Tehran has been playing a dangerous game of chicken with the U.S. administration for months. With the just concluded midterms now in hand, they risk making a dangerous miscalculation just when it matters most. This is unlikely to end well.
With the continuation of strikes this week against international shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, while simultaneously engaging in renewed negotiations, Tehran is poking the bear with one hand while feeding it with the other. This is a dangerous strategy; they could lose a hand… or worse.
The Iranian leadership is clearly trying to have it both ways. Equal parts emboldened and wary, with a hefty dose of economic reality rapidly bearing down upon them.
Tehran is and always has been a keen observer of American politics. This time, however, they appear to be overconfident, and potentially risk acting on a tragic misreading of the situation. This two-pronged strategy - continued taunting, both verbal and military, while offering to negotiate, sort of – appears to indicate they perceive a deep new vulnerability in their opponent given the historic drubbing the administration received in the midterms. That is possible, and the administration will certainly face harsh scrutiny over its handling of the war. But it is also possible that they are seeing a President Trump who is merely stunned and, if such a thing is possible… humbled, if only for the moment. But this humility is unlikely to last. The President retains primary control over U.S. foreign and military policy, and there are already reports of plans for massive new strikes if negotiations again fail, or the President becomes frustrated with Tehran’s usual stalling and stubbornness.
The President is already looking for a fall-guy within his administration for a failed, unpopular war, and the devastating impact on the midterms; with the odds-on favorite(s) being Secretary of Defense Hegseth and/or senior military leaders. He is almost certain to look for one outside his administration as well, with Iran the certain candidate for their unwillingness to accede to the President’s attempts at diplomacy pre-election. He has proven that he is nothing if not vengeful. At the same time, the President wants a deal and appears ready for one. Unless, that is, Tehran insists on rubbing his face in a less than optimal resolution. This risks a reaction that would serve no one.
Tehran’s hubris is legend. As is that of President Trump. When these meet head-to-head – hubris to hubris – the result is at best uncertain, and potentially disastrous.
In the end, the most likely conclusion remains a negotiated settlement. Iran has several advantages, including geography, proven resilience and staying power. And their just-concluded conclave with Russia is a new, ominous development that bodes ill. On the other hand, the U.S. administration may finally have an effective strategy in its naval/economic blockade. But this will take time, and it may no longer have the political runway to see it through.
Tehran should declare victory and allow the U.S. President to go home. Face-saving measures are essential for both sides to avoid the additional death and destruction that is sure to follow military escalation, by either side.
But this will not be the final bell. Tehran will be left to its own devices to face the enormous challenges of a shattered economy, a degraded environment, and a restive population.
This is not over by a long shot.
I am reposting portions of a previous post given their continued relevance
Iran Is “Counting Coup” On The United States!
“Iran is playing a very dangerous game. In the face of the awesome military power of the United States, in between desultory negotiating sessions, they continue to touch the enemy by launching attacks against U.S. and allied Gulf facilities. Recently, they have reached farther afield, striking U.S. assets in an Egyptian port. This would seem to be inexplicable behavior, given the U.S.’s obvious desire for a deal, inviting as it has strong retaliatory strikes against Iran’s increasingly beleaguered military, and potentially civilian, infrastructure. Most recently, we are seeing reports of possible Iranian cyberattacks on the water supplies of U.S. cities; such activities are certain to continue and likely to escalate, plausibly deniable and effective in sowing fear as they are. The question is why?”
“It may be simple hubris. It may be a misread of the desperation of their opponent. Or simply overconfidence in the strength of their position. It most certainly is part and parcel of a purposeful negotiating strategy, a reminder to all involved that Iranian forces can reach out and touch you whenever they wish.
Regardless, they are walking a fine line, and they have placed this conflict squarely in the crosshairs of unintended consequences.
As they so often do, they risk overreaching. Should one of these missile or drone strikes make it through, whether by luck or skill, and inflict truly significant casualties on U.S. personnel, either in a land-based facility or on a naval vessel for example, this could surge American support for a massive response, possibly including – however unlikely – ground troops, radically altering and escalating the course of this conflict.”
“The Iranian leadership’s actions, however, are likely aimed not only at the United States but may be the result of continued factional maneuvering in Tehran, as groups jockey for advantage for what comes next. Now that it appears likely the regime will survive, they are no doubt looking ahead to where they will land in a new regime. As both factions and individuals.”
As I wrote in ‘Is Iran Controlling the Gulf Conflict?’: “I would posit that the newly ascended Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, may in fact be a phantom leader. Alive in some fashion, perhaps largely incapacitated, but not actually in charge. And even if able to coherently express his views, in no way nearly as powerful or influential as his father. The seemingly reckless actions of the regime in courting U.S. retaliation may in actuality reflect a lack of a coherent decision-making process as opposed to a unified one. I think it is quite possible that competing factions within the regime are using Mojtaba as an avatar while they maneuver for decisive advantage.”
On 15 May, I laid out in “Ground Hog Day”, a recommended way forward for the U.S. that I think largely still applies. It is a measure of how fruitless continued military action is that these remain relevant today:
“Make a deal with Iran. One that they will accept. This will require painful concessions and is certain to include provisions that many will find objectionable, including significant sanctions relief. And it will leave the Iranian regime in place and in control of Iran. For now.”
“As much as I would prefer to see regime change in Iran, I believe a deal may be the only realistic way out of the Groundhog Day-like doom loop in which we find ourselves. Simply put, the administration squandered the initial opportunity presented by a unique confluence of events by its lack of strategic planning and a fundamental misunderstanding of Iran and the Iranian regime.”
“As a result, we are going to have to step back and take a longer view. I pity the people of Iran, at least in the near term. They are certain to suffer the brunt of the regime’s immediate ire. That is a hard truth.”
“This is not, however, the end of the story. Iran’s internal weaknesses still matter–and may shape what comes next more than battlefield successes. I am cautiously, very cautiously optimistic that even barring regime change, Iran’s leadership will be forced to change direction.”
“The issues facing Iran prior to the War were serious, in fact existential – a collapsing economy, hyper-inflation, severe water shortages, lack of electricity, and growing widespread popular anger and unrest – and are ongoing and only getting worse. Whatever the Iranian leadership looks like, it will have to address these issues. And it is not clear that they will be capable of doing this without outside help. This is where the U.S. and hopefully our Western allies come in: sanctions relief, and extensive economic and other assistance in exchange for real changes in policy and a pullback on objectionable activities and programs. The potential for this may, and I say may, have increased with the removal of Ali Khamenei from the Supreme Leader’s seat. But it will depend on whether his son and successor, Mojtaba, is less rigidly ideological than his father. We will see if he is willing to put the Iranian people ahead of the regime.”
It is becoming more obvious by the day that the U.S. needs to come to a negotiated settlement with Iran. And the terms of this settlement are certain to be painful and unsatisfactory from the perspective of the West. But continuing tit-for-tat airstrikes simply prolongs the pain and risks horrific unintended consequences without solving the problem, as well as providing the regime with a distraction from its appalling management of Iran’s economy, natural resources, and foreign policy.
An enraged and restive Iranian population awaits. Let the regime face, without fear or favor, the fruits of its mismanagement, leaving it to confront what it fears most: the streets. This is likely where genuine regime change will occur.
This article was originally published on Mark's Substack, which can be found here.
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