leader were controversial. President Roosevelt’s death removed Donovan’s patron. On Sept. 20, 1945, Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9621, and on Oct. 1 the OSS ceased to exist. Its pieces were scattered by function across the government and resulted in the creation of new organizations such as the CIA.

The postwar settlement deliberately separated the OSS’s two halves. Clandestine intelligence and covert political action went to a civilian agency answerable to the President; military special operations went to the uniformed services. Hegseth’s office inherits the name of the whole while holding the mandate of only one half.

Authorities: Title 10, Title 50 and the Line a Memo Can’t Move

It is tempting to frame this as a Title 10 vs. Title 50 contest. The statutory reality is more specific.

First, a Distinction Often Blurred: Covert vs. Clandestine

The two words are used interchangeably in headlines, but in law and doctrine they mean different things — and the difference determines who may act, who must approve, and which committees are told.

Clandestine describes an activity whose execution is hidden. The goal is that the adversary never learns the operation is happening. If it is discovered, the U.S. government may still acknowledge it. Espionage, a special reconnaissance team inserted behind enemy lines, or a submarine collecting signals off a hostile coast are clandestine. The Pentagon’s own dictionary puts the emphasis on concealing the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor.

Covert describes an activity whose sponsorship is hidden. The effects may be very visible — an election shaped, a militia armed, a pipeline sabotaged — but the U.S. role is meant to stay unacknowledged and plausibly deniable. By statute (50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)), covert action is activity to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad where the U.S. government’s role is not intended to be apparent or publicly acknowledged.

Clandestine (DOW and CIA)

Covert (CIA)

What is concealed

The operation itself

Who sponsored it

If exposed

U.S. can acknowledge it

U.S. role is meant to remain deniable

Typical examples

Intelligence collection, special reconnaissance, many SOF raids

Political influence, covert propaganda, arming proxies under deniable cover

Legal basis

Title 10 military authorities; Title 50 intelligence collection

Title 50 covert action statute

Approval

Normal chain of command / agency authority

Written presidential finding

Congressional notice

Armed services committees (sensitive military operations) or intelligence committees (collection)

Intelligence committees

The statute also carves out what covert action is not: traditional intelligence collection, traditional diplomatic and law-enforcement activity, and “traditional military activities” and routine support to them. That last exception is where most of the Title 10 vs. Title 50 argument actually lives. A clandestine SOF raid conducted under military command, as part of an anticipated or ongoing hostility, in which U.S. involvement will eventually be acknowledged, is generally treated as a traditional military activity — not covert action requiring a finding.

The 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound illustrates how blurry the line can get. It was executed by Navy SEALs but conducted under CIA direction and Title 50 authority — a covert action carried out by military operators — and then publicly acknowledged by the President within hours.

The original OSS did both, often under one roof. Jedburgh teams parachuted into France in uniform — clandestine insertion, acknowledged military combatants. The Morale Operations branch ran black propaganda whose American origin was meant never to be known — covert in the purest sense. When Truman broke up the OSS, the covert half eventually landed at the CIA; the uniformed, clandestine-but-acknowledgeable half became Special Forces. That division is exactly what the new name obscures.

Covert action belongs to the President, executed by default through CIA. Under 50 U.S.C. § 3093, covert action requires a written presidential finding and notification to the intelligence committees. Executive Order 12333 assigns its conduct to the CIA unless the President determines another component is more likely to achieve a particular objective. Nothing in a Secretary of War memo — and nothing in a renamed Pentagon office — alters that.

Military operations have their own lanes. The covert action statute excludes “traditional military activities” and routine support to them. Special operations forces already operate under a body of Title 10 authorities — support to surrogate forces for counterterrorism (10 U.S.C. § 127e), the Section 1202 authority for support to irregular warfare, and clandestine military activities subject to the sensitive military operations notification regime to the armed services committees. The new OSS doesn’t add to these; it oversees and resources the forces that use them.

The office is not an intelligence community element. Nothing in this memo discussed the Defense Intlligence Enterprise. The Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security maintains oversight, guidance and policy for Defense intelligence; DIA’s Defense Clandestine Service is not moving. The ASW(OSS) gains acquisition and budget authority over SOF-peculiar matters — Major Force Program 11 — not collection authority.

So, on paper, the CIA’s lanes are untouched. In practice, three pressure points deserve attention.

Where Friction Could Emerge

1. The “OSS 2.0” agenda. The concept is not a new idea. Since 1987, there have been pushes from the SOF community and from outside of it to redesignate and dramatically empower SO/LIC into a Department-level home for special operations and irregular warfare, to include ideas to relieve the CIA of paramilitary responsibilities. Hegseth’s memo stops well short of this vision. But an Under Secretary of Strategic Services — if Congress creates one — would be the natural institutional platform for the next step. Langley will read any legislative proposal closely for language touching paramilitary activity, irregular warfare policy coordination, or Title 50 support.

2. Field-level deconfliction. The CIA chief of station, as the chief of mission’s de facto if not in some case de jure senior intelligence advisor, has long been the gatekeeper for coordinating clandestine activity abroad, and SOF advocates have long chafed at what they see as an Agency veto on their actions. An office with service-secretary standing and an explicitly expansionist brand will push for a louder voice at the NSC and interagency tables where those coordination rules are set. With the Department running large-scale operations such as Operation Southern Spear in the Western Hemisphere, the questions of who leads, who supports and who notifies are not theoretical.

3. Congressional jurisdiction. SO/LIC answers to the armed services committees; covert action answers to the intelligence committees. An office named for the intelligence service that fathered the CIA will inevitably invite questions about which committees should see what. The intelligence committees will want assurance that “OSS” activities are not covert action under another name; the armed services committees will want the authorities they granted SO/LIC in 2017 finally exercised. A Congress that may change hands in January 2027 adds uncertainty to both.

What to Watch

•The legislative text. Does it amend only § 139b and the Title 10 succession provisions, or does it reach into Title 50, EO 12333 coordination, or irregular warfare policy authority?

•The FY2027 NDAA and appropriations. The $45 million and 100 billets are reallocations; durable change requires Congress to fund the office and protect it from the services.

•Paper on the interagency. Any revision to the DoD–CIA coordination agreements, or a new NSC directive on irregular warfare, would signal whether this is a rename or a realignment.

•SOCOM’s role. Elevating the civilian may sharpen oversight of SOCOM — or create friction with a combatant command accustomed to service-like independence.

The Verdict

There is a serious case for this change. Congress has spent nearly four decades trying to give special operations a civilian champion with real standing in the Pentagon’s budget fights. On the merits, Hegseth’s memo does more to fulfill congressional intent than anything since 2020.

But the name is a promise the office cannot yet keep, and arguably should not. Donovan’s OSS was powerful precisely because it combined secret intelligence, analysis and unconventional warfare under one director. America chose, deliberately, to take that apart in 1945–47 and put the clandestine half under civilian intelligence oversight. If the new OSS stays an advocate and overseer for the special operations community, the CIA has little to fear and SOF have much to gain. If the name becomes the down payment on recombining what Truman separated, that is a decision for the President and Congress to make openly.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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